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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to examine CCF-CCL 
relations in the Saskatchewan public service during the 
early years of the government of Tommy Douglas. While much 
has been written about the Co-operative Commonwealth 
Federation (CCF) and the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL), 
both as separate organizations and as political 'allies', 
little has been said about their relations in Saskatchewan. 
Yet, the CCF formed the government in Saskatchewan for five 
consecutive terms between 1944 and 1964, and it was in this 
agrarian province that the true test of the CCF-CCL 
relationship occurred. Saskatchewan was the one location 
where unions that supported the CCF were faced with a social 
democratic government which was also their employer. The 
difficulty the two sides encountered while trying to 
reconcile industrial relations with their political 
relations forms the subject of this study. 
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis discusses the major developments in the 
often strained relations between public service unions and 
the provincial government in Saskatchewan. It is restricted 
to relations between the Co-operative Commonwealth 
Federation (CCF), Saskatchewan Section, and unions in the 
provincial public service affiliated with the Canadian 
Congress of Labour (CCL) because the new industrial 
relations system was created largely for their benefit, and 
their performance was important to the success of the CCF's 
industrialization and social welfare policies. In addition, 
the CCL as a national labour organization had endorsed the 
CCF as the 'political arm' of labour, and it was hoped that 
developments in Saskatchewan would inspire increased union 
support for the party in Ontario. The thesis therefore 
examines labour relations in Saskatchewan crown corporations 
from 1944 to 1956 with reference to the role of the CCF as 
the 'benefactor' and as the employer of labour; and the 
response of labour as employees and political supporters of 
the CCF.l 
Elected to office in June, 1944, the Saskatchewan CCF 
were well-aware that their 'beach-head' of socialism was 
extremely important to the fortunes of the party elsewhere, 
as everywhere but in Saskatchewan the party was dependent 
upon labour support. The provincial party was dependent, of 
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course, upon rural votes, but it could not resolve the 
farmers' main grievances, prices and oligopoly exploitation, 
which fell within the purview of the Dominion Government. 
The national party, on the other hand, could not act on the 
farmers' behalf without forming the government in Ottawa, 
and they needed labour's support in Ontario if they were to 
_be successful. 
The Canadian Congress of Labour co-operated with the 
CCF at the national and provincial levels to develop a 
broader organizational base, and although these efforts 
proved unsuccessful in Ontario, the political 'alliance' 
forged between the CCF and CCL at the national level 
informed the motives of the leaders of the party and 
industrial union movement, and help to explain their actions 
regarding industrial relations in Saskatchewan. 2 
The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (Saskatchewan 
Section) was a collection of agrarian reformers, radical 
trade unionists, and Christian idealists. Its ideology 
expressed the farmers' traditional demands for farm 
security, democratic government, and anti-monopoly populism; 
the Christian tradition of the 'social gospel'; and the 
Fabian socialism of unions int~rested in labour reform and a 
higher standard of living. In Saskatchewan, the CCF 
advocated a planned economy, socialized health services, 
improved labour legislation, social ownership of utilities 
and natural resources, and co-operative production and 
3 
distribution based upon human needs rather than profits. 3 
A small but militant labour organization, the CCL in 
Saskatchewan were the 'vanguard' of the provincial working 
class, and they repeatedly clashed with the social 
democratic CCF which represented an agrarian petit-bourgeois 
class of independent commodity producers. 4 The national CCL 
may have endorsed the CCF as labour's 'political arm', but 
in Saskatchewan the local unions approached the government 
as they would any other employer and their militancy caused 
friction with the CCF, alienating farmers, party members, 
and government bureaucrats. Once they acquired the power to 
protect themselves they built strong unions and bargained 
aggressively for improved wages and working conditions. 
Their first priority was trade unionism, and they were not 
easily persuaded to subordinate their economic goals to 
political considerations. 
Among other things, the Saskatchewan CCF was a farmers' 
party and the government reflected the views of the rural 
community, which throughout this period underwent changes as 
farm operations became larger and more mechanized. Farmers 
became more like businessmen in the generally prosperous 
post-war years, and their earlier radicalism declined as 
they gained a measure of economic security under the CCF. 
They came to resent their labour allies as a threat to their 
new found security, and because the provincial government 
could not raise farm incomes they were loath to see unions, 
4 
especially in the public service, gain wage increases while 
their incomes fluctuated. 
Although the government repeatedly stressed its desire 
to be a 'model' employer, its industrial relations practices 
differed little from those of a private employer, and the 
traditional antagonism of the labour-capital conflict was 
reproduced in the 'co-operative commonwealth'. Wages 
remained the central issue in virtually all disputes, and 
the CCF twice approached Congress with a 'social contract' 
covering wages, grievances and negotiations problems in the 
crown corporations. 
The 'social contract' was in essence a call for 
voluntary wage restraint, and the government had a good deal 
less trouble convincing Congress leaders in Ottawa of the 
need for co-operation, than it had with local unions which 
were more concerned with the regulation of wages through 
collective bargaining. The interests of provincial and 
national trade unionists diverged when local unions rejected 
the 'social contract', and Congress leaders had to intervene 
frequently to prevent strikes, encourage co-operation, and 
repair damages to CCF-CCL relations caused by repeated 
industrial relations conflict. 
Frequent labour relations problems in the crown 
corporations did not always erupt into open conflict, but 
were symptomatic of the conflict of interests between an 
overwhelmingly agrarian political party and the militant 
5 
union movement. Although there were many disputes between 
the government and its unions, there were only four strikes 
in government industries in the twelve years from 1944 to 
1956. Three strikes involved CCL unions; two were 'wildcat' 
strikes and the other a wage strike. 5 The clash of 
interests should not be overstated, however, as the new 
industrial relations system earned the CCF the consistent 
political support of the majority of the provincial labour 
movement. 
Collective bargaining problems did not alienate 
labour's political support from the CCF because expanded 
employment opportunities existed with the growth in public 
ownership, and the benefits of socialized medicine, better 
access to education, and the new collective bargaining 
system directly affected workers and their families. The 
labour movement, especially the CCL, was reluctant to see 
the benefits of the CCF government lost, and workers 
defended the new status guo in every provincial election 
because they feared a return of the Liberals would mean the 
elimination or drastic curtailment of the industrial 
relations system and the emerg ing welf are state. Thus, 
prior to provincial elections, industrial relations problems 
receded into the background as labour showed its gratitude 
for the CCF's reforms. 
The conflict generated in bargaining disputes was not 
easily overcome. Both sides expected the other to be 
6 
understanding, supportive, and generous in their industrial 
relations, but conflict between the CCF's declared 
intentions to be a 'model' employer and their actual 
practices fed union militancy; and the aggressive posture of 
union negotiators contrasted with their political support of 
the party. In addition to its role as an employer, the 
government remained the regulator of the industrial 
relations framework, but it could not successfully mediate 
disputes with its own employees because it would not compel 
itself to compromise, even where it was not a threat to 
their economic interests. In addition, personal conflict 
between provincial CCF and CCL leaders added an element of 
mistrust to their relationship, and relations deteriorated 
as they struggled over the profits of public industry. 
The story of relations between the CCL and the CCF is 
structured as follows: Chapter II briefly discusses the 
effects of depression and war on the provincial labour 
force, and the impact of Mackenzie King's industrial 
relations policies on the labour movement in Saskatchewan. 
Chapter III outlines the CCF's policies regarding incomes 
and unions in government operations, while Chapter IV 
examines the CCF's major legacy to the provincial labour 
movement - the Trade Union Act. Chapters V through VII deal 
with CCL-CCF relations in each of the three consecutive 
terms the CCF served as government from 1944 to 1956. 
Chapter V discusses the emerging problems in their 
7 
relationship from 1944 to 1948; Chapter VI covers the 
period 1948-1952 in which the government tried to gain union 
support for a 'social contract'; and Chapter VII examines 
relations from 1952 to 1956 in the aftermath of the CCF's 
failure to convince unions to support their incomes policy. 
Finally, Chapter VII provides a brief conclusion to the 
study of union-government relations in Saskatchewan from 
1944 to 1956. Endnotes can be found at the end of each 
chapter. 
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1. 'Public service' refers to all provincial government 
employees. 'Civil service' refers to the white-collar 
public servants organized into the SCSA-TLC. CCL workers 
were public employees organized for the most part within the 
crown corporations. The Trades and Labour Congress of 
Canada (TLC) unions are excluded because, with one notable 
exception, they were for the most part outside of the 
public service, and were therefore not as important to the 
financial success of the CCF's plans. Moreover, while the 
TLC was officially 'neutral' regarding politics, it had a 
long-standing relationship with the older parties, 
especially with the Liberals, and it was suspicious of the 
CCF because the latter was closely associated with its union 
rival, the CCL. The thesis ends in 1956 because in that 
year the TLC and CCL buried their differences and merged to 
form the Canadian Labour Congress. The subsequent merger of 
the provincial labour movement changed the nature of 
unionism in Saskatchewan and opened a new page in its 
history. 
2.Union support for the Saskatchewan CCF contrasted with the 
'poor' showing of the Ontario party, which remained far from 
the levers of power. The Ontario CCF lacked the effective 
party organization evident in Saskatchewan, and the 
continual struggles between the CCF and communists within 
the labour movement did not induce workers to favour one or 
the other of the socialist alternatives. Furthermore, 
Mackenzie King's welfare and labour reforms dulled the CCF's 
platform, and the post-war prosperity evident in Ontario 
especially, produced political complacency among unionists 
more concerned with 'bread and butter' issues of collective 
bargaining than with political philosophies. Moreover, the 
Ontario party could not offer workers much more than what 
they had already gained through their own efforts, and the 
widely-publicized strikes in government-owned industries in 
Saskatchewan may have suggested to Ontario workers that the 
CCF in power was not altogether different from other 
employers. The passage of collective bargaining legislation 
in Ontario and a federal labour code, and the emergence of 
the Rand Formula of union security (though in all cases 
inferior to Saskatchewan laws) reflected the success of the 
labour movement in forcing concessions from governments and 
employers in the immediate post-war per iod. Nevertheless, 
the electoral fortunes of the Ontario party, and 
particularly of the national CCF, were of the utmost concern 
to the Congress, and they worked closely with the CCF 
towards the goal of forming social democratic governments. 
3.The best treatment of the Saskatchewan CCF remains Seymour 
Lipset's, Agrarian Socialism, (Berkeley, 1971). See also: 
Hoffman, G., "The Saskatchewan Farmer-Labour Party, 1932­
1934: How Radical Was Its Origin?", Saskatchewan History, 
9 
28(2) 1975; Young, W.D., "M.J. Coldwell, the Making of a 
Social Democrat", Journal of Canadian Studies, IX (3) August 
1974; and, Brennan, J .W., (ed.), "Building the Co-operative 
Commonwealth", Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition 
in Canada, (Regina, 1985) 
4.See:Lipset, op.cit., Introduction, p.xv and xx-xxi; and 
MacPherson, C.B., Democracy in Alberta, (Toronto, 1962), 
Ch.VII 
5.The wage strike occurred in the Saskatchewan Government 
Insurance Office in 1948, and the 'wildcat' strikes erupted 
in the box factory in 1947 and the Saskatchewan Government 
Ai rways in 1951. A fou rth strike in government industry 
involved the the TLC-affiliated bus drivers in the 
Saskatchewan Transportation Company (STC) in 1953. On the 
STC strike, see: Public Archives of Canada (hereafter, PAC), 
Department of Labour Files, Strike and Lockout Series, RG27, 
Vol.500, Strike i83, for newspaper accounts of pickets in 
Prince Albert wearing "Vote Diefenbaker" signs as an 
expression of their dissatisfaction with the CCF. 
CHAPTER II
MACKENZIE KING AND LABOUR IN SASKATCHEWAN
When the CCF were elected to office on 15 June 1944, 
they inherited an impoverished, unindustrialized, 
overwhelmingly agrarian province. Prosperity depended upon 
two uncontrollable factors affecting the production of 
wheat, "crop yields (in a hazardous climate) and world 
rna rk et ing condi t ions (in a speculative trade) ... ".l The 
depression had hit hard in Saskatchewan as it was 
accompanied by a prolonged drought, and the province had 
been forced to maintain relief, on occasion, for more than 
one-half the population. Conditions "were nothing short of 
disastrous" during the depression, and the provincial 
government acquired an enormous debt supplying raw materials 
and operating costs for the wheat economy merely to maintain 
it in production.2 
When the drought lifted in 1939 and wheat prices slowly 
began to rise, the rehabilitation of farming commenced. If 
the agricultural recovery did not completely satisfy 
farmers' demands for higher prices, it allowed them the 
opportunity to leave the 'relief' rolls and address the 
accumulated problems of seed and tax liens, mortgage debts 
and farm foreclosures. The relative prosperity of the war 
years, however, did not produce security of tenure for 
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farmers, and in their agitation for higher prices they were 
joined by the CCF, which had spent a decade refining its 
political platform to attract the rural vote. The party had 
dropped its land socialization policy in favour of security 
of title, and restricted its nationalization policies to 
In addition, the CCFmonopolies and public utilities. 
promised to stop foreclosures, to force banks to restructure 
debts, and to order a debt moratorium, if necessary. While 
the party offered farmers a programme of economic security, 
increased social services, and improvements to the 'rural 
way of life', they concentrated their efforts during the war 
on the farmers' struggle for increased prices. However, 
unless the CCF were to form the national government, the 
provincial party could not effectively act on the farmers' 
main grievances, and to capture parliamentary power the CCF 
needed the support of Canadian labour. 
The provincial labour movement represented a minority 
of urban workers within a largely rural population.3 The 
agricultural economy engaged a larger proportion of the 
labour force than elsewhere in Canada, while a~so providing 
the least employment in manufacturing, mining or forestry.4 
Urban employment varied according to the fluctuations of the 
wheat economy as the cities were primarily distribution 
centres for the rural agricultural community. Forwarding, 
retailing and the service industries were the mainstay of 
the cities which had little commercial or industrial 
12 
activity independent of agriculture. Railway transportation 
and the wholesale trade absorbed the energies of the greater 
part of the urban population, and those industries which did 
develop were closely connected to the agricultural life of 
the province. 5 Union recognition and collective bargaining 
only occurred where workers were successful in asserting 
their collective power. Thus, unions of railway workers and 
of building trades workers were predominant within the 
labour movement. 
During the depression, the cities were hard pressed to 
deal effectively with the "enforced emigration" of unskilled 
labour from the drought-stricken "rural slums".6 The 
outlook for alternative employment in the cities was bleak; 
unemployment was high - over twenty per cent in 1933 - wages 
were low, and working conditions 'poor'.7 Union membership 
declined by one-third between 1930 and 1934, and even the 
railway unions, traditionally with the largest and most 
stable membership, suffered from the effects of the 
depression. 8 As it was for workers elsewhere in Canada, the 
'dirty thirties' was a time of weakness, and it was not 
until the depression began to ease that union organization 
recovered from its losses. 
As the drought lifted and the provincial economy 
recovered, unemployment declined to less than ten per cent, 
and by 1939, union membership had recovered from a 
depression low of approximately 6500, to an un~recedented
13 
10,254. When the war began union membership decreased owing 
to enlistment, but as the war economy further reduced 
unemployment membership grew, surpassing the 11,000 mark in 
1943.9 Yet, this achievement did not alter the fact that 
the province ranked second last in union membership, ahead 
of Prince Edward Island. Indeed, Hamilton and Quebec City 
each had more unionists than were in the whole of 
Saskatchewan. lO 
The economy of the family farm produced a paternalistic 
employer attitude similar in view to the 'small town' 
merchant class which was primarily concerned with immediate 
profits. The paternalism was based upon an ideology of 
independence and self-reliance, and found expression in the 
'master and servant' relationship of the farmer-employer and 
the 'hired hand'.II This relationship was reinforced by 
the provincial government, long dominated by the Liberal 
party, which proved reluctant to grant labour's requests, 
and equally hesitant about enforcing the legislation that 
was passed. Provincial labour legislation administered by 
the Bureau of Labour dealt mainly with workers' safety and 
the protection of wages, and there was little legislation 
dealing with employer-employee relations. l2 
Like other provinces, Saskatchewan relied upon the 
Dominion government to regulate disputes between employees 
and workers, and Mackenzie King's Industrial Disputes 
Investigation Act, 1907, (IDIA) was the dominant piece of 
14 
labour legislation affecting union organization and 
collective bargaining. 13 The Act provided for the 
compulsory investigation and conciliation of labour disputes 
in 'essential' public industries where those disputes 
threatened to erupt in a strike or lockout. The IDIA 
prohibited work'stoppages until an ad hoc conciliation board 
had investigated the dispute, reported on it, and a further 
two-week "cooling-off" period had elapsed. The process was 
lengthy but board recommendations were not binding and the 
Act relied upon publicity to persuade the recalcitrant side 
to abide by the findings. King believed that because de 
facto recognition and collective bargaining occurred while 
the board sat, that this would lead to voluntary employer 
acceptance of union recognition and collective bargaining. 
However, without compulsion employers had no reason to 
continue to negotiate with unions after the conciliation 
process had ended. The essential element of the IDIA was 
delay, and this invariably worked to the advantage of the 
employer who wished to resist unionization by allowing the 
opportunity to hire a more compliant labour force. The 
'cooling off' period often became a 'heating up' period, and 
the strike remained the best weapon labour had to resolve 
disputes. 
Union recognition was not guaranteed under the Act, and 
support for collective bargaining was incidental to the 
formal investigation and conciliation of labour disputes. 
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The policy of delay of work stoppages and the lack of an 
enforceable award exhausted and frustrated unions. The IDIA 
did not prevent strikes; it merely delayed them, and it 
proved to be an effective obstacle to union recognition and 
collective bargaining. 14 
In contrast to the Canadian emphasis on investigation 
and conciliation of disputes, which remained unaltered until 
late in the Second World War, the "New Deal" response of 
American legislators to the depression included a policy 
which guaranteed union 'rights'. The role of the American 
government under the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act L 
1935, was to make the process of union recognition and 
collective bargaining compulsory, and allow it to work 
unimpeded, with only incidental assistance from 
conciliation. At the core of the Wagner Act was the right 
to organize and bargain collectively, which was guaranteed 
by an administrative board (the National Labor Relations 
Board) empowered to certify unions, investigate charges of 
unfair labour practices, and order employers to comply with 
the law. The Wagner Act was a stimulus to union 
organization and industrial unionism in particular received 
a tremendous boost. IS 
Pressed by the Canadian labour movement, the provinces 
began to experiment with their own 'New Deal' legislation. 
However, the adoption of Wagner Act principles into 
provincial statutes was not accompanied with the necessary 
16 
administrative machinery for the enforcement of union 
'rights'. The new provincial laws were therefore completely 
without effect, and the IDIA dispute settlement policy 
remained intact. 16 
In Saskatchewan, the first provincial response to the 
"New Deal" was the passage of the Industrial Standards Act, 
1937, which allowed employers and employees within 
designated geographic 'zones' to meet in a conference and 
set a schedule regulating wages, hours and working 
conditions covering the 'zone'.17 In effect, the conference 
would reach a 'collective agreement' which would, if it met 
with the government's approval, become law. The Act proved 
to be difficult to enforce or administer, and it hindered 
unionization by producing apathy among workers who saw their 
wages set by law. 18 
The provincial labour movement called for a 
Saskatchewan Wagner Act, but when the government introduced 
a draft trade union bill in 1938, "there was an immediate 
howl raised by labour in all centres."19· There were no 
guarantees of union recognition or collectiv~ bargaining, 
'company unions' were allowed, if not encouraged, by the 
bill, and employers could resort to some intimidation of 
employees. 20 At best the bill was 'window dressing', at 
worst it was a step backwards in industrial relations. 
Despite labour demands for alterations, the bill was passed 
as The Freedom of Trade Union Association Act, 1938. 21 
17 
When the Second World War began, the federal government 
extended the jurisdiction of the IDIA to cover the vast 
majority of Canadian industry. Together with subsequent 
orders-in-council which imposed wage controls and government 
supervised strike votes, an ad hoc industrial relations 
system was created that continued to ignore the central 
problems of union recognition and collective bargaining. An 
order-in-council recommending but not compelling recognition 
and bargaining was not enough to convince employers to make 
concessions to the labour movement. The ad hoc emergency 
industrial relations system did not prevent industrial 
unrest, and the weakness of the IDIA became evident during 
the war when full employment conditions strengthened 
unionization drives. 22 As the system fumbled along during 
the war an unprecedented number of strikes occurred, mostly 
dealing with union security, which disrupted the war economy 
and demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the IDIA.23 
The provincial labour movment became increasingly 
disappointed with the government's record in labour 
matters. They complained about the lack of labour 
representation on boards and committees affecting them, 
particularly the Workmens' Compensation Board, and they 
demanded improved labour legislation and a department of 
labour. 24 Responding to increased demands of the labour 
movement, a private members' bill was introduced from the 
government benches which promised union recognition and 
18 
collective bargaining. Bill 51 was designed to repeal both 
the lOlA and the Freedom of Trade Union Association Act, and 
provide instead for union certification and compulsory 
collective bargaining. Compulsory conciliation and delay 
were carried over from the lOlA, but labour enthusiastically 
welcomed its trade union 'rights'. The Liberal Government, 
however, was not solidly behind the bill, and it was 
referred to the Select Standing Committee on Law Amendments, 
where employer opposition forced a commission of inquiry. 
Chaired by Chief Justice W.M. Martin, a former Liberal 
Premier of the province, the Commission on Employer-Employee 
Relations toured Saskatchewan in the summer of 1943 
accumulating evidence from employers, labour and the 
public. The Report of the Martin Commission was a 
disappointment for the labour movement for it rejected 
compulsory collective bargaining and endorsed the lOlA, 
especially its conciliation procedures. The Report 
recommended the province await changes at the federal level 
where a similar investigation was proceeding, and adopt a 
uniform policy.25 
The provincial labour movment did not have to wait long 
for changes in labour legislation. In an effort to end the 
extraordinary labour unrest and restore order to the war 
economy, and as a response to the rise in popularity of the 
CCF (and its apparent growing connections with organized 
labour), the federal Liberal Government in early 1944 passed 
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an order-in-council that temporarily suspended the IDIA and 
introduced a modified version of the Wagner Act principles. 
PC 1003, The wartime Labour Relations Regulations, appeared 
to 'guarantee', at least on a temporary basis while the war 
lasted, union recognition and collective bargaining. 26 
In Saskatchewan, the provincial Liberal Government 
passed The Labour Relations Act, 1944, which was essentially 
enabling legislation applying PC 1003 to all industry in the 
province. 27 Although the labour movment did not greet the 
Act with the same enthusiasm as it had Bill 51, they 
accepted it graciously as "half a loaf was better than no 
bread at all."28 
In reality, PC 1003 was designed to compel union 
recognition but not collective bargaining. Certification 
procedures were difficult, conciliation remained a lengthy 
process, and enforcement provisions were lacking. The 
Regulations created a wartime Labour Relations Board (vffiRB) 
that was empowered to certify bargaining agents and 
investigate charges of unfair labour practices, though few 
such practices were outlined. The strongest provisions of 
PC 1003 related to compulsory conciliation and delay of 
strike action which were carried over from the IDIA with an 
additional step added. 29 
The lack of a remedy for the refusal to bargain was a 
serious defect in PC 1003, and King's order-in-council 
represented 'collective bargaining if necessary, but not 
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necessarily collective bargaining'. PC 1003 did reduce 
labour unrest, however, as it eliminated many recognition 
disputes, and while collective agreements were reached 
between unions and employers, this represents employer 
acquiesence to the temporary nature of PC 1003, and the fact 
employers could not afford to lose production during a 
period of economic expansion. Moreover, because the tight 
labour market increased the power of labour, employers could 
not as easily resort to wholesale firings of a militant 
workforce. Thus, although PC 1003 reduced industrial 
unrest, it was only a temporary measure, and did not provide 
for real union security and collective bargaining. 
However deficient PC 1003 was in practice, it marked an 
advance for unions and appeared to point in the way of a 
national labour code, a long standing demand of organized 
labour. The granting of union recognition brought about a 
sharp decrease in strike activity and restored a semblance 
of order to the war economy, but it was not a stimulus to 
union organization because gains in membership occurred 
before its passage. Provisions for collective bargaining 
were weak, and it would take the re-emergence of militant 
strike action following the end of the war for labour to 
achieve more favourable trade union legislation. 30 
Adding to the unrest caused by the federal government's 
wartime restrictions on labour was a new, enthusiastic and 
militant industrial union organization, the Canadian 
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Congress of Labour (CCL). The CCL was created in 1940 when 
the All-Canadian Congress of Labour, led by Aaron Mosher and 
the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees (CBRE), merged 
with the growing industrial unions of the Congress of 
Industr ial Organizations (CIa). Owing to the tight labour 
market, the CCL were aggressively and successfully 
organizing workers in the mass production industries. 31 In 
Saskatchewan, the merger brought together the CBRE, United 
Mine Workers of America (UMWA), and United Packinghouse 
Workers of America (UPWA) locals. By 1944, the CCL 
represented close to 4000 workers, or about twenty per cent 
of the organized labour force in the province. 32 
The provincial labour movement was not satisfied with 
the temporary concessions granted by the Liberals, and the 
emergence of the CCL heralded a qualitative change in its 
composition. The young and aggressive CCL organizers added 
a militant voice to the cries of the provincial TLC for 
improvments to the industrial relations system. While there 
are many reasons for the defeat of the Patterson Government 
and the election of the CCF, the new mood ~f the labour 
movement, radicalized by its experiences of depression and 
war, was certainly a factor in the cities. 33 
Until the war, the CCF did not have an appeal for 
labour as the party devoted its energies to modifying its 
platform to please farmers. During the war, the provincia~
party began to interest labour when it produced a platform 
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which included union recognition, collective bargaining, 
consultation, and legislative reform. Full employment in 
peace-time was a declared goal of the CCF, and housing and 
medical programmes, along with increased pensions and a 
higher minimum wage were promised. 34 Although the CCF did 
not elaborate upon their labour platform, it appealed 
strongly to workers for it addressed many of their concerns. 
The Party's general appeal for the "unity" of the 
"producing classes" against their common enemies was 
attractive to farmers and workers who had the common bonds 
of the human misery of the depression on which to forge 
closer ties. 35 Farmers tended to sympathize with workers 
and unionists at that time because they realized that they 
were exploited by some of the same 'big interests'. 
Moreover, some agriculturalists had trade union experience 
in the 'old country', while many younger trade unionists 
retained strong family ties with the land. In addition, 
farm organizations had often copied the forms and framework 
of democratic unionism in their economic and political 
struggles. 
Both farmers and labour were attracted to the CCF 
during the war because the party offered the opportunity for 
them to redress their immediate grievances and reform 
society in their interests. The state was conceived as an 
"instrument of the community" based upon popular co~sent for 
agreed upon 'social ends',36 and the CCF successfully 
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CHAPTER III 
CCF INCOMES POLICY 
In average personal income, wage earners in 
Saskatchewan during the late nineteen-forties and early 
nineteen-fifties generally ranked fifth in comparison with 
the other provinces. The provincial labour force as a whole 
usually ranked fourth or fifth in the nation, though in good 
crop years it could rise to first, or just as quickly fall 
to last place during a crop failure. l The CCF's desire to 
strengthen and diversify the provincial economy rested upon 
the belief that a planned economy would stabilize 
agriculture and generate far more wealth, on a more 
equitable basis, than would capitalism. As manager of the 
provincial economy the CCF represented a 'public interest' 
in maintaining and expanding the relative prosperity of 
farmers, and a variety of farm security measures were 
passed to protect the 'home quarter' and reduce the rural 
debt load. Seed and fodder banks were established and 
supplies were stored in good years to prevent drought from 
once more ravaging the province. In addition, social 
services were expanded and socialized medical care extended, 
and a number of projects were initiated which were designed 
to bring the amenities of modern life to rural Saskatchewan. 
Included among CCF plans were: rural electrification, 
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highway upgrading, farm sewage, and municipal road paving 
programmes. Moreover, it was hoped that industrialization 
would simultaneously create a manufacturing outlet for 
agricultural products and an urban industrial population 
that would consume those products. 2 
To finance the programmes of industrialization and 
social services, the CCF embarked upon the socialization of 
public utilities and the creation or extension of crown 
corporations. The objectives of the crown corporations 
were to create profits, wages and revenues, and surpluses 
were expected to provide revenues for the treasury, wages 
for workers, and to finance the extension of desirable but 
unprofitable services to the public at a low cost. 3 
The provincial government, however, was faced with 
constitutional restraints on its fiscal powers and it could 
not therefore manipulate, control or socialize the major 
financial institutions. These restrictions of the 
capitalist economy led the CCF Government to conclude that 
private enterprise would remain the major investor and that 
consequently the government would have to adopt capitalistic 
practices in order to compete. 4 The profit motive underlay 
CCF industrial policies as surpluses were appropriated for 
the creation of the 'welfare state'. 
The government and its managerial personnel were 
primarily concerned with efficiency, productivity, and the 
financial success of public ownership, in order to create a 
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viable social democratic 'model' for a Canadian CCF state. 
They wanted a supportive and compliant labour force that 
would enable them to produce sufficient profits to finance 
the expansion of the co-operative commonwealth. 
Once the CCF had established the framework of the new 
industrial relations system, it faced the difficult problem 
of contract negotiations with its own employees. The CCF's 
wage policy begins with the League for Social Reconstruction 
which drafted a vague and contradictory policy that made 
wage determination dependent upon a combination of 
collective bargaining and state regulation. The state's 
interest in wages , the League argued, stemmed from the 
possibility that union demands could interfere with social 
services or capital development. The League's general 
principles of wage determination included the needs of 
workers; the capacity of industry to pay; and the 
maintenance of fair wage differentials. The policy was 
car r ied into the Regina Manifesto where it had an immense 
potential for conflict if the CCF were elected because 
unions would have increased power under a social democratic 
government. 5 
The Regina Manifesto promised labour a variety of 
reforms. The expansion of socialized industry and public 
works projects committed the CCF to increased production and 
employment. Unemployment and social insurance, together 
with socialized health services promised to alleviate 
---~----~---------~--- -
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workers' insecurity under capitalism and to maintain their 
standard of living. Improved industrial standards 
legislation and the progressive reduction in the hours of 
work were offered along with union recognition and 
collective bargaining as the means by which labour's 
standard of living would be raised. Yet, the document also 
memtioned State regulation of wages, almost in passing, and 
it included a vague reference to "work councils" and 
"industrial democracy" as part of labour's "right" to 
participate in the management of industry.6 
The CCF Government, in fact, rejected 'profit-sharing' 
and 'democratization' of factories. They. feared unions 
would continuously take on more power if given the 
opportunity, and would eventually be in the position to 
"pressure" the government at a later date. Instead, they 
desired a "new" role for unions in which they would co­
operate with management in building the 'co-operative 
commonwealth'.7 
The government's first efforts were directed towards 
increasing productivity, and incentive systems of wage 
payments and Labour-Management Production Committees (LMPC) 
were created • Incentive systems, long associated wi th the 
'speed-up' and other forms of exploitation, were rejected 
outright by local unions. The government believed the 
LMPC's could persuade workers to accept their "new role in 
society" because they were designed to provide management 
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with a forum to present the government's case for its role 
in defending the 'public interest' and to inform workers of 
their own role as consumers. 8 However, these committees 
met with union indifference and seldom functioned for long 
in the few instances in which they were employed. 
Unionists, on the other hand, expected the government 
to "lead the way" in paying better wages and to set an 
example of "ideal" working conditions and labour relations. 
This was especially important regarding wages, which was the 
most "basic need" to be met in satisfying labour's desires 
for a better standard of living. 9 Workers who had 
experienced unemployment, depression pay, and wartime wage 
restrictions, became frustrated with CCF bargaining and 
complained that the government was slow to begin 
negotiations, devoted little time to them, and that its 
negotiators wore government 'reins' on their authority to 
bargain. 
Government industries were not immune to the effects of 
inflation and wage demands increased making contract talks 
lengthy and intense as unions struggled to catch up with the 
rising cost of living. The CCF were pressed by farmers to 
control labour, and they responded initially by passing a 
Public Service Act which infringed upon collective 
agreements and gave wide powers to the Public Service 
Commissioner to set wages and working conditions. IO Despite 
the labour movement's persistent and ,detailed opposition to 
34 
statutory control over collective bargaining in the civil 
service, the Act was passed, and it was not until 1951 that 
the government agreed to amend the Act to give precedence to 
collective agreements over provisons of the Act. Between 
the formulation and enactment of the Act in 1945-47, and the 
1951 amendments, "what developed was a structure that was 
quite private enterprise oriented ••• " which became "securely 
imbedded" in the thinking of government managers and 
administrators, and among politicians. ll 
Confronted by militant wage bargaining in the public 
service, CCF planners created a three-tiered wage structure 
for workers in government enterprises. The "Minimum" wage 
was not to be confused with the legal minimum set by 
legislation, but would be a wage among the better wages; 
that is, approximately at the general wage level of the 
community. The 'first charge' on surpluses would be to 
raise the Minimum wage to the "Fair" wage, which 
corresponded to wages at the bottom of the cost of living 
range. "Good" wages corresponded with wages near the top of 
the cost of living range and would only be paid where there 
were sufficient surpluses; that is, only in monopoly 
industries. 
The general wage policy adopted by the CCF was that 
wages would be comparable to the best paid in a comparable 
industry. It was stressed, however, that wages had to be 
consistent with the economic structure of the industry, the 
\
--------,---~---------~--~~-
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operating position of each enterprise, and the relationship 
of the enterprise, the industry, and the provincial economy. 
The basic wage rate was determined by considering the 
cost of living, the capacity of the industry to pay, and 
local wage levels in the industry and community. The CCF 
tried to match wages with the cost of living, but would not 
allow wages out of proportion with industry or community 
levels. Between the Fair and the Good wages workers and the 
public would share the surplus, with employees receiving a 
diminishing share as they approached the Good wage. 
Therefore, workers in monopoly industries would not be 
allowed to receive a wage greatly in excess of the community 
or industry levels, and surpluses would go to the public 
with a small incentive retained for employees. 12 
The government also consistently refused to consider 
CCL wage demands when they felt conflicted with negotiations 
elsewhere in the public service, and in negotiating with 
their own unions on an annual basis, the government used 
wage settlements with the more timid white-collar public 
servants as the precedent for a uniform treatment of the 
demands of the more militant blue-collar workers in the 
CCL. 
In addition, they. stuck closely to wage determination 
in relation to wages paid in private industry, irrespective 
of whether the wages were good or bad, and in the final 
analysis wages were related to the community level, which 
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was generally lower than union rates, and which fluctuated 
according to the vagaries of the agricultural economy. At 
the best of times, the wage comparison policy kept unions in 
Saskatchewan a "whisker"13 ahead of other jurisdictions, but 
in periods of acute inflation when workers' wages lagged far 
behind the cost of living, or when the agricultural economy 
stagnated and wages were 'frozen', labour unrest, disputes 
and strikes resulted. 
The CCF's incomes policy was designed to maintain 
existing differentials within the provincial economy. Wage 
comparisons within the unionized work force were set in the 
context of agricultural incomes. As the economy expanded, 
comparisons allowed for marginal increases relative to the 
prosperity of farmers. When rural incomes suffered, the CCF 
argued that workers had to shoulder their share of the 
burden. The planned economy was designed to distribute 
proportionate shares of prosperity among the 'producers'. 
When the agricultural economy slowed and wage 'freezes' 
were instituted by the government, unions argued that the 
policy was unfair because it hurt them without benefitting 
the farmers. 
By the end of the CCF's first term in office they had 
created a new industrial relations framework for 
Saskatchewan, and had formulated a labour policy for crown 
corporations. The CCF had deviated from the traditional 
roles of governments and employers when they encouraged 
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unionization and welcomed collective bargaining, and they 
expected labour's gratitude to be shown through voluntary 
wage restraint. As a self-proclaimed 'model' employer, 
however, the CCF Government was not always "Simon Pure"14 in 
its labour relations, and its declaration of 'solidarity' 
with workers was contradicted by its 'bottom-line' 
comparable wage policy. The economic fluctuations of 
inflation and stagnation created militant union demands and 
farmer hostility to organized labour, and the adversarial 
collective bargaining system produced bitterness and 
suspicion between the government and CCL unions. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SASKATCHEWAN TRADE UNION ACT OF 1944 
The CCF were elected at a time when governments in 
Canada were moving towards state intervention to promote 
union recognition and collective bargaining. Politicians 
became aware through the increasing conflict in the wartime 
economy that legislation establishing a rough equilibrium of 
forces in the labour-capital conflict was necessary if the 
'industrial peace' and economic stability were to be 
achieved. The CCF viewed the industrial relations balance 
of power as being heavily weighted in favour of employers, 
and they promised to redress the imbalance and to replace 
the conflict of interests under capitalism with a 'co­
operative commonwealth' in which the profit motive would be 
supplanted by harmonious employer-employee relations in a 
system of 'production for use'.l 
The Saskatchewan CCF went further than other 
jurisdictions in establishing an industrial relations 
framework which gave encouragement and protection to union 
organization as a means to counter the superior employer 
power in the workplace. In accordance with their election 
promises, and in addition to trade union and collective 
bargaining legislation, other labour laws were enacted or 
amended promising better minimum standards relating to 
41 
health and safety, vacations, hours of work, and wages. The 
CCF government even extended full trade union rights to 
their own public servants and when it expanded public 
ownership, the government quickly became the largest 
industrial employer in the province, with a highly skilled, 
unionized work force organized by the Canadian Congress of 
Labour. 
The CCF enacted or amended labour legislation to the 
benefit of organized and unorganized labour, and a 
Department of Labour was created with a Minister of Labour 
in charge to oversee the effective functioning of the new 
industrial relations system. The minimum wage was raised to 
the highest level in the country; the Workmen's Compensation 
Act was overhauled to increase benefits and provide for 
labour representation on the Board; the apprenticeship 
system was rationalized; and various 'industrial standards' 
legislation was improved and more vigorously enforced. The 
government introduced two weeks' paid annual vacations for 
all provincial workers, though the promised enactment of the 
forty-hour work week (without a reduction ,in pay) was 
delayed pending the expiry of the federal government's 
emergency wartime powers. 
Undoubtedly, the most important legislation passed was 
the Trade Union Act which granted workers union recognition 
and collective bargaining rights on terms unsurpassed by 
other jurisdictions "in the democratic capitalist world."2 
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ference, and this was the 'sieve' through which all 
organizations were strained to protect bona fide trade 
unionism. 4 
A seven member Labour Relations Board (LRB) was created 
with an 'impartial' chairman and equal representation from 
employees, employers and the public. The Board was 
empowered to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and 
to certify the appropriate trade union representing the 
majority of workers. 5 
Once certified, the union became the exclusive 
representative of the employees and the employer was 
compelled to deal with it. Collective bargaining was 
defined so that employers were actually forced to deal with 
the legitimate representatives of the workers and not merely 
go through the motions. The Act compelled employers to 
bargain in 'good faith', to put the terms in writing, to 
sign the agreement, and to deal with the union in adjusting 
grievances. Failure to do so constituted an unfair labour 
practice. 
In addition, it was compulsory to include maintenance 
of membership (union security) and dues 'check off' clauses 
if so requested by the union. These clauses were written 
into the Act so there would be no dispute as to wording, 
and failure on the part of the employer to include those 
provisions as requested by a union constituted an unfair 
labour practice. Since union security and the dues check 
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off were the "universal" request of labour at this time it 
was a foregone conclusion that these provisions of the Act 
would be included in all collective agreements in the 
province. 6 
To ensure the law would be obeyed, LRB orders were to 
be filed with the courts, which made them enforceable as 
judgments or orders of the court; and disobedience thus 
became contempt of court. This method of enforcement was 
more "flexible and formidable" than police court actions, 
and was remedial, not simply punitive. 7 The Board had the 
additional powers to determine the admissibility of evidence 
before it, and in court cases, to decide for the court 
whether or not the Board's orders had been complied with. 
A number of forms of employer interference in the 
formation or administration of bona fide trade unionism were 
outlawed, including "yellow dog" contracts and industrial 
espionage. One of the most common forms of employer 
interference was the ubiquitous 'company union'. Such 
company-dominated organizations were specifically excluded 
from the definition of a trade union, and they were subject 
to 'disestablishment' by the Board as an unfair labour 
practice. Of course, employers were forbidden to 
discriminate against union supporters, activists or 
organizers, and the LRB could order the reinstatement with 
reimbursement of any employee wrongfully dismissed. As a 
last resort, the Board could apply to the Cabinet for the 
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appointment of a controller to take over a business where 
the Board could demonstrate the employer had "wilfully 
disregarded" Board orders. This section was used late in 
1945 when a particularly intransigent employer refused to 
abide by the Board's decisions certifying a union in his 
plant. This action by the government, although it was the 
only time the section was invoked, was a dramatic 
demonstration to workers of the the CCF's intentions tb see 
labour's new rights enforced. 8 
Finally, in marked contrast to the fundamental policy 
of compulsory conciliation and delay embodied in the lDlA 
and PC 1003, the Trade Union Act created an 'elastic' 
conciliation procedure. Conciliation was treated very 
briefly and it was left to the Minister of Labour to make 
the regulations concerning the details. The cumbersome 
steps to a conciliation board common to King's system were 
eliminated, and although formal conciliation boards were 
easily created, the informal conciliation process was far 
more active and effective, and relatively few boards were 
created. With the implementation of the Trade Union Act, 
Saskatchewan became the only jurisdiction in the country 
without some form of compulsory conciliation or 
arbitration. 9 
The Trade Union Act effectively guaranteed workers' 
freedoms to organize and bargain collectively, and it forced 
anti-union employers to recognize and deal with unions in 
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Saskatchewan. Brewin knew the Act would be attacked for its 
'bias' because it placed numerous stringent restrictions on 
employer behavior, while defining only two unfair labour 
practices by unions. Unions were prohibited from striking 
while a matter was before the Board, and they were forbidden 
to use intimidation or force in organizing a bargaining 
unit. Thus, the Act was designed specifically to protect 
workers. "Employers do not require protection in their 
relations with employees, as they have generally held the 
whip hand.", Brewin told the government, and he was quite 
certain that unions would not abuse their position because 
they would be well aware that it might invite a 'public 
opinion' in favour of the withdrawl of the protection 
afforded them by the Act. Therefore, he concluded, unions 
would need no other incentive to act responsibly.lO 
The powers of the Labour Relations Board became the 
focus of employer opposition to the Trade Union Act. 
Despite the stringent measures in the Act designed to thwart 
employer resistance to unionization, and despite Section 15 
which denied appeals of Board orders, the courts made it 
quite clear that they would review Board decisions. For the 
Labour Relations Board, the threat of court interference 
meant they would administer the new rules in a cautious 
manner regarding legal technicalities. This led to delays 
in the certification process which upset union organizers, 
but for Board Chairman W.K. (Ken) Bryden, the delays were 
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necessary if they were to prevent an endless series of court 
actions launched by employers. "The Trade Union Act has 
from the start been viciously opposed by the vested 
interests", Bryden wrote CCL president A.R. (Aaron) Mosher, 
" •••Moreover, the Courts, as you know, are traditionally on 
the side of the vested interests, and in Saskatchewan we 
have an exceptionally biassed and ignorant gang of Judges 
who are bitterly opposed to the Labour Relations Board." 
Bryden assured Mosher that the government was prepared to 
test the Act in the courts, and amend it where necessary. 
Most court cases involved employer attacks on Board powers 
relating to unfair labour practices, bu~ despite the 
opposition of the provincial judiciary, superior courts 
upheld the powers of the Board, and while appeals of Board 
decisions were allowed, the substance of the Act was not 
altered. ll 
The initial flurry of legislative reform created a new 
industrial relations framework which greatly increased the 
power and significance of the provincial industrial union 
movement. The labour movement responded to the guarantees 
of the Act with an unprecedented organizing drive, and 
unionized workers increased from sixteen per cent in 1946 to 
over twenty-five per cent of the non-agricultural workforce 
ten year slate r. Union membership grew dramatically from 
approximately 11,000 in 1944 to over 42,000 by 1956, with 
the bulk of organizing taking place during the CCF's first 
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term in office. From 1944 to 1948, the TLC doubled in size 
and the CCL grew by over 150 per cent, and although 
organizational gains slowed after 1948, union membership 
continued to rise throughout this period. 12 
Representing over one-half the total union membership 
in Saskatchewan, the TLC continued to be the largest union 
organization in the province, but the CCL grew rapidly from 
less than 4000 members in 1944 to nearly 15,000 by 1956. 
Owing to the CCF's policies of public ownership, which made 
them the largest industrial employer, government employees 
constituted roughly one-quarter of all unionized workers in 
the province. Concentrated in the blue-collar crown 
corporations, the CCL came to represent about one-half of 
the provincial public service, and government workers 
represented approximately forty per cent of their total 
membership.13 Although they represented but one-third of 
organized labour in the province, the CCL were far more 
militant than the TLC, and they were involved in forty of 
the 81 strikes that occurred between 1944 and 1956. 14 
Aggressive bargaining by CCL organizers won them few 
friends in the CCF, and the government became obdurate when 
facing the militant actions of the unions' chief negotiator, 
C.G. (Cy) Palmer, eCL Regional Director of Organization in 
Saskatchewan. A hard-nosed trade unionist and a skilled 
negotiator, Palmer was a somewhat enigmatic union organizer 
who was respected by his colleagues and rank-and-file 
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unionists. To the government, however, Palmer was as 
disruptive of CCF-CCL relations as the Minister of Labour, 
C.C. (Charlie) Williams proved to be in the Department of 
Labour, and like Williams, he was often at the centre of 
conflict. 15 
The industrial union movement had continuous access to 
the government through direct and indirect means at the 
local and national levels, and they approached the 
government annually with briefs on the need for legislative 
change, or to prevent unwanted changes. 16 Through the 
Deputy Minister of Labour or the Premier, but not through 
the Minister of Labour, whose antipathy to the eCL was well­
known, they could attempt to influence events surrounding 
legislation, or disputes and strikes in crown corporations. 
In addition, through the national leadership of the CCL 
which had close relations with both the national and 
provincial CCF, the unions could likewise attempt to resolve 
legislative or industrial relations conflict. When these 
avenues of influence proved unproductive~ unions tried to 
influence the provincial party through their direct 
involvement in it. That they were not more successful 
within the party was owing partly to labour relations 
tensions, and partly to personal conflict with the Minister 
of Labour. 
Undoubtedly the Trade Union Act benefitted workers in 
the province and it was one of the major reasons behind the 
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continued political support shown the CCF by provincial 
unionists. The labour movement, however, did not receive 
all the other favourable legislation promised by the CCF, 
and one of their highest priorities (and a CCF campaign 
promise), the forty hour workweek, was consistently denied 
by the government owing to party opposition to it. 
Following the initial reforms, the two sides remained far 
apart on legislative matters, and the "hiatus ft in labour 
reform frustrated unionists. l ? In fact, further CCF 
initiatives on labour reform consisted of threats to 
introduce compulsory arbitration and to weaken 'union 
security'. These threats resulted from the central problem 
facing the government as an employer - wages. Moreover, 
conflict between CCL representatives and the Minister of 
Labour cast a shadow over CCL-CCF relations in the province. 
In fact, before the Trade Union Act was introduced into the 
Legislature, the CCL clashed with Williams over his 
appointment and the organization of the civil service. 
Thus, prior to the implementation of the Trade Union Act, 
CCL-CCF relations were strained by personal conflict with 
the Minister of Labour. 
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Under the maintenance of membership clause, employees not 
members of the union at the time of the agreement.were not 
forced to join the union, but new employees had to sign up 
within thirty days. Union security as a condition of 
employment strengthened the unions by preventing continual 
employer opposition even after the union had been certified 
and collective bargaining had taken place. The dues 'check 
off' freed union officials from the mundane and often 
difficult task of dues collection, and allowed them to 
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There are four main types of union security agreements: the 
"closed shop", in which employees must be union members to 
be hired; the "union shop", in which employees are given 30 
days to become union members and must thereafter maintain 
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Saskatchewan Trade Union Act provision for union security 
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employers were opposed to all the legislative initiatives of 
the CCF in labour matters, including changes to the minimum 
wage, workmens' compensation, and hours of work laws. 
Employers favoured PC 1003 and repeatedly demanded that the 
Trade Union Act be brought in line with it. Throughout this 
period, employers called for compulsory certification votes, 
compulsory strike votes and compulsory conciliation. See: 
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Aaron f4:osher (1881-1959) led the largest union of 
transport workers in the country, the Canadian Brotherhood 
of Railway Employees (CBRE) from its founding in 1908 until 
1952. An exponent of labour nationalism, he helped create 
the All-Canadian Congress of Labour (ACCL) in 1927, and 
served as its president until the ACCL merged with the 
Canadian branches of Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(CIO) unions in 1940, whereupon he became the first, and 
only, president of the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL­
CIO). Mosher was also a founding member of the CCF in 1932, 
but the uproar in the TLC-dominated Canadian labour movement 
caused by his relationship with the new party forced him to 
relinquish his executive position in the CCF. He 
ne~ertheless represented a powerful pro-CCF leader within 
the the Congress, and was "an important figure in the 
emerging CCF-CCL relations in Saskatchewan. 
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a rough idea of the distribution of CCL workers in 
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CHAPTER V
THE TONE IS SET
1944-1948
Relations between the CCF government and the CCL in 
Saskatchewan began on an ignominous note. Clashes between 
the Minister of Labour and the industrial unionists left the 
CCL without much influence within the new Department of 
Labour, and cost them the opportunity to capture the civil 
servants as a bargaining unit and thereby challenge the TLC 
for supremacy within the provincial labour movement. 
Relations were somewhat strained after this initial 
confrontation and mutual suspicions prevailed. Once granted 
the power to protect themselves, the unions in government 
industries were not averse to using their strength against 
the government in its role as an employer. Tough government 
bargaining meant that contract negotiations were long and 
drawn out affairs, with each side blaming the other for the 
frustrating delays in settlement. 
Militant industrial unionism alienated the CCF's rural 
electorate who began to view the CCL as greedy and ungrate­
ful, and they pressed the government to control labour. 
Caught between the conflicting demands of farmers and 
labour, the government approached Congress for an 
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understanding on wages and other industrial relations 
problems. l They desired to make their socialism work and 
they wanted unions to be more sympathetic to their economic 
problems. The CCF convinced the Congress to agree to a 
broad outline of a wage policy, but this agreement at the 
top was not reflected at the bottom where the adversarial 
collective bargaining system had estranged unions from their 
employer. Outside assistance was necessary to settle some 
disputes, and David Lewis and Pat Conroy were often 
instrumental in achieving agreements. Negotiations became 
increasingly tense, but attention was diverted by the 1948 
election, and collective bargaining problems were delayed 
until after the campaign. 
As Saskatchewan's first Minister of Labour Charlie 
Williams was involved in the passage of much labour 
legislation beneficial to provincial workers. The CCF 
granted a number of reforms but as a former railwayman 
Williams was most proud of improvements to the Workmens' 
Compensation laws. On the other hand, his involvement with 
the Trade Union Act apart from guiding it through the 
Legislature was negligible, and like-many rural Members of 
the Legislative Assembly (MLA's) he may not have understood 
1't • 2 
Despite the flurry of reforms, Williams was at best a 
'passive' labour minister who did not press labour's 
concerns in Cabinet, and he in fact twice sponsored 
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compulsory arbitration legislation for unions in public 
utilities. 3 He had difficulty explaining matters in caucus, 
while in the Legislature he was often easily "harpooned" by 
the opposition. 4 Essentially, Williams was prepared to 
accept the status guo and wanted things in his department to 
run "quietly and low key", and he apparently did not press 
for the enforcement of labour laws passed by the 
government. 5 
The appointment of C.C. (Charlie) Williams as Minister 
of Labour angered CCL trade unionists in Saskatchewan. 
Local eCL representatives questioned Williams' ability and 
opposed him because he was not 'left' enough. 6 Unfortunate­
ly, Premier Douglas had few choices in his caucus for the 
new ministerial post. Of the forty-seven CCF MLA's, only 
six men had labour backgrounds, and few had Williams' 
experience in politics. 7 He had been a popular mayor of 
Regina before his election to the Legislature, and had 
enjoyed considerable support from businessmen who regarded 
him as an unlikely "threat" to their interests. 8 At the 
time of his election, he knew little of th~ legislative 
needs of labour, and basically, "was not a radical person."9 
His pro-labour views, if indeed he had any, favoured the 
conservative craft unions, and he was suspicious of the 
militant CCL. 
H.S. (Hub) Elkin, one of the leading CCL organizers in 
the province, complained that Williams' had not been, "near 
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a union since the last war", and in any event, as a train 
dispatcher had been closer to management than labour. IO 
Williams' pro-AFL-TLC views were known, or at least 
suspected, by the industrial unionists, which caused them 
some concern. "It appears", he wrote," that this man is one 
of those amiable well-met fellows who doesn't know or do 
anything, [and] never offends anyone if he can avoid it."ll 
The appointment of J.H. (Harry) Williams (no relation) 
as Deputy Minister of Labour only increased their alarm. He 
had served as Minimum Wage Inspector in the old Bureau of 
Labour under the former Liberal administration, and had 
performed, "the government's dirty work" in .preventing the 
CCL from organizing in the province in the late 1930's and 
early 1940's.12 The appointments dismayed local CCL 
unionists who had expected to be rewarded for their 
political support during the election. In neither case was 
the labour movement consulted and CCL representatives became 
bitter when Douglas "sluffed" their complaint onto the 
advisory committee. 13 
Other ministers shared Williams' distaste for the CCL, 
and there were rumours they were encouraging the TLC because 
they feared the more militant industrial unions. Faced with 
the Williams 'twins', the CCL's initial enthusiasm over the 
election of a pro-labour government was dampened 
considerably. Rather than exulting in the CCF's victory, 
Elkin concluded, "The situation is certainly not good 
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McAuslane, a former coal-miner, and Congress first 
vice-president in charge of organization. 19 His style and 
tactics bore the marks of his years in the turbulent 
coal-fields of western Canada, and his abrasiveness quickly 
earned him a position as persona non grata with the CCF. He 
was perhaps an unfortunate choice to be sent to the one area 
where the most was expected, and he was an unlikely 
candidate to approach the timid civil servants for 
unionization. 20 
When McAuslane arrived in Regina in early August, 1944, 
armed with the belief that the CCF would actively support 
the CCL's organizing drive within the civil service, he was 
puzzled to discover that Williams declared the government 
neutral on the issue of the unionization of their workers. 
The CCL had not been neutral politically, and he expected 
the same treatment from the CCF. Moreover, the Minister of 
Labour had shocked McAuslane by advising him to direct the 
CCL's organizing drive away from the civil servants; "which 
was not a wise thing to have said."2l 
McAuslane had clearly not expected the government to 
react in this way, and he denounced Williams and warned 
organizers to beware of the minister and the government. At 
a conference called to lay the groundwork for a provincial 
labour federation, McAuslane let it be known where they 
stood, "Our programme and position in this respect should be 
made clear to Premier Douglas and the Cabinet, that we in 
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the CCL that [have] designated ••• the CCF as the political 
arm of labour, should have representation in the Department 
of Labour."22 He then led another delegation to the 
government, and again Williams' resignation was demanded, 
this time much more forcefully. "Nothing could have been 
better calculated to make future bad relations between the 
Minister and the CCL ... " , lamented Douglas. 23 
By instructing the CCL to steer clear of the civil 
servants, Williams had reacted as a private employer might 
have, and displayed remarkable insensitivity to the 
political relationship of the party and industrial unionism. 
Apparently excluded from the important positions in the 
Department of Labour, and disillusioned by the fact that 
they had not even been consulted on the controversial 
appointments, the CCL eyed the government with some 
suspicion. 
Douglas arranged for Williams to meet Congress 
officials in Ottawa in late August in an attempt to reach an 
understanding. Aware of his minister's anti-CCL views, he 
contacted David Lewis, national secretary of the CCF, and 
asked him to meet beforehand with Pat Conroy, "and put him 
straight on a few things."24 Douglas was angry because the 
CCL were in a minority position in the labour movement, and 
few of their unions had affiliated with the party. Their 
attack on the minister did not help their cause, and made it 
difficult for him to aid Congress. Moreover, ,McAuslane 
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alienated the Premier by his continual reference to the 
deputy minister as a 'labour rat', and Douglas hoped to have 
him replaced be~ause he was, "to say the least, tactless and 
offensive."25 
Douglas was not intimidated by McAuslane's tactics, nor 
was he concerned that McAuslane's hostility would harm the 
political welfare of the government. "We have a solid basis 
of support whatever the CCL does .•• ", he wrote Lewis. 26 
If the CCL wanted a "showdown", declared Douglas, they could 
have it; "with the communists running the show and McAuslane 
charging about like a bull in a china shop the CCL is well 
on its way to committing hari kari in Saskatchewan."27 
Lewis readily agreed to the Premier's request and also 
accompanied Williams to the meeting. However, he informed 
Douglas that while there were communists working for the CCL 
in Saskatchewan, they were hardly running the show, and that 
most of the complaints emanated from the CCF's own 
supporters in the labour movement.28 
Lewis sympathized with the Congress, hOe told Douglas, 
because the ministers' remarks were, "a very c9mmon refrain 
which union organizers hear sung frequently."29 The 
resentment in this case was even stronger because it was the 
'designated arm of labour' that was singing the tune, and 
Lewis was not especially sanguine when he viewed the 
probable future of labour relations in Saskatchewan. 
Williams had bluntly informed him that he favoured the AFL; 
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"I would strongly gather that he shows that partiality and 
that he has given grounds for the CCL people to sense it.", 
he told Douglas, "In other words his actions and tone 
have contradicted his formal declaration of neutrality." 
This was bound to lead to conflict, and without the proper 
(i.e., CCL) support in the Department of Labour the 
government was likely to have considerable problems in the 
future. Lewis placed the problem squarely on the shoulders 
of Charlie Williams, ".•. 1 have seldom met a man", he wrote, 
"less adequately equipped for an important job such as he 
has . .•. I really don't think he has as yet a conception of 
what the CCF approach to the labor programme is." He 
emphasized to the Premier that the "tone and attitude" shown 
to labour organizers, and the government's political 
commitment to assist in organizing, were in practice, "even 
more important than the best legislation." The Minister's 
mistakes, he warned, were "darn hard to overcome and 
outlive."30 
The Congress was not about to complain too vociferously 
as it was anxious to use the promised trade union 
legislation during the upcoming national conventions of the 
CCL and TLC, and Lewis convinced them that the government 
had to be neutral regarding the unionization of their 
workers. Congress refused to replace McAuslane but they 
were not totally pleased with his tactics, and he was 
ordered to apologize to the Premier. 31 Their organizers 
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were ordered not to criticize the government before it had 
enacted its labour and social programmes; and instructions 
to adopt a more "businesslike" approach included a warning 
not to expect the CCF to be partial to them. "The 
government cannot do our work of organizing", Conroy 
declared, "they can only provide what we believe to be fit 
and proper mediums to enable us to do a good job. The 
government cannot, and must not, be held responsible for 
work which we in our Congress can do."32 
Mutual suspicions remained and relations were strained 
by this early conflict.33 Owing to the mediation of David 
Lewis, however, the initial controversies were settled, and 
as the summer turned to fall, the Congress still expected to 
capture the civil service. The addition of thousands of 
government workers would mean the ceL could rival the TLC in 
numbers in the province, a prospect that was naturally 
exciting for the newer and smaller Congress. Yet the tone 
was set for future relations between the Congress locals and 
Charlie Williams, and despite the agreement in Ottawa, 
relations continued to deteriorate in Saskatchewan. 
The organization of the civil service took place in an 
"atmosphere of great acrimony".34 The Saskatchewan 
Government Services Association {SGSA} represented the 
largest bloc of potential unionists in the province and the 
TLC and CCL competed vigorously for this "prize".35 The 
SGSA was not a bargaining agency, but a fraternal 
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organization, and many civil servants were somewhat 
"perturbed" at having to make a decision to join a union. 36 
They viewed themselves as white-collar semi-professionals, 
and were unlikely to be sympathetic to unionism, especially 
the militant, industrial, blue-collar variety. The CCL, 
furthermore, were closely and publicly associated with the 
radical political party that was now their employer. 
Government encouragement to the TLC and McAuslane's 
tactics combined to prevent the CCL seizing the opportunity 
to certify the civil service as a bargaining unit. 
McAuslane's first act was to "declare open war" on the 
Saskatchewan Government Services Association (SGSA) 
executive, which he attacked as undemocratic. 37 When the 
SGSA called a meeting for the evening of August 31, 1944, to 
discuss unionization, McAuslane organized his own meeting 
for the same evening at the same time. In promoting the CCL 
sponsored meeting, he again attacked the SGSA as 
undemocratic, and denounced it for not being a bona fide 
employee organization. 
While McAuslane was waving the "big stick", the TLC was 
offering "friendly assistance" to the SGSA in "warding off 
the attacks" of the CCL.38 Carl Berg, TLC organizer for 
western Canada, pledged not to interfere with members' 
religious or political beliefs, promised lower dues, and 
vowed not to alter the structure of the SGSA if it 
affiliated. Berg made "considerable capital" out of the 
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CCL'S political position, and contrasted the TLC's 
patriotism with the subversive wartime "industrial strife" 
caused by the CCL.39 
The TLC position contrasted with that of McAuslane, who 
had not performed any organizational work, but who instead 
attacked the SGSA openly and vigorously, prompting the civil 
servants to seek, "a safe hiding place from the storm."40 
Civil servants who knew little about unionism and less about 
the CCL were easily intimidated by McAuslane's tactics and 
readily accepted the TLC's message. Under pressure to make 
a decision, the SGSA altered its constitution to include 
collective bargaining as one of its goals, and was accepted 
by the TLC. McAuslane's tactics backfired on the CCL and 
played into the hands of its rival. Not easily discouraged, 
he still believed they could win a certification vote and he 
encouraged the CCL representatives to continue their 
tireless organizational efforts. 
One of the first things McAuslane had done when he 
arrived in the province was to appointC.G.(Cy) Palmer as 
the CCL's Regional Director for Organization for 
Saskatchewan. Palmer was a newcomer to the CCL and his 
appointment, "alarmed, disturbed and annoyed" the other CCL 
representatives. He was an acerbic negotiator, and 
politically somewhat of a syndicalist, and he did not 
believe unions should be "beholden" to any political 
party.4l However, he was an able organizer and despite 
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government opposition, successfully organized the telephone 
workers and the provincial mental hospitals, though these 
victories did not come easily. 
At the North Battleford mental hospital, for example, 
the local liaison provided to the CCL by Douglas refused to 
compromise his position by supporting their organizing 
drive. His instructions from Charlie Williams via the local 
MLA, Alex Connon, were to aid the TLC-AFL. "There are a 
number of other instances of double-dealing on the part of 
the Minister of Labour.", complained McAuslane," .•• it is 
quite obvious that his press statements of neutrality and 
his continual condemnation of our organization as 
communistic, have only been a smoke screen to cover up his 
association with the A.F. of L.".42 Palmer was nonetheless 
confident they would overcome the government's opposition, 
and succeed despite difficulties in organizing the civil 
service, which was, Palmer alleged, dominated by "Liberal 
heelers".43 Open sympathy for a union opposed by the 
Liberal Party was impossible because workers had no 
guarantee the CCF would be in power forever, "and the 
Liberal Party is likely to retain a good memory!~44 Yet, 
like McAuslane, Palmer believed workers would support the 
eCL in a secret ballot, and his success in organizing some 
government workers appeared to be a harbinger of greater 
things to come. Palmer approached the Premier asking for 
recognition of his locals, but Douglas politely refused 
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until the trade union bill had been passed. 
By the opening of the Tenth Legislature, relations 
appeared calm, but this was owing more to distractions than 
to any positive improvements. The government was busily 
engaged in preparations for the upcoming session, while the 
labour movement was preoccupied with organizing the 
unorganized. Underneath the calm, the effects of the 
initial "clash of personalities" still simmered.45 
Government discrimination in favour of the TLC alienated the 
CCL unionists further, and the lack of a man on the inside 
of the Department of Labour increased their sense of 
isolation. 
By December, Palmer had become worried over their lack 
of further success among the bulk of the civil servants, and 
he again approached the government hoping to secure 
recognition for his locals. He hoped they could gain an 
edge on the TLC by negotiating good contracts, which would 
demonstrate the superiority of the CCL and convince the 
reluctant civil servants to join. However, Acting Premier 
Clarence Fines refused until the Labour Relations Board 
(LRB) had been created and had determined the bargaining 
units. 
Nevertheless, in early 1945, before the Board had 
decided the issue of bargaining units, Fines granted the 
Saskatchewan Civil Service Association (SCSA), as it was now 
known, the dues "check-off". Granting de facto recognition 
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before the Labour Relations Board had dealt with the matter 
was a flagrant violation of the government's declared 
neutrality. Coming as it did before a federal election, 
Congress viewed it as "political dynamite". Eamon Park, 
Director of the CCL's Political Action Committee (PAC), 
admonished Lewis, "We can't afford to have anyone pointing 
the finger at the only CCF Government in the country."46 
Fines' decision enraged the eCL and further embittered 
them to the government, and renewed calls were made for a 
man "on the inside" to counter the weight of the TLC within 
the Department of Labour. 47 Extremely disappointed with the 
government, the CCL was resigned to losing the SCSA. 
McAuslane was undeterred, however, and maintained they could 
win a certification vote, despite repeated warnings from the 
CCL representatives on the LRB that all they could count 
upon were Palmer's modest successes. Stubbornly, McAuslane 
pressed for a single vote in which the SCSA would be 
excluded, yet this was exactly what the TLC desired because 
in a straight two-union vote they would have "snowed under" 
the CCL. 48 
On the strength of the TLC's submission which 
demonstrated eighty per cent support from the workers, the 
Labour Relations Board certified the SCSA-TLC without a 
vote. 49 MCAuslane's tactics alienated the timid civil 
servants who affiliated with the TLC, which claimed a 
'proper' and 'distant' relationship with the CCF government, 
65 
and the vote was a serious blow to the provincial CCL as it 
ensured the organizational dominance of the TLC in 
Saskatchewan. McAuslane was furious at the outcome of the 
vote and Palmer's locals appealed to the Premier, whose 
intervention, in camera and in public before the Board, 
resulted in a separate vote for the CCL locals, which won 
certification. Thus, while Cabinet support for the TLC was 
also a factor in the TLC's successful bid to 'capture' the 
civil service, without the support of the Premier the entire 
group would have gone to the TLC.50 
Following on the heels of the appointments controversy, 
the civil service 'fiasco' further estranged the CCL from 
the government. Without support in the Department of 
Labour, and with the loss of the civil servants, the CCL 
appeared in 1945 to be isolated from the government, and 
they were deeply suspicious of Williams and Fines. 
The civil service problem was just one of the many 
applications that swamped the Labour Relations Board in its 
initial years. The protection afforded unionism by the 
Trade Union Act "astounded" the labour movement, and the 
deluge of certification appl~cations created a backlog. 51 
Denied the fruits of their political alliance, the CCL 
organized in earnest within the government industries that 
were created or extended by the CCF during their first term 
in office. By 1948, they had successfully organi~ed workers 
in Government Telephones and the provincial mental 
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hospitals; in the brick, leather, wool, box, and sodium 
sulphate factories; and in the Timber Board, Government 
Airways, the Insurance Office and the Power Commission. 
The CCL unions organized in the crown corporations were 
directly-chartered locals of the Congress. As such, they 
were less independent of the Congress leadership than were 
locals of the major international unions affiliated to the 
central Congress. Thus, negotiations between the directly­
chartered unions in the crown corporations and the 
government were by the CCL's Regional Director for 
Organization, Cy Palmer. 
Once unions had squeezed through the bottleneck at the 
LRB, they were faced with a government reluctant to grant 
wage increases. A number of disputes occurred and increas­
ingly strike threats were heard in negotiations, though only 
one wage strike actually took place. In the socialized 
industries, wage strikes were prevented through conciliation 
and the outside mediation of David Lewis, and especially 
through the direct intervention of Pat Conroy. 
Lengthy negotiations irritated the new unions, and 
there were grumblings in" 1945 that stalled talks were the 
fault of government officials who appeared to be more 
powerful and who were successfully blocking progress. 52 
Another irritating situation occurred in the 
government-owned boot and shoe factory where a "reactionary" 
plant superintendent attempted to stall certification 
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procedure by circulating an anti-union petition and 
threatening to close the plant rather than see it 
unionized. 53 The LRB rectified the situation, and although 
it was a minor incident, it did not improve the government's 
image with the CCL. The bottleneck in the LRB, bureaucratic 
interference, and hard bargaining by the CCF frustrated the 
unions, and did not dispel the friction between the 
government and its newly organized industrial workers. 
Despite the early problems, the government was quite 
pleased with its labour relations. W.K.(Ken) Bryden, the 
new Deputy Minister of Labour and Chairman of the Labour 
Relations Board, boasted enthusiastically that their union 
contracts were, "the very best, in the whole of Canada."54 
The unions did not view their contracts in the same light 
and the 1946 negotiations were more difficult to settle than 
the previous year. Tensions increased and each side blamed 
the other for obstructing settlements. 
During the CCF's first term in office, the provincial 
economy passed through a two year slump o~ing to a decline 
in agricultural income. 55 The situation improved after 
1946, and unemployment decreased as the farm economy 
recovered. 56 Under wartime controls wages had been exempted 
from collective bargaining, and the awarding of cost of 
living bonuses left most workers at or near depression 
wages. 57 
Wartime wage controls were carried over to the end of 
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1946, and labour's income had risen, if only slightly, after 
1944 as workers in government industries were forced to 
accept modest cost-of-living bonuses. This nevertheless 
antagonized farmers, who had seen their income drop, and the 
government soon felt the stings of complaints from their 
rural constituency. Douglas was unhappy that the unions 
appeared ungrateful for their labour legislation, "The 
Government of Saskatchewan has gone a great deal further 
than public sentiment in this province would warrant in 
pushing the organization of its own employees.", he told 
Conroy, "We have signed agreements ••• for which we have 
received a good deal of criticism because it is considered 
in some quarters that the terms •.• have been altogether too 
generous."58 The long and frustrating negotiations left the 
unions disenchanted also, and Conroy warned Douglas of the 
"smouldering discontent" among government workers. 59 
Adding to friction in CCF-CCL relations was the 
question of the forty hour week, promised by the CCF in 
1944, but not implemented despite the repeated demands of 
both the CCL and TLC. The party had in fact endorsed the 
forty hour work week (without a reduction in pay) at its 
1945 provincial convention, but it was rejected by the 
caucus during the 1946 session of the Legislature, owing to 
farmer and employer opposition. The labour movement became 
qu i te frustrated and 'disappointed wi th the government for 
its refusal to honour the 'promise'. 
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Inflation exacerbated wage negotiations in 1947 and a 
confidential government report on the hours issue 
recommended approval as it was believed that a reduced work 
week could be substituted for wage demands, with a 
substantial savings on labour costs in the long run. It was 
also argued that the government could escape political 
embarrassment for its refusal to act on ther issue, but the 
caucus was not convinced, and the forty hour week was again 
rejected. 
Pressed by its rural supporters to control labour, the 
CCF began an attempt to control wage negotiations in the 
public service. The government's draft Public Service Act 
threatened to take wages, seniority and other contractual 
items out of the realm of collective bargaining. The Act 
met with considerable CCL and TLC opposition owing to its 
infringement on collective bargaining, and the wide-ranging 
and arbitrary powers granted to the Public Service 
Commissioner regarding the setting of wages and working 
conditions. The labour movement was given short notice of 
the government's intention to pass the Act, and it appeared 
to unionists that the CCF wished to rush through the 
legislation to prevent their opposition to it. The CCF also 
brought in wage 'experts' to formulate a wage classification 
system, which was anathema to trade unions. Had the 
situation arisen in private industry, Conroy told the 
Premier, "a work stoppage would have ensued some time 
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ago."60 This attempt to regulate negotiations threatened 
traditional collective bargaining practices and antagonized 
the unions. Congress was quite annoyed and Conroy wished 
the CCF would act as an employer and not as the government 
and settle wage classifications through negotiations. 61 
Once they had established their classification system, 
the government placed SCSA negotiations ahead of those with 
the CCL, and had then insisted on "uniformity of 
treatment".62 This only served to strengthen the CCL's 
resolve to struggle more intensely for better contracts, 
and it was not long before they decided to learn from their 
mistakes and attempt another assault on the SCSA. Hoping to 
build upon a rumoured split in the Association, Conroy 
instructed Palmer to lay solid organizational groundwork, 
"so that we may lift the organization bodily into the 
Congress at the appropriate time."63 Conroy knew the 
government would not like their approach, but the SCSA 
"guise" as a trade union was a distinct "menace" to CCL 
unions because of its low standards. 64 
From 1944 to 1946, inflation had risen only 7.5 per 
cent under federal price controls. When price controls were 
lifted and wages restored to collective bargaining, 
inflation jumped to fifteen per cent in 1947 alone. 65 For 
the labour movement, inflation wiped out whatever hopes they 
had entertained about the post-war recovery, and the result 
was a strike wave. Government unions were not exempt from 
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the pressures of inflation and negotiations became 
increasingly difficult to settle in 1947. Pressed by its 
rural supporters to control labour, they approached Congress 
unions through the SFL for an understanding. The government 
was concerned with the financial performance of the crown 
companies, distressed by their frustrating labour relations, 
and unhappy the CCL were not more sympathetic. "We have 
done so much for labour; we think labour should do more for 
us."66 
The government had expected CCL support on labour 
relations, but instead received opposition. Union 
organizers tended to treat the government as they would "the 
most recalcitrant employer" and they were upset that the 
unions would not make concessions based on the government's 
general pro-labour position. 67 The CCF asked the unions to 
agree to apply "planning" to their relations in an effort to 
improve negotiations, and they hoped regular discussions 
would provide a basis for future contract talks in which 
uniform agreements would make for more co-operation. 
Essentially the CCF desired to change the adversarial system 
of bargaining to a new "pattern" which would be more 
sympathetic to their position. 68 In essence, it was an 
attempt at a 'social contract' on wages, and the government 
expected union support. 
The SFL declined the government's initiative because 
such policy matters were the concern of Congress and the 
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individual unions involved.69 With inflation making 
negotiations even more difficult, the CCF anxiously 
approached the Congress for an understanding on labour 
relations in government industries. Mosher, who was more 
sympathetic to the CCF than Conroy, urged the 
secretary-treasurer to travel to Regina to lay the ground­
work. In Conroy's view, their unions were merely pursuing 
the same function as unions throughout the country. "In 
fact," he wrote SFL executive secretary Bill Davies, "I 
think it is important that the government be made to 
understand that the first function of our representatives is 
to represent the workers."70 
On June S, 1947, Conroy arrived in Regina ostensibly 
on a routine trip into the field. He intended to establish 
a better liaison with the government as he was a "firm 
believer" in personal contacts. 71 The next day, as was the 
"custom", he paid his respects to the government while 
"passing through" the provincial capital. 72 At the meeting, 
he raised the issue of 'poor' wages and also commented 
unfavourably on the CCF's "employer" attitude, but the two 
sides agreed to establish a permanent joint committee on 
labour-management relations in the five competitve 
government plants. 73 
The two sides agreed that the first effort was to 
"streamline negotiations" by drafting a Master Agreement for 
general terms to be applied in all five contracts. 74 In 
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return for Congress agreement, the CCF "committed" itself to 
the highest wages possible, and agreed to the elimination of 
wage ranges. 75 However, the CCF warned improvements in the 
basic rate could only be achieved in stages. The government 
stated that wages would be consistent with the cost of 
living, but this was qualified by the economic peculiarities 
of each plant, and the relationship of the plant to the 
industry and to the provincial economy as a whole. The 
government insisted strongly that their capacity to pay and 
local wage levels be considered paramount. 76 
Conroy returned to Ottawa believing the discussion had 
"cleared the air" and he was confident that regular 
discussions would develop into a "genuine working 
partnership", and that plans for a Master Agreement would 
improve negotiations. 77 The government's Chief Executive 
Officer in charge of the crown corporations, George Cadbury, 
was not pleased with the outcome of the June meeting, 
however. He had expected more sympathy from Congress, but 
was instead confronted with Conroy's defence of the unions 
and his comments on the CCF's 'poor' employer attitudes. 
Don Black, of the Industrial Development Office, visited 
Conroy in Ottawa to convey Cadbury's extreme 
dissatisfaction. Conroy countered Black's complaints about 
Congress representatives with "a few choice observations" on 
government personnel, after which Black became "apologetic" 
and asked for Congress help in resolving negotiation 
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difficulties. 78 The exchange worried ConroYi "something has 
gone wrong somewhere", he told Palmer. 79 
The CCF expected sympathy from unions in contract talks 
simply because the government was generally pro-labour and 
Cadbury was disappointed that Congress had not renounced its 
adversarial collective bargaining policy and become more 
accommodating to the government's position. The CCF's 
industrial relations system, however, was based on adver­
sarial bargaining, and Cadbury's capitalistic premises for 
the operation of the crown corporations precluded an easy 
settlement of their differences. Cadbury had set his 
expectations too high, considering the opposing interests of 
unions and management, the suspicions held by the unions 
about the government's policies, and wage conflict in 
negotiations which had increased tensions between the two 
parties. 
Cadbury should have been as optimistic as Conroy 
because the creation of the joint committee showed the 
unions' willingness to begin co-operation on labour 
matters. The SFL believed Cadbury to be ~prematurely
pessimistic" owing to his lack of knowledge on labour 
relations. "It is no use for Mr. Cadbury to be disappointed 
because matters have not resolved themselves in a twinking 
of an eye.", Davies wrote Conroy.80 
Before the joint committee could meet again, problems 
arose in two government plants, and relations took a 
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downward turn. Competition from large eastern capitalists, 
outdated machinery, 'poor' marketing and business 
resistance, plagued the government's attempts to diversify 
the economy and manufacture provincial resources. As the 
CCF sought to prove the success of their socialist 
experiments in industry, their labour policies became a 
barrier to improved industrial relations. The government's 
bargaining tactics and resistance to wage increases 
conflicted with their call for union 'solidarity' and 
exacerbated tensions in their relations with the CCL. 
For the local unions, the June meeting had solved 
little and their negotiations were merely a "repetition" of 
what they had already gone through. 81 The woolen mill was a 
case in point. Before it was closed in 1954 after losing 
$800,000, the mill had turned a profit only once, in 1947. 82 
The government was reluctant that year to grant the union's 
demands for a twenty cent increase on a basic rate of 
fifty-seven cents per hour. 83 The union was adamant and 
demanded conciliation, and there was talk of strike action. 
Although the government's wages compared favourably 
with the best in the industry, "sweatshop" wages were hardly 
justifiable by the CCP's fair wage philosophy. Congress 
contacted the national CCF to explain the situation, and 
informed Lewis "in confidence" that the union was 
contemplating strike action. Conroy wished to avoid a 
strike owing to the political consequences and the 
76 
"unpleasantness to the Government, and to the relationship 
between the CCL and CCF •.. ". He asked the government 
through Lewis to delay negotiations until he could arrive in 
Regina to take over the discussions. 84 
Lewis informed Cadbury of the problem and lectured him 
on the government's substandard wages. He warned Cadbury 
that the CCF would find it impossible to defend the 
government anywhere in the country, 
••• it is recognized throughout Canada, 
and the CCF has for years hammered on 
the fact, that the textile industry in 
this country is one of depressed 
wages ••.• In fact, if you ask any even 
superficial student of this question in 
Canada, to name the three lowest paid 
industries in the country, he would name 
tobacco, textiles and shoe and 
leather. 8S 
Cadbury, however, did not believe he could convince the 
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"shareholders" to pay much higher wages. Prices were 
dropping and he felt the electorate would not long tolerate 
subsidization. While Conroy successfully negotiated a 
settlement and prevented open conflict, the dispute 
reflected a basic weakness in the CCF's wage policy. 
Comparable wages tended to keep unionized wages low, because 
the competition was largely unorganized. 
While the wage dispute was occurring in the woolen 
mill, relations in the box factory deteriorated. Wage 
problems, poor quality goods and inefficient production 
hindered the performance of the socialized factory. In 
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twelve years of goverment operation the factory recorded 
only three surpluses, the first in 1947. Management was 
eager to make a profit after the government had confiscated 
the plant from the reactionary former owner and wages were a 
"very contentious point" at the factory.87 A 'speed-up' had 
been instituted and the problems of poor resources, old 
machinery, and an inefficient plant layout were not address­
ed. 
In May, 1947, three employees were fired on charges of 
poor workmanship, malingering and performing 'work' while on 
paid sick leave. All were experienced, long-time employees, 
and despite the union's protests, the company would only 
reinstate the worker accused of malingering. The union set 
a deadline for the reinstatement of the other men for 
Friday, JUly 25, and when the company ignored their demands, 
the workers punched in for the morning shift, and then sat 
down. 88 A meeting of the factory's Board of Directors was 
taking place in Prince Albert at the time, and the Chairman, 
Minister of Natural Resources, J.L. (Joe) Phelps, instructed 
the manager to order them back to work and to fire those who 
were not willing. The men refused to comply and were 
discharged. The union asked Congress for strike 
authorization so they could set up pickets, and the SFL 
contemplated a strike fund, but Congress denied both 
requests because it was not an authorized strike. 89 
Provincial Treasurer Clarence Fines was particularly 
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upset at the 'wildcat' strike and condemned the workers for 
engaging in "sabotage" for "political purposes".90 The 
press made much of the government's embarrassment at having 
been shown to be little better than private employers. The 
Regina Leader-Post crowed, " ••• what is sauce for the goose 
is sauce for the gander", and newspapers across Canada 
played up the strike. 91 
The rank and file of the union were opposed to 
arbitration, preferring a complete investigation of plant 
operations, but Deputy Labour Minister Ken Bryden and SFL 
executive secretary Bill Davies continued to work for a 
settlement, and it was finally agreed that the government 
would call off the lockout if the union would call off the 
strike. All workers would be reinstated except those three 
originally discharged, whose case would go to arbitration. 
Phelps agreed, but at the last minute as Bryden and Davies 
were preparing to travel to Prince Albert, he reversed 
himself. Wanting to maximize the CCL's embarrassment at 
having gone on strike while the CCF were in convention in 
Saskatoon, Charlie Williams had advised Phelps not to settle 
on the agreed basis. Williams prohibited Bryden from 
leaving for the factory and the dispute dragged on over the 
weekend.92 
The dispute was finally settled and work resumed on 
August 4, with the dismissals referred to arbitration and an 
outside commission created to investigate the plant's 
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operations. A labour-management production committee was 
established in the factory to' encourage co-operation, but 
"Jolting Joe" Phelps declared soon after that- he would close 
the plant within three months if it did not get out of the 
red. 93 
The threat of a strike in the woolen mill, and the 
wildcat strike in the box factory embarrassed the government 
and annoyed the CCF members. The strike in particular 
tarnished the government's image as a "model" employer, and 
the wage dispute further alienated party opinion of labour. 
The two incidents hindered developments in the joint 
committee, and when it was reconvened after the box factory 
had resumed operations, there was considerable discussion 
over its scope and purpose. Its failure to prevent the two 
incidents is understandable given that it had met only once, 
but for further progress to be made in labour relations, the 
committee would have to expand its scope. Most of the 
August 6 meeting was spent trying to find a basis for 
discussion, but they finally agreed to investigate dispute 
and grievance machinery to prevent the reccure~ce of public 
conflict. 94 
The two incidents "very much perturbed" the government. 
Douglas began to suspect the joint committee was not up to 
the task it faced, and he pushed for a higher level meeting 
with Congress in order to re-establish co-operation on a 
firmer basis. 95 The Saskatchewan CCF, the national CCF, and 
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Congress agreed to meet in Toronto in early September, 1947, 
and the government began to formulate its wage policy which 
it hoped would be the basis for a 'social contract' with 
Congress on labour relations in government industry. 
Embarrassed by labour turmoil and upset over wage 
bargaining problems, the government reluctantly decided it 
was faced with "maintaining its position in Saskatchewan and 
retaining the good-will of the CCL."96 Representing the 
"public's interest", the CCF had repeatedly clashed with 
unions that were protecting the interests of their members. 
This conflict was inevitable, but the CCF hoped, not 
insurmountable, and they still expected a re~sonable degree 
of understanding from labour on industrial relations 
problems, given their similar social and political 
objectives. These objectives, however, were not central to 
their bargaining relationship in which economic factors were 
paramount. The CCF's plans for the province were extensive 
and its industrial relations policies were designed to 
maximize profits, which clashed with union interests in a 
higher standard of living. 
The government realized that while their wages compared 
favourably with private industry, "•.• it could hardly be 
denied that the wages we pay are, in many cases, difficult 
to live on."97 Their desire for a formula to prevent labour 
unrest was hindered by these poor wages, which did not 
reflect favourably on a pro-labour government, and 
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subsequent negotiation problems precluded rank and file 
sympathy for the government's position. 'Solidarity' of 
long-term interests did not satisfy the short-term interests 
of unions seeking to maintain or increase their members' 
standard of living. The government continued on with its 
goal of convincing labour that wages had to conform to the 
economic circumstances in which the crown companies found 
themselves. However,it proved easier to persuade Congress 
than the unions in Saskatchewan that co-operation should 
prevail. 
Before the CCF went east, they attempted to convince 
the unions, through their representatives on the joint 
committee, that a general agreement on wage policy was 
necessary. Warning Palmer that without CCL co-operation the 
government might introduce a policy unilaterally, Bryden 
told the Regional Director, 
It is suggested that if the Government 
and the CCL discussed in private their 
respective problems and objectives 
regarding wages the result would be a 
much greater degree of mutual 
understanding and perhaps even a 
substantial degree of agreement on 
fundamental principles of wage policy. 
This would eliminate the interminable 
poker playing and resultant friction at 
present in individual negotiations. 98 
He denied such a wage agreement would interfere in 
collective bargaining unless it was conceived of as, "a 
perpetual state of open or covert warfare, and not as a 
rational process designed to establish a firm basis of good 
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relations between management and employees."99 However, the 
CCL's previous experiences with the government did not 
incline the unions to Bryden's position. 
Bryden outlined to Palmer the policy of the "Minimum", 
the "Fair" and the "Good" wage, but emphasized the 
government's ability to pay would be paramount. The 
problem was to weigh industry and provincial wage levels and 
the cost of living, and achieve some type of uniformity 
within government operations. If the government were to 
initiate the policy, the problem remained how to distribute 
the surpluses between the workers and the public. They 
would grant a "living wage", Bryden assured Palmer, but who 
was to get the "lion's share" proved contentious. The 
government would not allow workers to receive wages "out of 
all proportion to wages paid to other workers in the 
community ..• ", and the public would receive an increasing 
share of the surpluses as contributions to the treasury, or 
in the form of reduced prices. IOO Palmer rejected the 
government's proposal which lent urgency to the CCF's 
upcoming meeting in Toronto. 
Wage issues dominated the Toronto meeting as they tried 
to reach an agreement. 101 The government pledged to pay a 
minimum that would be an adequate living, even if it meant 
subsidization, which in the case of the troubled crown 
enterprises was a certainty; and Congress agreed to the 
division of surpluses giving the public the greater share as 
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"dividends". The meeting adjourned with an agreement that 
one CCL organizer be designated to handle all negotiations 
in government unions, and this task fell to Palmer. 102 
The outcome of the Toronto meeting placed the respon­
sibility for improved relations on the one man who reflected 
local union opposition to the top-level agreement, and who 
was implacably opposed to such arrangements in the first 
place. Palmer cannot be faulted for being a tough 
negotiator, but he had already rejected the policy decided 
at the meeting, and the September meeting accomplished 
little that was of lasting effect. This is not to suggest 
that Palmer was responsible for the subsequent failure of 
the wage 'understanding'. He accurately reflected the 
interests of the local unions he represented, and the rank 
and file were not interested in the government's wage 
policy. His acerbic style and hard-headed approach to 
negotiations only reinforced the conflict between the 
interests of the unions and their employer. Thus, 
co-operation at the top was not reflected at the bottom. 
Local unionists were loyal to the provincial CCF, but 
this political support was always secondary to their primary 
tasks of trade unionism, and it was a good deal easier for 
the national CCL leade(s to arrive at a compromise with the 
government, than it was for local unions to negotiate a 
collective agreement with the CCF. Thus, local union 
interests diverged not only from the government as an 
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employer, but also from the national Congress as a political 
supporter of the CCP. Congress hoped to reverse the party's 
fortunes in the next Ontario provincial election, widely 
expected in 1948, and they agreed to the Saskatchewan 
government's concerns because they did not want anything to 
'rock the boat' in the meantime. 
Pressed by political opponents to make a profit and by 
farmers to control wages, and armed with the September 
arrangement, the government prepared to institute its wage 
principles. While admitting that subsidization was 
necessary at least temporarily, Cadbury decided that each 
company would soori have to "stand on its own feet."I03 This 
meant the general principle would be that labour costs would 
have to "conform to the commercial possibilities in each 
case."I04 Encouraged by the understanding with Congress, 
the government decided employees in the monopolies would not 
be entitled to "considerably higher" wages than those in the 
less profitable enterprises. IOS 
Contract negotiations in government industries in 1947 
proved difficult to settle owing to the rapid rise in the 
cost of living. Conciliation was often used and unions 
gained some wage increases, though they remained behind the 
inflation rate. The government was unhappy with the 
conciliated settlements, though it recognized the Department 
of Labour had a responsibility to intervene regardless of 
the government's role as an employer. After the difficult 
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1947 negotiations, however, they decided the department was 
not to intervene without the express consent of the 
government itself. 106 
Thus, as the government entered an election year it 
appeared to have firmly grasped the reins of labour 
relations. Cabinet, of course, controlled the distribution 
of surpluses and the CCF had achieved Congress approval of 
the broad outlines of their wage policy. Moreover, disputes 
arising from negotiations were now subject to Cabinet 
control over the use of conciliation as a means of 
settlement. Although the government was more comfortable 
with its labour relations, there had been- doubts about 
labour's political commitment. 
That the government was concerned about a potential 
decline in labour support was evident when their 1946 'brief 
to the SFL included a call for more CCF political activity 
within the unions. I07 The importance of its political ties 
to Congress was increased by the tendency of craft unionists 
not to be 'socialistically' inclined. TLC unions frequently 
promised to support the CCF but just as often voted 
Liberal. 108 
As the election approached Congress became concerned 
about an apparent split in the ranks among CCL unionists in 
the province. Some of the organizers with only Saskatchewan 
experience were opposed to political action, while those 
with broader experience favoured it. Congress leaders knew 
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the party was more than holding its own among "the all 
important farm vote" and they realized the CCF's rural 
support benefitted the labour movement by preventing the old 
parties from mobilizing farmers against workers. 109 They 
were worried that a poor showing in the upcoming election 
would reflect on them and alienate farmers, which, "might 
undo much of the good which this new partnership is now 
bringing us, both in Saskatchewan, and in the field of 
Dominion-wide politics."110 
Political support from CCL unions in Saskatchewan 
reflected the tension in labour relations with the 
government, and some locals refused outright to openly 
support the CCF. Congress was not hopeful that any drop in 
CCF electoral strength would be offset by support from 
unions in government operations which were reluctant to 
associate themselves too closely with their employer. Most 
union support was given at arm's length, as they preferred 
to donate money rather than affiliate to, proselytize for, 
or become more involved in, the CCF party. When the SFL 
began organizing Labour Election Committees within unions as 
part of their campaign efforts, they had to 'soft-pedal' 
their programme to the government unions in light of their 
negotiation problems. lll 
Government bargaining practices represented the major 
obstacle to more union support for the CCF. Armed with the 
September agreement with Congress, the government's 
---------------- ----
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protection afforded workers by the Trade Union Act (and 
other favourable labour and social legislation). The 
problems of the past were temporarily shelved as labour saw 
the election as a contest between 'us and them', between a 
generally favourable pro-labour Government and a reactionary 
employer opposition. The larger question of politics 
overcame collective bargaining problems. Wage negotiations 
were restrained, concluded one organizer, "lest any 
unfavourable attitude towards the government would develop, 
with the election in the spring, and the Congress Convention 
resolution calling for support of the Government, any 
unfavourable attitude would make the job of the Labour 
Election Committees that much harder."llS 
The reluctance of government unions to become involved 
did not hinder the SFL's contribution to the re-election of 
the CCF. Seven MLA's were re-elected, including four cabinet 
ministers, in the four major cities where the SFL was 
involved in publicity, fund-raising and canvassing. 116 On 
election day they helped to get the vote out and worked as 
returning officers, poll clerks and scrutineers; and in the 
cities the labour vote was heavy with an 83-96 per cent 
turnout. 117 The CCF were re-elected with 47 per cent of the 
vote and 31 seats, and while this was less than their 
showing in 1944, the re-election of the government was a 
significant victory. "We are breathing a little easier here 
now", wrote Davies, "[with] the return to power of the 
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CCF. "118 Unfortunately, labour representation in the
Legislature was reduced when W.J. Arthurs (Melville) and
A.D. Connon (The Battlefords) were defeated. 
However, the CCF also suffered losses in the rural 
areas where even two cabinet ministers, J. L. Phelps and 
o.w. Valleau were defeated, and as Congress had feared, some 
of the CCF's rural supporters blamed labour. Joe Phelps, 
for example, publicly denounced the party's labour legisla­
tion for the drop in support. A post-mortem of the losses 
conducted by the party showed "overconfidence", "fear of 
the communist bogey" and, higher school taxes and larger 
school units as the main contributors to the decline in 
support. Not one constituency complained of the labour 
laws. 119 Nonetheless, Phelp's comments demonstrated there 
was more than a little suspicion of labour among the 
farmers. 
Despite the victory and the CCL's part in it, tensions 
remained between the political 'allies'. The CCF complained 
vigorously about Palmer's bargaining tactics .and his general 
antipathy to the government, and his "conspicuous" absence 
from the campaign further annoyed the CCF.120 Charlie 
Millard viewed Palmer with some suspicion and advocated his 
replacement fearing that the CCL would otherwise, "someday 
look back rather regretfully."12l Mosher and Conroy were 
pleased with Palmer's record in Saskatchewan, and Conroy in 
particular defended Palmer from the CCF's "hatchet job".122 
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The Regional Director, Conroy replied to Millard, had 
"probably produced more friends for the Government than any 
one person by the excellent contracts he has negotiated, 
thereby justifying the faith of these people that crown 
companies can provide good wages and working conditions."123 
Thus, Congress reaffirmed their support for Palmer, who 
reflected local opposition to the government's wage policy 
and whose militant bargaining tactics were consistently a 
thorn in the side of the CCF. 
The clash over the appointment of the Williams 'twins', 
and the conflict over the organization of the civil service 
set the tone for the subsequent relations between the CCL 
and CCF. Relations which began on the wrong foot 
deteriorated with each round of negotiations, and 
disenchantment grew on both sides. Each had expected the 
other to be more sympathetic, and each blamed the other for 
the friction accompanying their relations. The CCF, 
dominated by farmers, represented a 'public interest' that 
was opposed to the interests of labour, and contract 
negotiations became increasingly bitter. The development of 
antagonism, suspicion and frustration marred relations 
between the government and its industrial workers. 
As a political party the CCF appealed to workers, but 
as an employer, they alienated unions with their hard-line 
approach to industrial relations. The personalities, 
attitudes and problems remained despite political 
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co-operation, and these would reappear in the government's 
second term when the CCF attempted to enforce its wage 
policy and gain some control over the adversarial collective 
bargaining system they had created. 
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elected to the Ontario Legislature, and it was natural for 
him to be upset at Palmer's bargaining tactics and political 
behaviour. 
122.IBID., Conroy to Millard, 7 July 1948, p.l. 
123.IBID., p.2 
CHAPTER VI
LABOUR UNREST 1948-1952
Conflict generated by their bargaining relationship 
was only temporarily postponed by the 1948 election, and 
political co-operation quickly gave way to old animosities. 
Following the decline in rural support in the 1948 election, 
demands were made in the CCF caucus to delete the union 
security clause from the Trade Union Act and to make strikes 
in government industries illegal. l Before the year was out, 
a wage strike erupted in a crown corporation, which placed a 
great strain on union-government relations. On the one hand 
the government was faced with union militancy, on the other 
pressed by farmers and party members to control labour and 
place restrictions on unions. Douglas was faced with twin 
problems of placating farmers and labour, and alienating 
either had political repercussions not only in Saskatchewan, 
but at the national level as well. 
Douglas sought to moderate labour unrest and forestall 
party demands for restrictions on public workers, and 
following the wage strike a more elaborate social contract 
was offered to all CCL unions in government service. The 
joint industrial relations committee was revived as a 
mechanism of co-operation and preventative dispute 
settlement, but like its precursor, the new committee was a 
failure. Wage conflict and labour unrest swamped the 
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committee and government~union industrial relations did not 
improve, but rather, deteriorated. Political co-operation, 
of course, still existed, though by the 1952 provincial 
election the party was hostile to the CCL's involvement in 
'their' politics. 
By 1948, the bulk of organizing was complete and the 
pace of unionization slowed considerably during the CCF's 
second term in office. The most important gain for the CCL 
was the acquisition of jurisdiction in the Power corporation 
after a long struggle with the SCSA. Palmer expected the 
new locals of the Electrical Utilities Employees Union 
(EUEU) would have "far-reaching effects" on their plans for 
further expansion in the civil service. 2 He hoped to 
increase the CCL's "prestige" among the SCSA membership, and 
by achieving better contracts in Power, persuade them to 
join. 3 
The downturn in the agricultural economy prior to the 
outbreak of the Korean War took further stearn from 
organizing drives. As the provincial economy slowed, 
unemployment rose. Real wages declined from 1947 to 1949, 
and in 1950 fell below the 1947 level. 4 As inflation 
continued to erode working class incomes, wages remained the 
dominant issue in labour relations. Government wages were 
often low, and the CCL's persistent struggle to raise 
incomes clashed repeatedly with the CCF's desire to control 
costs as it expanded social services and public utilities. 
Militant bargaining by the CCL was matched by government 
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intransigence on wages. Neither side would relax its 
bargaining position, and the result was continuous conflict. 
Union concern over inflation, wages and negotiation 
troubles was best expressed by SFL president Lloyd Gardiner, 
who was himself a government employee, 
We are not afraid of the grim struggle which now 
looms before us as we find ourselves confronted 
with a bitter price-wage war on the negotiating 
front, where new working agreements must be drawn 
up ••.• We realize that negotiations will 
undoubtedly be tougher, with respect to wages, 
than ever before, but we are content our position 
is just •••• 5 
The government also took a dim view of negotiations. 
Cadbury blamed the unions for industrial relations problems, 
and complained of their bargaining tactics. Negotiations 
were troublesome, he argued, because unionists, "having been 
trained under Capitalism to regard the employer as something 
of an enemy on whom the greatest possible pressure is to be 
exerted, tend to apply this same attitude to the govern­
ment."6 Cadbury believed the challenge was to prove the 
CCF's policy of state intervention brought major benefits to 
the people and his primary concern was with the balance 
sheet. Revenues for the treasury and s~rplusesfor
corporation expansion took precedence over employee claims 
for wages, and he began to wonder whether the unions were 
potentially "detrimental to the welfare of the community at 
large."7 
Following the CCF's re-election, Cadbury hoped to 
develop public ownership under a new pattern, "which would 
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not only measure up to the criteria of a capitalistic 
balance sheet, but w[ould] also adopt patterns of human and 
financial relationship which are superior to those in 
private industry."S His post-election review of crown 
corporations showed the overall performance to be quite 
satisfactory, with the exception of the smaller competitive 
crown enterprises which were rather unsuccessful. These 
small attempts to industrialize the province were 
economically unfeasible and filled with embarrassing labour 
relations. They tarnished the image of the CCF's record of 
state intervention in the economy, and he urged the 
government to close these "problem children".9 
Provincial Treasurer Clarence Fines agreed with 
Cadbury's assessment of the troubled secondary manufacturing 
industries under public ownership.IO In general he was also 
pleased with the overall performance of the crown 
corporations, but his primary consideration w~s the cost of 
government services which had increased greatly.ll The 
government had recorded surpluses in every year since 1944, 
however, Fines warned, 
One word of caution should be given at this time. 
During the past five years the revenues of the 
province have been very bouyant. We have had fair 
crops on the average and have obtained reasonably 
good prices for our farm products. As long as 
this condition continues, there will be no 
difficulty in financing our present program, but 
if conditions deteriorate either through crop 
failure or low prices, then the task of financing 
will become very difficult. We will be placed in 
the position of having to discontinue some of the 
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present services or of finding new sources of 
revenue. 12 
Fines' caution and Cadbury's emphasis on profits added 
friction to the 1948 negotiations, and Gardiner's prediction 
of a 'grim struggle' over wages was played out when Cy 
Palmer "locked horns" with Oakland W. Valleau, Chairman of 
the Saskatchewan Government Insurance Office (SGIO).13 The 
accumulated tensions and suspicions generated by five years 
of antagonistic industrial relations burst into the open in 
a bitter three week wage strike in November 1948. 
SGIO had been created in 1944 and became the 
government's "most spectacular" success. 14 Its revenues 
climbed when compulsory automobile accident insurance was 
introduced and it provided large surpluses to the treasury. 
Negotiations between the Saskatchewan Insurance Employees 
Union (SlEU) and SGlO did not markedly improve wages or 
working conditions for the poorly paid insurance workers, 
however, and they had reason to complain that they had never 
been granted an equitable increase. lS Whatever wage 
comparison the government made it was opposed to the 
interests of the union and clashed with the aims of the 
CCL.16 
When negotiations opened in the fall of 1948, inflation 
exacerbated union demands, but SGlO refused to even consider 
the "very extreme" wage proposal.I7 The company, moreover, 
refused to make a counter offer, and despite repeated union 
requests, they, "blankly refused to put anything in 
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writing."lB Management considered the demands to be a 
bargaining tactic designed to force conciliation, wherein 
the resulting compromise would greatly benefit the 
workers. 19 The company would not compromise its position by 
submitting a counter proposal on wages , but insisted the 
issue be considered on the basis of the prevailing rates in 
Saskatchewan and in the insurance industry, and in 
consideration of its financial position. They demanded the 
union first revise its "absurd" and "ridiculous" proposal, 
claiming that granting even one-half the demands would force 
the company out of business. 20 This was an "unfortunate" 
statement given the company's well-known large surplus. 21 
SlED attempted to force a written counterproposal from 
the company by threatening to take a strike vote, but SGlO 
ignored the warning, believing that the union was trying to 
force a crisis. 22 The subsequent stike vote was virtually 
unanimous, but the company would not alter its position. The 
government refused to see that it had to bargain in good 
faith with its employees, and the union struck not only for 
increased wages and better working conditions for its 
members, but also to force the company to bargain by its 
standards. 
Mosher did not believe the union's wage demands to be 
excessive, though he admitted it would be difficult to grant 
such an increase all at once, and he appealed to Douglas for 
a generous counter offer. The low wages paid in SGlO 
- - ----------------~
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concerned Mosher and he denied wage comparisons with other 
civil servants was the proper basis for a government offer, 
given that these wages were in themselves inadequate. 23 
Conroy appealed to the Premier to use conciliation to settle 
the strike, but to no avail. Douglas had already instructed 
the company not to seek conciliation, and he reminded 
government negotiators to bear in mind the effects the 
eventual settlement would have on other negotiations. 24 
SGlO was ordered not to settle without the government's 
prior approval, and faced with the CCF's reluctance to 
compromise, Mosher dispatched Harry Chappell to mediate the 
end to the strike. 25 
When Chappell arrived in Regina, he found both sides 
intransigent. The company refused to budge from its position 
unless union demands were first modified substantially, 
which the SlED refused to do. The company maintained "the 
rather fallacious position that if they were to submit a 
counter proposal first it could be construed that the union 
had won the strike."26 After marathon talks, Chappell 
managed to squeeze a counter proposal from SGlO and wage 
modifications from the union. Acting in concert, the two 
sides exchanged proposals, but management considered that 
SlEU had not moved far enough, and it awaited a "prolonged" 
strike. 27 Thus, while it had appeared that Chappell had 
broken the deadlock, talks broke off again. 
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The strike attracted considerable press coverage across 
Canada, and newspap~rs were quick to point to the fallacies 
of the CCF's 'utopian' labour laws. 28 The press coverage 
embarrassed the pro-labour government, and strained 
relations between the farmer's party and the CCL. The 
strike also embarrassed Congress, and Conroy rushed to 
Regina to take over negotiations. Conroy believed the 
situation to be little different than any other strike, and 
his intervention produced a settlement which left the union 
"very satisfied".29 
The strike produced widespread sympathy within the 
provincial labour movement. The SFL and TLC both publicly 
urged the government to settle, and CCL labour councils and 
individual unions supported the SIEU with strike funds and 
by sending telegrams to the Premier. 30 The SFL met in 
convention while the strike was in progess, and it passed 
resolutions promising its full support to the SIEU and 
urging the government to reconsider its bargaining tactics. 
Conroy, who was in Regina to settle the strike, attempted to 
calm the mood of the delegates. "I am convinced," he told 
them, "if another government is elected in this province, 
not only the trade union legislation, but all other benefits 
you now have will be deleted or amended ••. they will hang 
your skeleton to a sour apple tree as they did in the 
U.S.A•.•• ".31 
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While urging delegates not to be too hasty in 
condemning the CCF, he warned them also not to become 
subordinate to it. "r am not expecting any miracles from 
the CCF", he told the convention. "It has undoubtedly got 
some shortcomings •••. The cure is to get into the CCF on 
a mass basis and do the job which you think it should be 
doing for you." He was not, however, advocating political 
action over union interests, and he stressed the CCL's 
permanent task, "regardless of the government", was to 
achieve the best contracts possible and improve wages and 
working conditions. This was, in fact, the best support the 
unions could give the government, Conroy argued, because 
improvements in wages and working conditions would mean 
more "working class" votes for the party.32 
Acting on Conroy's suggestion, CCL staff 
representatives met shortly after the conclusion of the SGIO 
strike to discuss labour relations problems with the CCF 
government. They all encountered difficulties in handling 
grievances, and in negotiations, particularly in getting the 
government to begin talks. Moreover, once talks began, 
government representatives devoted little time to bargaining 
sessions, which left unions with, "chronic feelings of 
frustration".33 
The most "outstanding obstacle" during negotiations was 
that government representatives had no authority ~o bargain 
on the merits of the union's case, "but [were] only in the 
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position of delivering a cut and dried proposition ••• from 
somewhere higher up." These propositions were decided at a 
meeting remote from the actual negotiations without 
knowledge of what had transpired, and the union could not 
argue persuasively because it had no effect on government 
negotiators who were only following orders. 34 
CCL representatives were concerned that CCF political 
promises of high wages were not being fulfilled. The 
government insisted on introducing or extending wage 
'ranges', and their representatives repeatedly attempted to 
"whittle away" at the contracts. 35 In addition, the 
government attempted to initiate undesirable changes into 
collective agreements, such as small cost of living bonuses 
instead of wage increases, incentive plans, and wage 
settlements lower than Saskatchewan industrial standards. 36 
All this only served to increase workers' resentment. 
Furthermore, CCL organizers were frustrated with government 
bureaucrats, because they consistently ignored union advice 
on improving production methods. Moreover, they 
continually tried to "drive a wedge" between the rank and 
file and the union negotiating committees. "This 
experience", wrote Palmer, "has been general to everyone of 
our staff representatives."37 
The government was faced with another strike involving 
a Congress union at the same time as the SGIO strike, which 
further soured the farmer's party on the CCL. On 3 November 
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1948, a strike erupted in the Estevan - Bienfait coal fields 
which threatened to create a province-wide coal shortage. 38 
Douglas was forced to make a deal with the major operator, 
which had not been struck, in order to achieve a settlement, 
and end the coal shortages in Regina, Weyburn and Estevan. 39 
The coal strike angered the party and the government, who 
were already upset with the SGIO strike. 
The CCF were extremely unhappy with their labour 
relations with the CCL, and the government, concerned with 
the "farm vote problem", was fearful of possible rural MLA 
actions in the upcoming session. 40 To prevent further 
conflict in labour relations and to forestall caucus demands 
for anti-labour action, the government prepared a "new 
policy".4l 
When the SFL arrived to present its Annual Brief to the 
government, the CCF warned them that unions would not be 
allowed to become a "new privileged group", and the 
government again offered workers a 'social contract' on 
wages. 42 While reiterating their desire to raise provincial 
standards of living, the government insisted negotiations be 
considered in relation to the pattern of agreements "in 
other similar Government activities", and to end the annual 
"tussle" over wage bargaining they proposed that talks not 
begin until the two sides had first arrived at a mutually 
acceptable statement of joint objectives and procedures. 43 
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For the unions the only hopeful sign in the 
government's brief was the admission for the first time that 
it had made mistakes. However, this was couched in terms 
which left little doubt where the CCF stood, 
We have only to look at the sorry mess made of 
some of our annual negotiations between the 
government and its employees to realize that we 
are behaving as if [our] common objectives did not 
exist. The strike in the [SGIO] was the final act 
in a long drama of mounting misunderstanding and 
bitterness. We have been approaching each other 
like two dogs quarreling over a bone, when it is 
sometimes doubtful whether the bone legitimately 
belongs to either of us, but may in fact belong to 
the people of the Province as a whole. 44 
Essentially, the new policy was a call for the 
resurrection of the moribund joint committee, and the 
government requested a 'no strike' pledge in return for 
resisting demands being made to repeal or modify the Trade 
Union Act. 45 While Douglas may have been exaggerating his 
fears, they were largely real fears. Following the 
experiences of the SGIO and coal strikes, proposals were 
made by the party to control labour which included 
prohibiting strikes in public utilities and establishing 
"definite" mediation procedures (i.e., compulsory 
arbitration) .46 
The CCF's Brief was beyond the scope of the SFL in its 
legislative function, but it aroused the suspicion and anger 
of the unionists, especially when negotiations were 
suspended pending an understanding. For all the talk of 
common interests and responsibilities to the province as a 
114 
whole, the CCL was not about to surrender basic trade union 
rights and principles, particularly the right to strike. 47 
As separate entities, the CCF and CCL had responsibilities 
to those they represented, which for the unions was to 
bargain for the best contracts for their members, and to 
protect and maintain sound trade union principles. 
In the discussion which followed the brief, Premier 
Douglas "lamented" the unions' tendency to bargain as if the 
CCF were "hard-boiled reactionary big business employers." 
The reason for this, Chappell explained, was that government 
representatives frequently made "reactionary statements 
••• that many hard-boiled employers had quit using years 
ago." He warned Douglas not to expect to achieve all the 
"dreams" contained in the brief, and he stressed that the 
CCL did not intend to become "a slavish appendage of the 
C.C.F • ••• ". Moreover, if anything were to be achieved by 
the revived joint committee, the government would have to 
change the composition of its delegation, he told Douglas, 
because unions wanted "to sit opposite somebody who knew the 
score ••• and not some of his people who were pure theorists 
and who knew none of the realism of the trade union 
movement. "48 
The Premier subsequently wrote Mosher to explain the 
brief and the motives behind it. "This strike", he 
declared, "was the unfortunate symptom of something much 
more serious than a mere difference of opinion about 
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wages." The real issue for Douglas was the continual 
"challenge" laid down by unions to the government's power to 
maintain its services to the public. There was only one 
answer to this issue as far as the Premier was concerned, 
The citizens of Saskatchewan, including the 
members of the Trade Unions, can govern through 
their elected representatives and [in] no other 
way • ••• [T]here can be no opportunity for any 
group to use their economic or political power to 
establish a favoured position among their fellows 
except by consent of the community as a whole 
expressed through their democratic franchise. 
That is what the C.C.F. stands for. That is why 
we have brought in the Trade Union and 
Co-operative and other Acts, to give the various 
groups the chance for self-protection against the 
old vested interests of Capitalism. We did not 
pass these measures to create a new class of 
privileged persons. 49 
If there was no forthcoming agreement, Douglas 
continued, then the CCF was forced to either close down 
government enterprises or "to restrict the power of the 
unions and operate under a quite new relationship." The 
first alternative was undesirable because the party wished 
to prove its experiments in State intervention successful. 
The second alternative was "distasteful ... unnecessary and 
unreasonable", Douglas wrote, "and would have repercussions 
we would regret as much as you would. But for us it is the 
lesser evil."50 
He warned Mosher of the "tremendous pressure" being 
exerted on the government to control labour, pressure which 
emanated from those who "have always feared the urban trade 
union movement." Thus, he continued, without an agreement 
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he would be left no alternative but to act to control labour 
or risk alienating the rural CCF movement. At the very 
least he would be unable to resist CCF attacks on the Trade 
Union Act which in themselves would affect CCF-CCL relations 
nationally and hinder their prospects at federal power. 
Hence, the "national importance" of the matter made it 
impe rat i ve to rev i ve the joint commi ttee and broaden its 
scope. The response of Congress to this proposal, he 
concluded, would determine "whether there is to be harmony 
or continued strife between us."Sl To revive the joint 
committee, he called for a top-level meeting of 
representatives from the Saskatchewan Government, the 
national leaders of the CCL and the national executive of 
the CCF, to which all sides agreed. 
Cadbury prepared the approach taken at the 
forthcoming Ottawa conference with the Congress. He stated 
his belief that the State should be a 'model' employer, but 
argued the unions were demanding special privileges not 
accorded others in the province. He assumed the unions 
agreed with the CCF's "Socialist solution", and suggested 
that this 'solidarity' meant that each side had to 
relinquish some of their prerogatives. Their common goals, 
he argued, meant the normal animosity in employer-employee 
relations was supplanted by "reciprocal responsibilities" in 
industrial relations. He questioned the CCL's "militant 
methods" which prevented co-operation, and wanted them to 
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drop their approach which dealt with the government as they 
would any other employer. Wages were the central question 
dividing the two sides, but Cadbury was adamant that their 
wage comparison policy was the correct approach, and all 
that was necessary was to devise the correct "machinery" to 
encourage co-operation in this area. 52 
In late January, 1949, the CCL and CCF met in Ottawa to 
discuss industrial relations problems concerning 
negotiations and wages, and to seek areas of greater 
co-operation. The conference redefined the social contract 
and created a new committee, widened in scope to include all 
CCL unions in government service. Its composition was again 
set at ten members; five top-level union and management 
representatives, but there were few assurances that the 
'new' committee could act effectively as a means of dispute 
prevention. 53 
That the conference dealt with a wide variety of issues 
reflected the build-up of tensions and frustrations since 
the last joint committee in the summer of 1947. Congress 
agreed in principle to a number of government suggestions 
for developing more co-operation, including incentive plans, 
labour-management production committees, and labour 
representation on the. Boards of Directors of the crown 
corporations. Negotiation techniques were discussed and it 
was agreed that "recriminatory" attitudes in bargaining were 
counterproductive as they spawned irrelevant discussions 
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which only prolonged negotiations. It was agreed that 
counter proposals should be in writing, and that exploratory 
sessions be encouraged before the contracts expired. 54 
When it came to the government's wage determination 
policy Congress was respectful, but it did not alter its 
negotiation policies. The government believed that because 
they held common objectives that labour would naturally be 
more co-operative on wages. The government reiterated its 
commitment to a minimum standard of living, but insisted 
that subsequent increments were negotiable in comparison to 
other wage levels, and that this was dependent upon the 
government's ability to pay. 
Congress could agree to this because they were not out 
to bankrupt their employers, but were only striving to 
increase their members' standard of living. They did not 
expect the government to be so belligerent in negotiations 
and so intransigent on wages, and they too had expected more 
co-operation, especially on wages. Congress representatives 
had always treated the government as they would any other 
employer, but while they bargained strongly, th~y were fully 
cognizant of the government's financial position. Militant 
union bargaining against the government as an employer was 
in the eyes of the Congress no different than similar action 
against any other employer. For the Congress, the 
protection of the interests of their membership was their 
first priority, but this did not exclude co-operation with 
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the CCF where this did not conflict with their trade union 
goals. Thus, when the CCF reiterated its policy of 
financial responsibility and wage comparisons, Congress 
could silently nod its approval and agree to refer the 
issues to the upcoming joint committee. 
Much was discussed at the Ottawa conference, but little 
was resolved. They could agree on the problems and on the 
need to co-operate to settle them, but the conference did 
not achieve a definite understanding on the outstanding 
issues, especially wages. As an advisory body, the 
committee was excluded from dealing with individual collec­
tive bargaining problems, and the central issue, a social 
contract on wages, could not be addressed directly. 
One of the obstacles to the success of the committee 
was that its composition was essentially the same as in 
1917 , and two and one-half years of mounting industrial 
relations problems had sharpened the antagonism between the 
representatives. Those individuals who had bargained 
annually in an increasingly hostile relationship, were now 
asked to meet in a committee and erect a more co-operative 
relationship. Moreover, the Ottawa understanding was 
applied to a situation in which there was no guarantee that 
even if the committee could agree on principles of wage 
determination, negotiation techniques, or co-operative 
efforts, that the rank and file would find such an 
understanding acceptable. The Ottawa agreement was no 
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agreement at all, and co-operation at the top was not 
reflected at the bottom. 
Before the new committee could be convened, a dispute 
in SPC threatened to undo the efforts at co-operation. 
Power workers, despite working in a monopoly industry which 
produced large surpluses, were among the lowest paid in the 
entire civil service. Contract talks were prolonged and 
frustrating for the Electrical utilities Employees' Union 
(EUEU), and in early 1949, they asked Congress for authority 
to hold a strike vote. Conroy denied the vote, fearing the 
young union would be broken in a strike, and he placed his 
hopes for a good settlement with the government's 
conciliator. 55 However, conciliation failed to produce a 
settlement and the situation soon became "extremely 
serious".56 Conroy eventually changed his mind and bluntly 
informed Douglas to settle or he would authorize the strike 
vote. He told Douglas he would withhold the authorization 
for a reasonable length of time, but he could not stall the 
union indefinitely because the workers were anxious to 
settle. 57 
The CCL's militancy again posed a problem for the 
government, and demands were made by the conservative 
right-wing of the CCF's rural constituency for legislation 
banning strikes in government services. "They are also 
getting ready to mobilize volunteers to break the strike if 
it happens", Cadbury warned Lewis, "and to demand police 
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protection in doing so ••• I cannot be sure that the 
Government would be successful in holding down such a 
movement as such a large section of the C.C.F. would 
sympathize with that point of view ••• ".58 The mood of the 
provincial party, Cadbury stated, placed the interests of 
the national party behind that of the "political fortunes" 
of the government, and they were in fact suspicious that the 
"ultimate" aim of the CCL was to capture the urban CCF and 
leave the farm movement to play "second fiddle" to an 
Ontario-based party.59 SPC negotiations frustrated the 
government. "We feel the time has come to say no", Cadbury 
told Lewis. "We are therefore making all preparations for a 
strike." The Minister of Labour prepared to introduce 
legislation to intervene if necessary "in the public 
interest" to avoid a work stoppage in public utilities. The 
bill was never introduced, but it reflected the feeling at 
the time in the party that strikes in public utilities 
should be prevented.60 
The repercussions of another open conflict over wages 
so soon after the SGIO strike was a distinct threat, not 
only to the joint committee which had yet to meet, but to 
the national relations between the CCL and CCF. The 
government retreated this time as it would have likely 
shouldered the burden of criticism for a weakening, or 
possibly a break, in the CCF-CCL alliance, as its own 
supporters would have acted to break the strike. 6l The 
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possible repercussions were not lost on Congress either, and 
as preparations were underway to convene the new joint 
commit'tee, Conroy advised them, "The time has come ••• to go 
slowly in making demands for wage increases, and our unions 
in Saskatchewan should recognize this fact."62 
It was not until early July that the first meeting of 
the joint committee took place. The agendas drawn up by 
each side reflected the differences between them. Cadbury's 
agenda stressed the financial responsibility of a "Socialist 
Government". The demands of the welfare state and the 
economics of crown corporations had priority over employee 
claims for wages, but Cadbury denied this undermined his 
call for 'solidarity' and co-operation. Rather, he blamed 
conflict in labour relations, not on government wage 
policies, but on techniques in handling grievances and 
contract negotiations. 63 
The CCL's agenda stressed wages, working conditions, 
and negotiation problems. "The Committee might well analyze 
the situation which has developed during the past two 
years", suggested Palmer, " ••• [which in] almost every 
negotiations have required the entrance of conciliators 
" This was a serious weakness, and unions wanted an 
end to the lengthy, costly and frustrating annual talks. 
The central obstacle to successful negotiation was the 
government's bargaining· stand on wages. 64 
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The ensuing two-day discussion revealed the depth of 
disagreement on the central labour relations issues. ~fui1e
the committee reiterated the list of items discussed at 
Ottawa, they could not agree on much, and most of the 
discussion was spent trying to find a basis for discussion. 
Management rights were raised, and countered by union 
rights, and the best they could do was to agree to 
disagree. 65 
Owing to negotiations and conventions, it was difficult 
to reconvene the committee and it did not meet again for 
another six months. Discussions in the January, 1950, 
meeting revealed the gulf had widened. The government 
continued to press for 'solidarity' (i.e., wage restraint), 
but the CCL remained concerned with their more immediate 
problems of grievances and negotiations. 66 Again much was 
raised, but little resolved. Each side expected movement 
from the other, and when no one would make the first 
gesture, talks again degenerated as each side jealously 
guarded their rights. Given the difficulties encountered in 
negotiations it is not surprising the two sides were 
suspicious of each other when they met in the joint 
committee. Neither side had altered its bargaining position 
in contract negotiations, and had no incentive to do so in 
the committee. 
Without a dramatic change in official Congress policy 
on wage bargaining, or a drastic change in the CCF's wage 
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policy, the new committee was placed in the impossible 
position of fostering co-operation in labour relations. The 
discussions in the committee only served to reinforce the 
gulf between the employer and its employees. While the 
government could reach a vague understanding with the 
Congress, the animosity created in negotiations spilled over 
into the committee, and failing a complete reversal in 
bargaining philosophies, the joint committee was doomed to 
failure. 
In the fall of 1949, the government introduced an 
unofficial wage 'freeze' owing to a decline in agricultural 
incorne. In ea r 1y 1950, M0 she r sen t C hap pel 1 t 0 
Saskatchewan to settle negotiations in several crown 
corporations, which had subsequently become deadlocked. 
Negotiations in Power were particularly difficult and rela­
tions quickly deteriorated. 67 
Negotiations had begun for a new contract in October, 
1949, but SPC refused to make a counteroffer on wages and 
talks had broken off. Informal conciliation was tried on 
two occasions, but each side clung to their positions and by 
the end of the year the stale~ate persisted. Early in the 
new year, the company offered to consider adjustments in 
individual classifications , if the union could justify 
them, but the union consistently demanded an 
across-the-board wage increase. After another month of 
futile negotiation, the two sides jointly applied for a 
125 
conciliation board. Charlie Williams denied the request and 
suggested instead that they use their agreed upon 
conciliators to form an "informal" board. Faced with 
little alternative, the two sides agreed to this proposal. 68 
At the same time, the government contemplated amending 
the union security clause of the Trade Union Act to read as 
a maintenance of dues clause similar to the Rand Formula. 69 
The proposed amendment was not the brainchild of employers, 
nor of workers, but emananted solely from the government 
itself. 
When word reached the SFL that cabinet had given its 
approval to the amendment, the Federation responded quickly 
to the challenge and Davies led a delegation to the govern­
ment to present their case. 70 The SFL also organized a 
massive campaign which deluged the government with letters, 
telegrams and telephone calls from unions, labour councils, 
and Congress, protesting the proposed measure. 
The SFL argued the amendment was unnecessary, unjust, 
and unsound legislation, 
The proposed amendment would be hailed by 
reactionaries from one end of Canada to the other, 
and beyond, as proof that all their objections to 
union security were well-founded. They would be 
able to say that even a government explicitly 
endorsed by [labour] .•. and kept in power by the 
labour vote ••• had been forced to recognize that 
maintenance of membership with the union shop for 
new employees was a vicious principle. 71 
The clause had been an original feature of the Act, and had 
been widely acclaimed in Canada by labour "as a charter of 
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union rights and a notable, indeed a unique, contribution to 
good labour relations." In fact, Saskatchewan had been free 
of strikes over the issue of union security, while the rest 
of the country was frequently beset by such labour turmoil. 
Moreover, Davies argued, unions would not respond silently 
to a change in the law; "Workers who have enjoyed the form 
of union security granted them under the subsection will 
not, without a struggle, accept anything less."72 
Compulsory arbitration for the public service was 
also being considered by the CCF and this did not escape the 
8FL's attention. 73 An organized effort similar to that 
opposing changes in union security was mounted, and the SFL 
included an attack on this issue in its presentation to the 
government. The entire labour movement condemned the 
concept of compulsory arbitration, as they believed 
that neither side would bargain in earnest knowing the 
ultimate decision was out of their hands, and that this 
would generate extravagant demands. Moreover, it would not 
work without enforcement, which raised the question whether 
the police would be used to keep workers on the job if 
imposed settlements sparked 'wildcat' rank and file 
strikes. 74 
Central to the problem was the fact that arbitrators 
would likely be judges who were inexperienced in labour 
matters. The only reason compulsory arbitration was ever 
accepted in disputes arising from contracts was because such 
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boards operated under the very narrow and precise terms of 
reference set out in a collective bargaining agreement. In 
such circumstances, the arbitrator's 'assumptions' were 
precluded; "It is a totally different matter to ask these 
gentlemen to decide what is a 'living wage', and how far it 
should have precedence over low taxes on the real property 
of people like themselves."75 Essentially, the SFL argued 
that the burden of proof was on the government to show the 
proposed changes were in fact necessary. Failing this, the 
SFL wanted the government to leave well enough alone. 
Following the SFL's presentation, Douglas replied that 
it was "unfortunate" labour had acted on information which 
was not final government policy, but merely an "office memo" 
which had been "leaked" without authority. However, he 
subsequently defended the 'memo' by declaring the clause to 
have meant maintenance of dues only when it was drafted in 
1944, and that the intention of the amendment was merely to 
"clarify" this meaning. However, it is extremely doubtful 
that Brewin intended the clause to be interpreted in the way 
the government suggested. The Rand Formula, which closely 
followed the government's thinking, was not in existence in 
1944, and the clause meant what it said, and was not merely 
a maintenance of dues clause. 76 
The discussion was "brisk and vigorous", but after an 
hour and a half, Douglas agreed to pull the amendment, 
though he still desired the unions to eventually 
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be declaring that all wages, prior to rise in inflation, 
were at an adequate level, which the union (and Congress) 
rejected. The union argued that past settlements on wages 
had been in fact "scanty", and that to agree to wage 
comparisons as a guideline would mean the trade union 
movement would make no progress in raising the standard of 
living for workers. 81 
The Majority Report of the board recommended a general 
across-the-board increase in wages, but left other 
contractual problems as they were. 82 However, SPC rejected 
the Report, and negotiations were back to square one. The 
government rejected any retreat from the-ir bargaining 
position, and instructed the company that any concessions 
would have to be approved by Cabinet beforehand. B3 
Anticipating further trouble, the government created a 
committee to handle publicity regarding the negotiations. 84 
The subsequent government publicity campaign included 
radio broadcasts, press statements, and the dissemination of 
the "details" of negotiations and "related material" to 
their "community contacts" throughout the province. 8S A 
press release was issued which argued that falling farm 
incomes upset the provincial economy and union demands were 
thus unrealistic, and that the public should not suffer 
through "militant" strike action. 86 The press statement 
explained to farmers that the government was tough but fair, 
and above all consistent. The statement concluded, "The 
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Government has a fair wage policy. The advance on wages 
over the past few years has been in accordance with this, 
and NOT [sic] a reluctant yielding to Union pressure."87 
The government's handling of the dispute was a 
well-orchestrated blunder. Williams' refusal to create a 
conciliation board, SPC's refusal to accept the 
recommendations of the 'informal' board, and the press 
campaign, combined to create an extremely hostile­
relationship with the CCL representatives. The union 
requested strike authorization, but this was denied by 
Congress, and Mosher's instructions were to finalize 
contracts as quickly as possible, "on a basis which 
recognized the problems of the Government and the long-run 
political implications which involve us both." The CCL 
staff representatives were "rather perturbed" at Mosher's 
orders because they felt the union's demands were fair and 
reasonable, and they feared Mosher was forcing them to let 
the membership down. The situation in power was 
"particularly critical" because union compromises had been 
rejected by the corporation, and the membership wanted a 
strike vote if there was no settlement on the basis of the 
conciliation board report. Moreover, press statements by 
both sides had aggravated an already "tense" situation.88 
The government was faced with a serious problem with 
the farmers, and Chappell informed Congress that, "literally 
speaking their hands are tied." The Provincial Council had 
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been deluged with letters from constituency associations 
demanding no further wage concessio'ns to organized labour, 
so that money could be saved and taxes reduced. "The 
pressure on the Government to 'stop labour' is tremendous," 
Chappell told Conroy, "and at a recent meeting of the 
C.C.F. Provincial Council - who, in effect, govern the 
decisions 'of the Cabinet - it was made abundantly clear 
that, in Power particularly, no concessions were to be made, 
and they were to hold the line at all costs." Chappell 
believed that Cabinet would have settled reasonably, "but to 
flaunt themselves in the face of farm opinion, would very 
probably spell the defeat of the government, and the 
election of ••• a reactionary government that would mean 
suicide for the labour movement." He warned Mosher that the 
mood of the party was stiffening against labour, and warned 
him of party demands for legislation outlawing strikes, "And 
so the story goes ••• ".89 
Chappell suggested the CCL soften its stand in 
negotiations in order to weather the crisis, but that 
afterwards, they had to organize within the CCF at the 
constituency level, and try to secure positions on the 
Provincial Executive and Provincial Council of the party. 
In this way they would be able to move the government to a 
"more sound labour policy." All in all, he considered the 
labour relations situation in Saskatchewan to be "grim".90 
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Conroy expressed sympathy with the power workers,' and 
felt the government's intransigence was a sure sign SPC had 
a "very weak case".9l Nevertheless, he urged Palmer to 
continue to seek a compromise, because he felt a strike in 
Power would ruin both the CCF and the CCL.92 To Mosher the 
dispute appeared to be a "tempest in a teapot" and he wished 
both sides would be more diplomatic and co-operative. 93 He 
urged Douglas to settle, but instructed the union to 
reconsider the government's position. However, neither side 
would budge, and EUEU again asked Congress for strike 
authorization, which Mosher rejected outright, 
The dispute should be settled on the basis of the 
best offer from the Corporation and without resort 
to strike action. A settlement on this basis may 
not do justice to the workers involved, but we are 
fully convinced that any other action at this time 
would be more harmful than helpful to those 
directly affected and to the whole labour movement 
in the Province of Saskatchewan. 94 
Subsequently, the union again offered compromises, but 
the government maintained that wage comparisons with SGIO 
and SCSA precluded an increase for power workers. In early 
June, each side again rejected the other's proposals, and it 
was left to Conroy to settle the contract despite Cadbury's 
opposition to concessions. Thus, after nine months of 
bitter and frustrating negotiations, the union got what it 
wanted. The contract settlement was reached owing to the 
intervention of Congress, and the government compromised in 
order to maintain efforts at co-operation in the joint 
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committee. Farmers were unhappy that the government 
appeared to have retreated from its position, and they 
continued to press the CCF to control unions. 
Before he left Regina, Conroy drew up a list of 
suggestions which was basically a rehash of the Ottawa 
conference, and the government agreed to it in principle, 
including the provision that they not introduce compulsory 
arbitration or meddle with union security. That such an 
understanding had to be agreed to a year after joint 
consultations had been reinstituted, suggests the gulf 
between the two sides had widened considerably, and that the 
joint committee was proving ineffective in fostering 
co-operation. 95 
Continued labour relations problems upset the 
government, and Cadbury blamed the unions for the fact 
negotiations became "running fights all the year". He felt 
the Trade Union Act, based on the "traditional antagonism" 
of employer and employee, was not applicable to a pro-labour 
government, and he expected labour peace because they were 
"allies in a single cause - the overthrow of vested interest 
and Capitalism." Yet the reverse occurred, and he blamed 
unions for using their new found power against the 
government. The unions, he believed, had over-reached them­
selves in attacking the government and the result was each 
side adopted belligerent attitudes in negotiations. 96 
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After the settlement of the power dispute, a public 
utility strike affecting Regina city power workers (EUEU) 
gave the party and government another reason to fear the 
possible effects of a public utility strike, and further 
alienated them from the CCL.97 Following the problems in 
Power, the joint committee met twice before the end of the 
year. Little progress was made, and the unions emphasized 
the fact the government should face up to reality and accept 
that even with a friendly government in office, they could 
not afford to dispense with their protective weapons, 
especially the right to strike. Moreover, management under 
a pro-labour government was not necessarily friendly to 
workers, as they had found out, and unions had to protect 
their interests first or become defenceless when an 
anti-labour party assumed power. "In the foreseeable 
future," they told the CCF joint committee members,"there 
will continue to be areas in which there will be union 
management disagreement, which fact corporation managers 
must corne to accept."98 
The joint committee continued to meet through 1950 and 
into 1951, but it had little success in fostering 
co-operation or preventing conflict. Although wage 
bargaining was the primary obstacle to greater co-operation, 
the 1951 'wildcat' strike in Saskatchewan Government Airways 
(SGA) was in effect, the deathknell for the joint commi­
ttee. This strike infuriated both the Congress and the 
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government, and led directly to the cessation of talks on 
co-operation. After the demise of the joint committee the 
lines of communication between the government and the CCL 
were broken. 
During the summer of 1951 a wildcat strike erupted in 
SGA when according to the union the company unfairly 
dismissed pilot S.H. Millar alleging a poor safety 
record. The issue for the union was job security and a fair 
hearing for Millar. The company had not followed the 
grievance procedure, had not given Millar sufficient notice 
as required by provincial law, and had not even conducted a 
proper investigation of the matter. 
The Canadian Airline Employees' Union (CAEU) took the 
grievance to the Board of Directors, who refused their 
'request for a formal Department of Transport (DOT) inquiry 
into the matter. Instead they conducted their own inquiry 
board, despite their obvious lack of qualifications, to 
decide whether Millar's eight crashes were owing to pilot 
error or flying conditions. The union produced three pilots 
and three aircraft engineers of high qualifications, who 
agreed unanimously the crashes were owing to the 
"operational policies of [the] company, structural failures 
or hazardous flying conditions ••• ".99 Nonetheless, the 
Board of Directors concluded the pilot was at fault and 
refused to reinstate him. 
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The union met and without consulting Congress decided 
on a strike vote to force the company to reinstate Millar 
pending a complete investigation, and the result was 
virtually unanimous. The company ignored the strike 
deadline and the workers walked off their jobs on July 5 in 
a strike that lasted two weeks. While on strike the union 
rejected the company's offer of arbitration because even if 
Millar were found innocent, such exoneration would not have 
validity in the eyes of the DOT or any future employer 
because the board would not have had competence to decide 
the issues. Once again, a government initiated press battle 
inflamed the situation and fed animosities that had 
developed in the past. lOa 
In an attempt to settle the strike, Palmer approached 
William Hill, president of the Prince Albert TLC, and a 
prominent CCF supporter; and Hill mediated a settlement in 
which Millar was reinstated pending a DOT investigation. 
This had been the union's position since the beginning, 
which the government had rejected, forcing the union out on 
strike. Conroy was glad the strike had been settled. " ••. I 
have never conditioned myself to taking a rigid attitude on 
controversial matters, and particularly with regard to our 
relationship with the Government of Saskatchewan, since 
believe that based on our experience, our unions can be 
right just as often as the Government."lOI 
I 
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Mosher, however, was angered by the wildcat and he had 
threatened to denounce the strike publicly, suspend the 
union and repudiate Palmer. 102 Palmer explained to Congress 
that he had not informed them of the strike action because 
he had followed procedures and had notified the government 
through the joint committee of the likely response of a 
negative solution to the problem. Moreover, he feared the 
Congress would deny the request, such as it had in SPC in 
19S0, which would have crippled the union's negotiating 
strength, and result in a "dictated" settlement. Not only 
would this have affected CAEU, he argued, but it would have 
had "disastrous" effects on the rank and file in CCL 
government unions, and he reminded Congress that EUEU were 
again looking at the IBEW-AFL.I03 
Following the settlement, Palmer travelled to 
Saskatoon to the CCF convention to explain the strike to 
Douglas and other members of the party, and it appeared to 
Palmer that he had succeeded in re-establishing friendly 
relations with the government. 104 However, Douglas was 
tiring of defending the CCL to his party and it was only his 
"strong labour sympathies" and the interests of the national 
CCF which kept him from "giving Palmer and the C.C.L. in 
this province the tongue lashing that is coming to them. To 
do so would raise our stock politically in Saskatchewan 
because most people are fed up with them. nlOS He did not 
publicly confront the ceL because he expected Congress to 
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remedy the situation, but if they failed to act regarding 
Palmer, declared Douglas, "then I will not answer for the 
results as far as C.C.F. - C.C.L. relations are 
concerned."106 
Others in the government tended to agree with this 
assessment, and feared Palmer would eventually cause a 
"rift" between the CCF and CCL, 
Several years ago we were in the habit of running 
to Ottawa with our problems, but never achieved 
concrete results. For the past two years the line 
of communication between our government and Ottawa 
officials of the [CCL] has slowed down to a full 
stop ••• Perhaps the time has come for a definite 
showdown with the Union, but in view of the 
serious repercussions which would result, it is a 
matter which should be embarked upon with the 
greatest of reluctance. lO? 
Following the SGA dispute, the government decided not 
to reconvene another meeting of the joint committee, but to 
take up the matter of the deteriorating relationship 
directly with congress. I08 "It is absurd to suggest", wrote 
Douglas," that our difficulties have arisen from the 
Government's attitude on the matter of w~ges, hours and 
conditions of work."I09 
However, the hours of work controversy spilled-onto the 
floor of the 1951 CCF convention when a long debate 
surrounded a resolution advocating the forty hour week. The 
problem for the labour movement was that if the resolution 
was defeated, the principle of the reduced work week might 
be killed in the process. After a two hour debate, the 
principle but not the practice of the forty hour week was 
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approved. The resolution was amended so the introduction of 
the reduced work week would only occur if there was 
widespread unemployment. Thus, the convention passed the 
resolution only because it did not have to be implemented, 
and the principle was approved only because the government 
did not have to live up to it. 
At the Premier's request Mosher stopped in Regina on 
his way back from the CCL convention in Vancouver, but the 
Congress president was preoccupied with Conroy's sudden 
resignation , and the meeting was inconclusive. 1lD Douglas 
soon wrote Congress asking for another top level meeting in 
order to revive and restructure the joint committee, " .•• ! 
think the situation here is so serious that unless it is 
dealt with in the course of the next couple of months the 
repercussions are liable to be unfortunate, both for the 
Congress and for the C.C.F.".lll 
The new secretary-treasurer of Congress, Donald 
MacDonald, travelled to Regina in February, 1952, where 
Douglas was most happy to discuss their mutual problems, 
especially since an election was approaching. Douglas and 
MacDonald discussed negotiation procedures, CeL-government 
consultations and political action matters, including CCL 
candidates in the upcoming election, which Douglas appeared 
to welcome. The Premier again suggested rekindling the 
ashes of the joint committee, but nothing was done. 112 
---- -----------------~------
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Congress had been searching for some time to get 
greater trade union involvement in the CCF because they felt 
it would assist them in the industrialized provinces if 
there was something done about showing the labour movement 
that they were in fact a part of the CCF and the Government. 
Moreover, Congress hoped that successful CCL candidates 
would aid the government in approaching labour matters more 
sympathetically. Following the Douglas-MacDonald meeting, 
the CCL decided to become more active in the Saskatchewan 
party, and two industrial trade unionists, Bill Davies and 
Clarence Lyons, began organizing to run for the CCF nomina­
tions in Moose Jaw and Regina. However, their nominations 
were defeated. 113 
Lyons was urged to run in Regina when a third seat was 
added, and his campaign supporters included many non-trade 
unionists. 114 The three candidates (Lyons, Henry Baker and 
Marjorie Cooper) built a huge nominating convention with 
over 1700 voting delegates. llS Unfortunately, he was 
'red-baited' and lost the nomination to Mrs. Marjorie 
Cooper, who was at the time a public representative on the 
Labour Relations Board. 116 
When the incumbent in Moose Jaw, D. H. R. (Dempster) 
Heming, got wind of Davies' intention, he began a 'smear' 
campaign to thwart the challenge. He sent out a circular 
letter to CCF members in which he claimed the CeL were out 
to assume "dogmatic leadership" of the party. "It is very 
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evident," he wrote, "that the ultimate intention is for the 
CCL group to have all the administrative and elective 
positions in the Government in return for their 
support."ll? Davies had been led to believe Heming welcomed 
his nomination, however, he was rudely awakened to the facts 
when he arrived at the nominating meeting to find the hall 
packed with Heming's supporters. While the incident upset 
rank and file CCL supporters, Davies worked hard to re-elect 
Heming. IIB 
MacDonald reacted sharply, as he was surprised at the 
party's reaction to the CCL nominations, and in particular, 
he was alarmed at Heming's tactics. He denounced the 
circular for its "outright lies" and wrote Douglas, "It 
constitutes one of the most contemptible and malicious 
documents that has ever been my ill-fortune to encounter." 
Heming's actions, and the party's 'red-baiting' of Lyons, 
made it difficult, he warned, to implement PAC and marshall 
support for the CCP. To MacDonald, their February meeting 
in which Douglas had appeared to welcome CCL candidates, had 
"lost all significance. nl19 
Industrial relations problems affected the enthusiasm 
some workers felt for the CCP. Nevertheless, despite 
negotiation problems, strikes and the party's anti-CCL mood, 
many of the leading CCL unionists worked hard to re-elect 
the CCP. The labour movement, especially the CCL, still saw 
politics in Saskatchewan as an 'us versus them' proposition, 
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and the legislated benefits of the 'co-operative 
commonwealth' far outweighed their economic problems. 120 
Nor was there an alternative politically, except the return 
to power of an employer dominated opposition party. The 
June 11 provincial election gave the CCF a "tremendous 
endorsation" for a third term. The Liberal opposition had 
been cut from 19 to 11, while CCF seats had risen from 31 to 
42, and the four labour representative in the Legislature, 
all CCF MLA's, were re-elected. The 8FL in particular did 
an "excellent job" in getting trade union support in the 
election, and the Congress applauded the "untiring efforts" 
of Davies in this regard. 12l 
The rights granted to labour by the Trade Union Act 
earned the CCF the political support of workers. Once 
granted the power to protect themselves, workers used it to 
protect themselves from the government, as an employer, when 
the CCF acted as an old-fashioned capitalist. As labour 
relations problems deteriorated into open and bitter 
disputes, the government sought labour's co-operation in 
preventing further trouble. However, the joint committee 
excluded the discussion of immediate collective bargaining 
problems and became a forum where opposing rights were 
raised. Anatgonism developed in their collective bargaining 
relationship spilled over into the committee, and the issues 
of union versus management 'rights' revealed the depth of 
differences between them. Thus, interests and rights 
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clashed, and when disputes in the former alienated the party 
sufficiently, the latter were threatened, as in the case of 
union security and compulsory arbitration. 
Essentially the joint committee was a failure. The 
membership of the committee, drawn from the ranks of 
negotiators, could not agree when they had spent so much 
time in contract talks developing bitterness, animosity and 
suspicion. The government cried 'solidarity' as their 
slogan for a 'social contract', but bargained like 
'hard-boiled reactionaries'. Co-operation was extremely 
limited, and the joint committee was in fact a forum where 
each side raised its rights, which the other would acknow­
ledge, but not agree to. Much of what was discussed only 
reinforced their adversarial roles. 122 
Ultimately, the Ottawa agreement was no agreement at 
all. Disputes, strikes, and tough bargaining did little to 
endear the two sides to one another, and as neither side was 
willing, nor had any reason to expect compromise to be 
beneficial to them, little was accomplished. The joint 
committee failed to respond to the challenge of co-operation 
and Congress was still directly involved in settling 
disputes. 123 The CCL continued to bargain aggressively for 
higher wages and the mutual confidence and co-operation that 
the CCF and Congress expressed to each other at the top was 
not reflected at the bottom. 
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Essentially, workers were interested in a rising 
standard of living, especially since their contracts were 
consistently eroded by inflation. The CCF on the other hand 
were pressed to keep costs down and to control labour. In 
turn, the militant bargaining of the CCL alienated the CCF, 
which contributed to the government's rigid wage policy. 
Unions did not relax their "tough bargaining stance", but 
cannot be faulted for that. In disputes and strikes, press 
statements and the general buildup of bad feelings did not 
help collective bargaining or the overall position of 
organized labour. 124 
With the collapse of the joint committee concept, 
relations between the CCF and CCL reverted to a more 
traditional employer-employee basis. The CCF's third term 
in office was not devoid of industrial relations conflict, 
and the problems generated by the clash of interests in 
bargaining would continue after 1952. An additional problem 
in the worsening relations between the CCF and CCL prior to 
1952 centred upon the Department of Labour. The long 
simmering antagonism between the Minister of Labour and CCL 
employees in the department further complicated relations. 
Early in the CCF's third term in office, problems in the 
Department of Labour arose which threatened relations 
between the CCL and CeF. 
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thorn in the side of the government. They were 
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•.• in there." Lyons Interview, 21 August 1986 
l14.As long as the highly popular Fines and Williams were 
around there was no purpose in seeking a nomination in Regina. 
IIS.Lyons Interview, 21 August 1986. Douglas supported the 
idea of having a woman on the government side of the House, 
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campaigned for Mrs. Cooper, and it was generally known that 
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117.SAB-SFL, Political Action Committee, D.H.R. Heming to 
All CCF Members, 15 April 1952. 
ll8.Davies admitted that one factor in the CCL's nomination 
struggles was the CCF's fear of CCL domination. He stated 
the whole episode reflected the "petit bourgeois 
McCarthyism" of the period. Davies Interview, 7 June 1986 
119.PAC-CCL, Accession 80/289, Vol. 8, Saskatchewan, General 
Correspondence, 1952, MacDonald to Douglas, 7 May 1952. 
l20.A similar argument could be made regarding farmers who 
were the main beneficiaries of the planned economy. That 
is; despite rural discontent with militant unions, farmers 
were reluctant to blame the CCF for conceding wage increases 
in the Power Corporation, for example. During provincial 
elections, the overall importance of the CCF was uppermost 
in the minds of farmers and they would not express their 
displeasure with contract settlements by voting against the 
government. On the other hand, it appears that their 
growing antagonism to organized labour may have informed the 
motives of those anti-labour forces within the party that 
had worked to prevent CCL unionists from gaining the CCF 
nominations in Moose Jaw and Regina. 
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September 22, 1952, Toronto, Report of PAC, p.2l Lyons 
believed the "party apparatus" did not want labour too 
active in the CCF. Because it was a "people's party", the 
CCF leadership would grant labour some reforms, but it would 
not go too far and it did not want labour involved in the 
party. The CCF were afraid labour would become their 
leaders, and that the party would therefore begin to listen 
to them instead. They feared labour would supplant them as 
the party "establishment". Lyons Interview, 21 August 1986 
122.According to Davies, "plants of this kind need some 
pretty good soil and sympathetic treatment; sunshine, 
TLC •.• "; unfortunately, he concluded, there were not enough 
of these ingredients around and the joint commi ttee, "died 
on the vine." He argued that the government did not show 
enough "innovation and imagination", so the whole fault for 
the collapse of the joint committee did not lie with the 
unions. Davies Interview, 7 June 1986 
123.Clarence Lyons complained that the only time Congress 
officials came to Saskatchewan was when there were 
problems. "One of the tragic mistakes ••• that Congress 
made, was not involving local people in any and all 
discussions that they had with the CCF Government. There 
were all kinds of times when they carne in ••• had their 
meetings and left, and we didn't even know they were 
here •••• We were the ones here that had to do the work 
••• and if we were going to be effective in doing our work 
we would have been a lot more effective if we had been 
involved at all levels of these discussions." Lyons 
Interview, 21 August 1986 
l24.Davies Interview, 12 June 1986 
CHAPTER VIr
RELATIONS 1952-1956
The government's private enterprise orientation, and 
its reluctance to legislate further gains for the labour 
movement were reinforced by union rejection of the social 
contract and the collapse of the joint committee. Relations 
between the CCF and CCL became more formal, distant and 
unco-operative, especially after the 'red-baiting' episode, 
and each side blamed the other for their problems. By the 
end of 1952, CCF-CCL relations were at their nadir, and 
labour unrest carne to a head in the 1954-55 wage dispute in 
the Power corporation. Yet, it was not only legislation, 
wage conflict, or friction with the party that caused the 
relationship to deteriorate. Rather, underlining CCF-CCL 
industrial and political problems were relations between the 
Minister of Labour and local unionists. 
Problems within the Department of Labour began early in 
1948, when Ken Bryden expressed a desire to return to 
Ontario and become more actively involved in the CCF party. 
The SFL immediately began to press for H.S.(Hub) Elkin's 
appointment as Bryden's successor as Deputy Minister of 
Labour. l They were concerned that the government would 
appoint Williams' preference, P.W. Haffner, Personnel 
Director for the City of Regina, and a former active member 
of the TLC. Certainly Williams opposed Elkin's nomination 
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because the Minister had not forgotten who had led the 1944 
trade union delegation protesting his appointment and 
demanding his resignation. This confrontation had 
reinforced Williams' "inherent" opposition to industrial 
unionism, and left a lasting resentment with him.2 
The SFL made quiet representations on Elkin's behalf to 
Douglas and others in the government, and they urged 
Congress to make their support known as well. Conroy, 
however, responded cautiously, as he felt the appointment 
was directly related to their 'labour loyalty' to the CCF, 
which in early 1948, was in some doubt.3 The SFL worked 
hard for the CCF during the provincial election campaign and 
following the re-election of the Douglas Government they 
again approached Congress for their . support in securing 
Elkin's appointment. Mosher, however, was personally 
opposed to such interference and the Federation was left to 
act alone. 4 
Without the support of Congress, the SFL redoubled its 
efforts to persuade Douglas and the government of the 
desirability of Elkin's appointment. Bryden supported 
Elkin's nomination, which undoubtedly aided his cause, and 
at the end of March, 1949, Elkin was appointed Deputy 
Minister of Labour. Perhaps the government felt that such a 
key appointment would improve relations with the CCL; 
relations which were in serious trouble following the SGIO 
and coal strikes. The appointment, in any event, satisfied 
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a long-standing grievance of the CCL that they had little 
'clout' in the Department of Labour. 5 
The TLC was naturally upset that their man was not 
chosen, but it was the Saskatchewan Employer's Association 
(SEA) which protested most vigorously, denouncing Elkin for 
his alleged 'bias'.6 However, it was not with the TLC nor 
even with the SEA that Elkin subsequently encountered 
problems. Rather, his own boss, Charlie Williams, expressed 
his displeasure with the appointment by isolating Elkin and 
denying him the prerogatives of the position, and by 
increasing his campaign to force the more 'aggressive' trade 
unionists from the department. 
Hub Elkin brought to the Department of Labour his 
experience as an organizer, a conciliator, and an 
administrator. He was even more persistent and hard-working 
than Bryden, and he continually sought to advance labour's 
rights. As Deputy Minister, however, he refused to play 
Bryden's former role as mediator between the government and 
its workers, and he studiously avoided intervening in 
CCF-CCL bargaining disputes which he felt should have 
settled through 'outside' mediation.? Elkin's refusal to 
become involved in disputes between the government and its 
employees did not help his cause with Williams, who was 
already suspicious and resentful of his new deputy. The 
situation in the Department of Labour simmered from 1949 to 
1952, adding an element of rancour to the increasingly 
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strained CCF-CCL relations. 
Following the deterioration in CCF-CCL relations in 
1951, Douglas appeared to relent to Congress' desires to 
have vvilliams replaced as labour minister. Donald MacDonald, 
Pat Conroy's replacement as secretary-treasurer of the 
Canadian Congress of Labour, met with the Premier in 
February 1952, when they discussed, among other things, 
nominations for the upcoming election. CCL hopes had been 
raised by the Premier's apparent 'promise' to switch the 
Minister to another post, and the unions, "took everything 
that Williams threw at them because they did not want to 
rock the boat before the election."8 
Williams shared the business-oriented views of the 
farmer-dominated CCF and was a popular politican, enjoying 
considerable business support at the polls. He received the 
largest plurality among MLA's in the 1952 election, which 
put him in such a strong position in the government that 
Douglas could not exert the authority he had previously 
held. 
CCL unionists were particularly incensed with Williams' 
rumoured involvement in rejecting CCL nominations for the 
CCF 'ticket', where Congress alleged he capitalized on the 
agricultural background of the cabinet, some members of 
which were "openly hostile" to the CCL. CCF opposition to 
CCL party candidates in 1952 affected CCL-PAC strength and 
support in Saskatchewan, which MacDonald lamented was 
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"rapidly declining". The CCL's political support for the 
CCF was likely to continue to deteriorate unless something 
was done, and make it impossible to organize PAC support for 
the CCF government in the future. "Some of our unions feel 
that their interests are being jeopardized", MacDonald 
stated, "because of our natural reluctance to create any 
un toward s i tuat ion which would cause embar rassment to the 
Government or a rupture in our relationships."9 
However, June passed and nothing was done, and 
William's personal handling of the department, especially 
his personnel practices, led him into quarrels with the 
labour movement. The CCL considered Elkin capable of 
running the department, if he was given the chance, and the 
Minister's actions produced "widespread dissatisfaction".IO 
When Williams was not removed from the labour post in 1952, 
discontent increased amongst CCL unions, who did not feel 
they would ever receive 'justice' from him. 
Williams interfered most in the hiring process where he 
managed to acquire information on applicants to the depart­
ment. Successful applicants were often hired, not for their 
competence, but for their personal loyalty to Williams. 
Aggressive and dedicated trade unionists, especially, but 
not exclusively, from the CCL, often encountered 
"considerable difficulty getting appointments."ll Williams, 
moreover, appeared to favour his personal appointees 
including those allegedly "openly hostile to labour."12 
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Elkin endured the machinations of his boss, and 
struggled with Williams over the prerogatives of a Deputy 
Minister, but steadily lost ground. Like Elkin, there were 
other employees in the department who by their actions, 
annoyed the Minister. This was especially true of employees 
who applied and enforced the labour laws with consistency 
and vigour, and those who persistently advocated further 
labour reforms. 13 Williams allegedly discriminated against 
and fired such employees, regardless of their competence, 
dedication or labour background, and one such case led to 
Elkin's resignation. 
G.L. (Gordon) Quaale, a former carpenter, and a 
dedicated and effective Industrial Standards Officer, was 
discharged by Williams ostensibly for an automobile 
accident. The incident had been reported to the department 
immediately, Quaale had paid for the damages, and at the 
time nothing more was said. Close to a year later, in the 
fall of 1952, Williams fired Quaale, citing the accident as 
sufficient grounds. The carpenters' locals and TLC councils 
protested the dismissal as a "direct attack" on labour, and 
demanded Quaale's immediate reinstatement, and the SFL 
viewed it as part of Williams' plan to force out, "all 
except the sycophants and rightwingers."14 
Williams was taken aback that the TLC would criticize 
him, and he demanded that Quaale "square" the minister with 
those labour organizations that had protested his dismissal; 
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yet he did not promise reinstatement.lS Quaale did not 
feel obliged to 'square' Williams with anyone, and 
complained that his dismissal was the result of the 
Minister's desire to keep certain positions in the 
department as rewards for his "personal supporters".16 
Quaale was a dedicated department employee who 
conscientiously applied the labour laws as he believed they 
had been intended by the CCF. His firing greatly dismayed 
Elkin, as it was unjust and removed from the department 
another hardworking, effective defender of labour's rights. 
Quaale's dismissal led to the resignation of one of the 
labour department's research assistants, W.A. Beckett, a 
former electrical utility employee from Saskatoon. Beckett 
was frustrated that Williams appeared "indifferent, if not 
hostile to" impartial economic research into labour 
matters. 17 Moreover, he was incensed that conscientious 
employees, like himself or Quaale, were "smeared, villified 
[sic] and in other ways discriminated against", while others 
in the department worked "openly and dishonestly" against 
the government's interests but had their mistakes ignored 
and "their misdemeanors cloaked with Ministerial immunity. 
The only requirement is that they be loyal to the Minister 
personally."18 
Following Quaale's dismissal and Beckett's resignation, 
Williams began to interfere more with Elkin's position. 
While circumventing the established lines of authority and 
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directly administering certain branches, Williams 
communicated little with Elkin, isolated him from Cabinet, 
and controlled the department personally.19 Excluded from 
the hiring process, Elkin was forced to endure subordinates 
in whom he had no confidence; and forbidden to attend any 
functions outside the department, including the deputy 
minister's conferences, he was only allowed to speak at the 
annual SFL convention. 20 Williams exerted as much control 
as he could over his deputy, and when Elkin, following CCF 
policy, advised the labour movement of impending 
legislation, he would often get into 'tangles' with his 
superior. 
The last straw carne when the Minister countermanded 
Elkin's direct orders to the branch heads without even 
telling him. The incident reflected the powerlessness and 
increasing frustration of the Deputy Minister; it had in 
fact, Elkin complained, "practically destroyed the last 
vestige of prestige and control" he had in the d partment.2l 
Elkin decided to resign, but was persuaded to remain until 
the SFL convention in late November. In the meantime, SFL 
president Lloyd Gardiner met with Elkin to persuade him not 
to resign. 
Elkin reminded Gardiner that he had stayed on until the 
convention as promised, but he was convinced he would have 
to resign eventually, and the convention was to be his 
forum. After much pleading, Gardiner convinced him to 
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remain within the department, at least temporarily because, 
notwithstanding his talents as a union representative, he 
was more useful to the movement within the department, than 
outside of it. 22 
Word of Elkin's impending resignation produced extreme 
anger within the SFL, and some consternation. Resolutions 
submitted to the executive for consideration at the 
convention denounced the Minister's personnel and personal 
practices in the department, and threatened to discontinue 
labour support for the CCF.23 The resolutions reflected a 
growing movement within the CCL to demand a public 
denunciation of Williams, and his actions and practices in 
the department, and to demand a new labour minister. 
Chappell warned Douglas that the upcoming SFL 
convention might speak to the matter in a "hot-headed 
moment", and he was concerned with the probable political 
consequences. "The opposition to Williams is bitter and I 
suspect with some legitimacy;" Chappell told Douglas, 
you know as well as I do that this is not new, but 
what surprises me is that the talk has been 
confined within the limits of the top CCL 
representatives. I rather think the Leader Post 
would give its eye teeth to hear some of the 
things which were said to me and the fact that the 
newspapers have got nothing yet betokens an 
amazing loyalty on the part of the CCL group to 
the Government. 24 
The SFL executive was split over the resolutions. Some 
were in favour of the resolutions being debated and passed, 
"and let the chips fall where they may." Others, such as Cy 
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Palmer, thought such action by the smallest section of the 
labour movement would be a hopeless gesture, and would only 
serve to rally the TLC to the Minister's side. Davies 
counselled caution because the inflammatory resolutions 
would only "isolate" the SFL from the department, the 
government, and possibly even from Congress. During the 
discussion, Gardiner telephoned MacDonald, who asked that 
the SFL "not upset the apple cart", and try to have the 
resolutions withdrawn, assuring the SFLhe would meet 
Douglas and rectify the situation. 25 This did not appease 
everyone, as such action had been tried in the past without 
success, yet they feared the consequences of an "open­
break".26 
Rather than drafting an alternative, and milder 
resolution, the SFL executive finally agreed the three 
resolutions should be withdrawn, and that Gardiner would 
read a prepared statement to a closed session of the 
convention, which would deal with the issue in general 
terms. Shortly before lunch on Sunday 23 November 1952, 
Gardiner called the convention into a closed session, and 
read his prepared statement. He called on the delegates not 
to debate the resolutions owing to MacDonald's request that 
it be deferred until Congress could act. After his 
statement was completed, he asked the convention to rise and 
observe a minute of silence on the death of CIa president 
Phillip Murray. "The silence was impressive."~ wrote 
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Gardiner, "By the time this was over it was 12 noon and I 
adjourned the convention to dinner. I then breathed a big 
sigh of relief."27 
The 8FL had dodged the bullet, but the real test 
remained. Elkin had only reluctantly agreed to s~ay on 
temporarily, and they would have to persuade him to withdraw 
his resignation, and convince Douglas to remove Williams 
from his post. A month later, at the end of December, 
Gardiner anxiously inquired of MacDonald as to the state of 
the Premier's commitments. He feared some 8FL members had 
had their hopes raised, and were in for a "bitter dis­
appointment". 
I very frankly do not hold much faith in Premier 
Douglas's promises. He is a genuinely fine 
fellow, but I am sorry to say that I have found 
that he is prone to understand the other fellow's 
problem so well that his big and kindly heart 
speaks instead of his head, and that he therefore 
sometimes is liable to promise things he hasn't a 
chance of accomplishing. I don't mean that he 
intends to mislead or bluff people, for I believe 
that he really is sincere at the time he is 
speaking to you. The fact is though, that he 
later finds that he can't accomplis~ what he 
thought he could, and then you go through a period 
of being put off because he hasn't the time to 
attend to it. It is then that one begins. to find 
out what a smart politician he is, and you find 
yourself beginning to wonder, as I have many 
times, whether or not he was really genuine at 
all. This is the depth, but following that one 
sees the great things that this lion-hearted 
little man is accomplishing for our every-day 
people against over-whelming odds and the bitter 
antagonism of powerful interests and you are prone 
to shake your head and say, 'Gosh, I don't know 
what to think.,28 
In early January, 1953, Gardiner and Davies met 
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Douglas, showed him the resolutions, presented some of the 
facts surrounding Elkin's decision to resign, and asked that 
Williams be replaced. They assured the Premier they wished 
to avoid publicity which would damage their PAC program and 
the prestige of the CCF party.29 Douglas suggested that he 
had contemplated a ministerial change, but that he could not 
find a suitable replacement. The Premier had spoken to 
MacDonald on the matter, and had taken it to Cabinet which 
had refused to accept Elkin's resignation and had criticized 
Williams for his running of the department. 3D As well, 
Douglas had spoken to Williams privately and felt the 
minister sincerely wanted a chance to develop 'harmony' in 
the department. The Premier agreed to appoint a committee 
of Cabinet to investigate the matter, but only if the 8FL 
agreed to first see Williams, and only if the Minister did 
nothing. Douglas further suggested that Elkin draft a memo 
to Williams setting out what prerogatives he required to 
stay.3l 
Gardiner and Davies reluctantly agreed to meet 
Williams, w~ich they did that afternoon. They read the 
resolutions to him and spoke of the rank and file 
dissatisfaction which was expressed in a demand for a 
special convention to deal with the issue. Williams reacted 
by stating that the eeL had always been "'after his scalp'" 
ever since 1944, and he pertinently remarked that Elkin had 
led the delegation. 32 The meeting lasted ninety minutes, 
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but the Minister refused to make concessions, calling the 
resolutions the work of a "'few extremists'".33 They 
reminded Williams that they had kept the resolutions from 
the floor of the convention, and suggested that had they 
been 'out to get him', there had been other occasions and 
"countless ways".34 They informed the Minister that they 
would be approaching the Premier to create a Cabinet 
committee to investigate the matter, but Williams warned 
that the SFL would suffer more than he would if they went to 
the press. Needless to say, Gardiner and Davies were 
"ext~emely disappointed" with the Minister's response. 35 
Acting on the Premier's suggestion, Elkin sent a memo 
to Williams dealing with the proper minister - deputy 
relationship, but Williams refused Elkin's conditions, and 
the latter referred the matter to Cabinet. As promised, a 
Cabinet committee was created, and it met with an SFL 
delegation in late February 1953.36 It was evident to the 
delegation that the Minister wanted to get into a "brawl" 
over the contents of the resolutions as Williams immediately 
launched into a litany of problems between the CCL and the 
department. The delegation restrained itself until Williams 
became "particularly repulsive in his remarks and 
attitudes." When Williams declared that had the resolu­
tions made it to the convention floor, the SFL would have 
suffered as much as the government, Douglas was "pretty 
sharp with him", and suggested the SFL should receive 
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cabinet's appreciation for their efforts.37 
However, as the meeting progressed, Douglas retreated 
from his earlier position, and appeared reluctant to back 
the SFL. "I got the unhappy impression", wrote Gardiner, 
"that Mr.Douglas was beginning to cast about for a way of 
backing away from some of his bold statements."38 Even Bill 
Davies, the CCF's strongest supporter in the SFL, felt the 
change in the Premier's attitude was "the most significant 
thing in the whole meeting ••• " .39 Williams appeared 
unrepentant and unconcerned with the bitterness felt in the 
labour movement over his 'poor' administration of the 
Department of Labour, and he pressed the SFL to give him 
copies of the resolutions, presumably, wrote Davies, "for 
the purpose of stirring things up."40 
The situation concerned Congress because it appeared 
the CCF no longer cared for their concerns, and were not 
prepared to act on the Department of Labour problems. 41 
MacDonald visited Douglas whenever he was in Regina, and 
knew the Premier appreciated the need for good relations in 
view of their national political relationship and the effect 
adverse publicity would have. Douglas had admitted to 
MacDonald that he understood the effects Williams' attitudes 
and practices had on CCF-CCL relations, and he had promised 
action up to and including removing the Minister to another 
post. This had been relayed to the SFL, who held Douglas in 
"high esteem", and they in turn worked to prevent an open 
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display of their differences with Williams. However, no 
action was taken, and Congress sensed their unions in 
Saskatchewan were "rapidly losing" confidence in the 
Premier because he had not delivered the promised changes. 42 
Local CCL unions were indeed becoming worried over 
relations with the government, and in the spring of 1953 a 
staff seminar was held to deal with the attitude of CCF 
members towards labour, the resolutions problems and the 
Department of Labour, and the government's legislative 
program. They found themselves in a difficult position, as 
the general membership was becoming more aware of the 
situation and-were "very resentful" of it. 43 The CCL 
representatives were alarmed at the state of union­
government relations, and anxious that Congress and the 
government reach a definite understanding on their 
outstanding complaints. "We are convinced we can no longer 
sit ~n the lid," they told Congress, and they felt something 
positive had to be done to "ward off an 'ultimate 
explosion,."44 
In the spring of 1953, Douglas also reviewed labour 
relations in government operations, and blamed unions for 
not understanding the "financial limits" of crown 
corporations. He argued that unionists had not recognized 
that they competed in a capitalistic market, and they were 
in danger of pricing themselves out of business by making 
"excessive" wage demands which meant increased subsidies not 
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understood the various cost factors in production, which 
included raw materials, equipment, management, and 
marketing. Therefore, Congress told Douglas, their policies 
"[welre not predicated on a superficial analysis of labour 
costs alone."46 
For Congress the basic difficulty was not collective 
bargaining, but "the unsympathetic or hostile attitude of 
the government."47 In particular, Congress complained of 
the attitude of Charlie Williams and the administrative 
practices of the Department of Labour, "which have been 
reflected in almost every aspect of our relationship." The 
situation had become "acute" , they told Douglas, because 
CCF MLA's lacked sympathy with labour generally, and with 
the CCL in particular. This was illustrated by the "open 
opposition" of the CCF to CCL nominations in 1952, by 
Government opposition to the SFL's legislative 
recommendations, and by CCF opposition to CCL personnel. 48 
In all cases, Williams figured prominently. 
MacDonald reminded Douglas that he had promised the 
SFL, on the Premier's assurances, that the Department of 
Labour problems would be rectified. However, Douglas had 
not even alluded to the matter in his letter, and as far as 
Congress was concerned, until the matter was settled, it 
would be difficult to retain, "even the facade of co-opera­
tion and good relationships."49 
The exchange of views between Douglas and MacDonald did 
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not resolve the Department of Labour situation and relations 
remained strained. The SFL believed the outlook for better 
relations "was not optimistic."50 The mood in the SFL was 
indeed unhappy. Gardiner wrote Davies in October, 1953, 
complaining of their relations with the government, and 
vented his anger and disillusionment with their "rabid 
farmer friends" in the CCF . 
•.. The attitude of this farmer government 
doesn't seem to have improved towards the CCL and 
our Federation. I am very frankly becoming very 
tired of their lip-service friendship. They seem 
to think that because Tommy Douglas turns on his 
charm and gives us the treatment with it period­
ically, we will feel automatically that everything 
in the garden is lovely, and that we will 
therefor(sic} stay in line. I am becoming 
convinced that our ceL political action policy has 
had only one result as far as the CCL in 
Sask.(sic} is concerned - - namely a few good 
husky kicks in the face by these people who can't 
be blamed for thinking that we have to take their 
kicks and still come back for more. I believe 
that our National Policy in this matter has been a 
serious mistake. It certainly hasn't paid off 
down east and what does it get us here in the west 
but abuse by some of these half-baked fascists who 
feel secure because of the CCL national policy 
when they kick us around. Oh well, I suppose all 
we can do is keep on trying, and whenever we do 
get into their inner sanctums take those 
opportunities to let it be known in no 
unmistakable terms that everything in the garden 
is a long ways from being 10vely.5I 
Gardiner's comments suggest the depth of frustration felt by 
the CCL towards both the CCF and Congress. Tension between 
CCL locals and the government increased in 1954 when Charlie 
Williams pushed again for the Rand Formula, and the party 
rejected the forty hour work week. 
The 'union security' issue resurfaced early in 1954 
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when the government threatened to amend the Trade Union Act, 
"to make clear its intent beyond all shadow of doubt."52 
The "kernel" of the issue was that dues payment was only one 
condition of union membership, and that it was up to the 
unions, their members and constitutions to decide what 
constituted 'membership'. The SFL felt that unions in North 
America had only formalized what British workers had done 
for many years; enforcing union security by refusing to work 
beside those they distrusted. Ten years had passed since 
the Act had been enacted, and it had worked well in 
thousands of cases with few complaints. Although seldom 
used, the union interpretation of the clause, argued Davies, 
was of "inestimable importance in maintaining the strength 
and authority of a union to represent the workers and 
present a strong front to employers."53 
Congress was not happy that the Government was again 
arguing that the intent of the section was to create the 
Rand Formula, and it hoped the CCF would not act 
precipitously and risk the "terrific repercussions" 
throughout Canada. "If the Legislature had meant 'shall pay 
dues to Union as a condition of employment'," complained 
l-1acDonald, "I credit the members with sufficient intelli­
gence and ability to have said so. In fact, if it had meant 
that, it would not be necessary now for the Premier to 
threaten an amendment to say so."54 
The SFL asked for a full blown top-level conference to 
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deal with the issue, but the govenment was not interested. 
Charlie Williams, in fact, added fuel to the fire by 
publicly attacking the CCL's interpretation of the clause. 
He claimed no TLC organizer had ever "abused or wrongly 
interpreted" the union security clause, but that other 
organizers had. 55 Williams' continual pronouncements on the 
issue made the labour movement very worried that the 
government had decided to pass the amendment. However, the 
issue died down by the summer of 1954 as the government carne 
to realize that the amendment would have political 
repercussions elsewhere. Yet, to the end Williams continued 
to threaten to replace the clause with the Rand Formula, and 
at one point, evidently near defeat, he suggested the Trade 
Union Act be scrapped altogether as unnecessary.56 
The labour movement, led QY the CCL, again tried to 
gain the forty-hour week at the 1954 CCF convention, and 
once more it was approved for implementation during a period 
of high unemployment, but only after a split vote, and only 
after farm labour was specifically excluded. Thus, despite 
repeated efforts to achieve the reduced work week through 
lobbying the government and arguing their case within the 
party, labour came away empty-handed. 
Over the union security issue, the SFL successfully 
argued for the status guo, and undoubtedly the Premier's 
pro-labour sympathies, and political loyalty to the national 
party, played a part in the government's decision to 
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withdraw the proposed amendment. The failure of labour to 
acquire the reduced work week and government attempts to 
weaken union security were owing once again to rural 
pressure on the government to control labour. Wheat 
marketing problems led to a decline in farm income and the 
CCF were pressed to keep costs down while expanding their 
programs. That union security was raised again reflects a 
deterioration in labour relations; relations which were 
further strained by union reaction to the government's 1954 
wage 'freeze'. Once again, events surrounding contract 
negotiations in SPC threatened to result in a decisive break 
in relations between the CCF and CCL. 
Before the re-election of the CCF in 1952, Cy Palmer 
resigned his position as Regional Director for the CCL in 
Saskatchewan after helping lead disaffected Power locals 
from the directly-chartered Electrical Utilities Employees 
Union (EUEU) to the more militant Oil Workers International 
Union (OWIU). Discontent within the EUEU locals began with 
the 1950 contract settlement, which Conroy himself 
negotiated. Palmer successfully defused the situation, but 
the 1951 settlement rekindled dissatisfaction with Congress, 
and a renewed attempt arose to affiliate with the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW-TLC). 
The lengthy 1951 contract negotiations frustrated the 
Union and its request for strike authorization was again 
refused by Congress, who imposed a settlement that the Union 
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viewed as "peanuts."57 It appeared to the Union that 
Congress was placing its political relationship with the CCF 
ahead of the concerns of its own directly chartered locals, 
and they complained that "Something must be done to 
counteract the whispers going around this province that the 
CCL is no longer a militant union but is only a tool of the 
CCF party."58 Considerable discussion ensued within the 
locals about the relative merits of the EUEU versus the 
IBEW. 
Alex McAuslane arrived in the province and persuaded 
Palmer to organize defections to the more radical OWIU.59 
The transfer of the locals was carried out quietly without 
the knowledge of Congress, and Palmer and McAuslane received 
positions with the International union. 60 Palmer resigned 
his position with Congress before he could be fired, and as 
leader of the OWIU in Saskatchewan he was outside their 
direct control. This had implications when another wage 
dispute erupted in SPC in 1954. 
Contract negotiations in SPC began in late April, 1954, 
when the Union presented the Corporation with its proposals 
which included a demand for a seventeen per cent 
across-the-board wage increase. 6l The Corporation replied 
that owing to the worsening general economic conditions in 
the province their revenue from the rural electrification 
program had decreased. This jeopardized their plan to 
expand gas and electric operations because large capital 
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expenditures were to be made without the benefit of 
substantial income. Eventually, SPC argued, the expansion 
would benefit the employees, but in the meantime it needed a 
"healthy operating statement" in order to acquire sufficient 
capital to expand.62 
It was not until 9 June that wages were discussed. The 
corporation's negotiator, J.R. Sarsfield, denied Union 
claims that wages lagged behind the industry norm, and 
added, " ••• do not think we can be expected to lead industry 
in Canada. We cannot ••• ". He argued that the peculiar 
circumstances of Saskatchewan's agricultural economy were 
the main determinant of wages, and that the Union was 
demanding a "more preferred position." Sarsfield denied 
Union claims that it was subsidizing SPC surpluses at the 
expense of their wages, "the truth of the matter is, you are 
asking our customers ••• to subsidize industrial wages from 
agricultural income." He argued that SPC had consistently 
granted "substantial increases" and that the Union's demands 
were "astounding" and "unreasonable". Sarsfield argued that 
wages had risen faster than the cost of living, and that 
owing to the Corporation's expansion policy, it could not 
meet the demands. However, Sarsfield claimed, the expansion 
policy would provide more opportunities for promotion and 
thus workers stood to gain more in the future than the 
seventeen per cent wage increase being demanded. Thus, he 
concluded, there would be no across-the-board wage increase, 
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but only adjustments of specific categories, if the Union 
could justify them. 63 ­
Negotiations continued through to July with the 
Corporation holding firm to its position and the Union 
lowering its demands to a 12 per cent across-the-board 
increase. 64 The CCF's rural constituency frequently had 
been opposed to concessions in wage bargaining in the Power 
corporation, and the economic slump of 1954 led to more 
demands for control over labour. The government's own wage 
comparisons, however, indicated Power workers were "somewhat 
behind" their colleagues in Saskatchewan and Alberta, and 
the Cabinet's advisors admitted that the union was "quite 
conciliatory", and they expected that three per cent would 
settle it.65 Nevertheless, when the provincial Cabinet met 
on 20 July 1954 to discuss negotiations in Power, it was 
agreed that the contract "should be negotiated with the 
understanding that there will be no salary increases except 
for special adjustments."66 Armed with the Cabinet's 
approval of their position, the Corporation refused to 
consider the Unions' wage demands, and talks broke off 
indefinitely. 
In the fall of 1954 negotiations became troublesome not 
only in Power, but in the other government operations as 
well. A Rust blight affected the 1954 harvest, and in some 
parts of the province an early snowfall added to the 
farmers' troubles. Cabinet finally decided that no 
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across-the-board wage increases would be allowed in the 
crown corporations or the rest of the civil service. 67 The 
SCSA-TLC agreed to the government's wage 'freeze' policy, 
and signed an agreement "without any fight or argument" 
which put added pressure on the CCL unions. 68 
The two sides in the Power dispute met in September 
with the Corporation advising the Union of Cabinet's 
decision, and suggesting that OWIU either meet with the 
Cabinet or accept a conciliator. This was entirely 
unacceptable to the union owing to the "painful" experience 
of the 'voluntary' conciliation board in the 1950 dispute. 69 
In October, SPC again offered to make "inequity adjustments" 
on individual categories, but refused the Union's revised 
demand for eight per cent. 70 The Union countered with five 
per cent, but without success. Sarsfield denied Union 
claims that SPC was not bargaining in good faith, arguing 
they were merely resisting the union's "unwarranted" 
demands.71 The Union refused to accept that SPC had 
fulfilled its collective bargaining responsibilities. It 
had tried for six months to reach a settlement, and warned 
the Corporation to begin bargaining in 'good faith' or face 
the consequences. "Frankly, our patience is exhaust­
ed •.. ".72 Talks broke off with each side accusing the other 
of responsibility for the failure. 
A CCL staff meeting on 6 November dealt with the CCL's 
failure to complete any set of negotiations owing to the 
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Cabinet's "official decree" barring wage increases. 73 The 
political implications of the wage 'freeze' were evident to 
CCF trade union supporters and they appealed to Congress for 
assistance in confronting the government's policy. The 
Congress executive discussed the problem and MacDonald 
travelled to Regina and met with Douglas and the Cabinet, 
but the deadlock rernained. 74 
At the SFL's annual convention in late November, 1954, 
an emergency resolution was passed on the deadlocked 
negotiations in crown corporations. The resolution 
condemned the wage 'freeze' as "anti-labour, reactionary, 
and completely dictatorial", and it called on the government 
to rescind the decree and restore "free, unrestricted, and 
realistic collective bargaining."75 Douglas, however, 
denied the government was unfair to its employees in asking 
them to bear their share of the greatly reduced provincial 
income owing to the crop failure. "In light of economic 
prospects for the coming year", he added, "we are simply 
stating that we cannot give what we haven~t got."76 He 
argued that workers had received increases in every year 
since 1944, but that economic conditions forced the 
government to instruct their negotiators not to bargain for 
across-the-board increases. Reduced farm income, he stated, 
equalled $2500 per family farm and, "Under present economic 
conditions no group in the community is entitled to a larger 
slice of a smaller cake."77 
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The CCL responded to the Premier's press statement with 
one of their own, in which they argued that while farm 
income was indeed reduced, the government was at the same 
time boasting of its record financial surplus. The CCL 
complained the policy hurt workers without helping the 
farmers, and was not in line with the CCF's oft-stated goal 
of maintaining or increasing the purchasing power of farmers 
and labour. 78 
The SFL took the matter to Cabinet and a long 
discussion ensued over two days. The convention resolution 
was read to the Cabinet, but Gardiner cautioned that it was 
not a general criticism of the CCF's labour and social 
policies, but only a condemnation of the negative collective 
bargaining policy which had produced deadlocked 
negotiations. The SFL argued for a return to normal wage 
bargaining, 
This is a period in Canada, when organized workers 
are struggling to secure more purchasing power, 
and to maintain decent conditions of work. It is 
a period when the employers have mobilized to 
retrench and to fight unions and social progress. 
In the general situation, the action of the 
Government in this Province, particularly because 
it is the largest Saskatchewan employer of labour, 
assumes basic significance and importance. 
Undoubtedly, other employers in the Province will 
justify their refusal to grant concessions by 
using the government as an example. 79 
The government would not budge but it did agree to meet 
with the OWIU following the SFL's brief. Nothing was 
accomplished, however, as neither side would compromise its 
position. The OWIU refused to reconvene talks until the 
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wage issue had been settled, which the government stood 
firmly against. 
Congress denounced the wage 'freeze' as "arbitrary", 
"ill-advised", and "politically expedient", but denied that 
the policy was in conflict with their recognition of the CCF 
as their 'political arm'. The situation was "regrettable" 
because it negated collective bargaining, and they felt 
their representatives were quite correct in publicly 
protesing the policy. However, the Congress was not 
impressed with the wording of the resolution condemning the 
'freeze', and instructed the CCL representatives that, while 
free collective bargaining should be allowed, they should 
also consider the government's ability to pay.80 Thus, 
while Congress declared their support for the unions against 
the 'freeze', they wanted them to be more conciliatory in 
wage bargaining. 
The OWIU as an International Union had complete 
autonomy in its internal affairs, and Congress could not 
exercise any authority over the Union or its chief 
negotiator, Cy Palmer. In addition, owing to the 
Williams-Elkin feud, and the rejection by union locals of 
the social contract, the Congress had little influence with 
the government. The SPC-OWIU dispute threatened to disrupt 
relations decisively and Congress was helpless to affect the 
situation. 
Over nine months had elapsed since negotiations began 
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and the union should have been preparing for the 1955-56 
contract talks. Without an end in sight, a strike appeared 
quite likely. CCL unions in other government operations 
suspended negotiations owing to the freeze, and some trade 
unionists purportedly called the Trade Union Act a "sham" 
because the crown corporations were ordered not to negotiate 
wage increases. 8l 
At the annual conference of the Saskatchewan-based ONIU 
locals in Regina in January, 1955, the International 
promised to support the local against the wage 'freeze', "to 
the hilt."82 Strike action was recommended if there was no 
settlement of the dispute, and a central strike committee 
and a strike balloting committee were formed. The 
conference, however, decided against an immediate strike 
because it did not want to antagonize public opinion. 83 
The government responded to this strike threat with 
threats of compulsory arbitration, but the OWIU were not 
intimidated, and declared that the CCF would have to pass 
the legislation before they would react.E4 Pressed by the 
public, the CCF were beginning to feel uncomfortable with 
the idea of a power strike in the dead of winter. 85 Douglas 
suspected the union was "bluffing", but if it came to a 
strike, the government was prepared to act. 86 He felt 
Palmer was trying to provoke a quarrel, and blamed him for 
strike rumours surfacing in the press. Such threats only 
aroused fears in the public, which led to more pressure on 
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the government for "legislative action" (i.e., compulsory 
arbitration) .87 
tn Toronto, the national meeting of the Political 
Action Committee of the Congress (PAC-CeL) convened with 
Bill Davies, the permanent SFL representative to PAC, 
insisting upon discussing the situation in Saskatchewan. 
The government, he felt, was being "obdurate", and he 
demanded action be taken or they would face "one hell of a 
dust up" .88 The dispute, if it erupted into a strike, 
threatened the national PAC program, and the PAC delegates 
called upon Congress to effect a reopening of negotia­
tions. 89 In addition, Davies argued with David Lewis over 
lunch and convinced him to contact Douglas to get talks 
going again. 90 
SPC quickly offered to reopen talks, suggesting they 
were prepared to make a wage proposal if the Union would 
agree to a two-year contract. The two sides met on 2 
February, but the corporation's offer amounted to only a few 
adjustments in specific categories, and the Union denounced 
it as "window dressing".91 The talks wandered over familiar 
ground, and arguments over which side was subsidizing the 
other, led nowhere. The Union warned that they were 
"working against time", and complained the Corporation was 
"deliberately" trying to force them out by offering "chicken 
feed".92 
The OWIU had altered its position four times and it 
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expected SPC to begin to bargain in 'good faith', yet the 
company demanded another Union counterproposal. The Union 
considered this an attempt by the corporation to "inflame" 
the situation and continued wrangling over counterproposals 
and whose turn it was, solved nothing. 93 Yet, despite the 
lack of consensus they agreed to continue talking. 
As the deadlock continued the Government became 
increasingly impatient, and on 8 February, Cabinet 
authorized Williams to engage lawyers to draft amendments to 
labour legislation "to meet the threat of a strike of power 
employees in the Province of Saskatchewan."94 The SFL 
learned that such legislation was being drafted, and that it 
would include, according to rumour, provisions to decertify 
unions striking against the law. 95 The Union would not back 
down, however, because it would be the equivalent of having 
the legislation in practice. 96 Thus, the OWIU went ahead 
with a strike vote during the first week in March. The 
result was 89% in favour, and SPC had thir~y days in which 
to reach a settlement or face a strike. 97 
The dispute alarmed the executive of the· federal CCF 
party. They were "deeply disturbed" with the threat of 
compulsory arbi tration. "It would mean the end of the CCF 
support in the labour movement for years to corne for 
example [in] the whole Ontario movement, that is the same 
thing as saying it would mean the end of the CCF." The 
Canadian Congress of Labour felt the Saskatchewan government 
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was somewhat "culpable" in its labour relations, and the 
national party wanted to "avoid having to go on record as a 
movement which had, when it was in power, used the weapon of 
compulsory arbitration." Such legislation, argued CCF 
national secretary Lorne Ingle, would mean the collapse of 
PAC support in Ontario and elsewhere, and the CCF would be 
reduced to "a little rump protest group without either 
influence or resources." Ingle placed his hopes in the 
National and International officers of the union, whom he 
termed as "sympathetic" to socialism, to prevent a "complete 
breakdown".98 
Congress could do little to aid the government with the 
OWIU, but it tried to persuade Douglas not to introduce the 
legislation. The industrial labour movement had always been 
opposed to compulsory arbitration because it negated the 
basic principle of collective bargaining, and failed to 
avert strikes; "••• [I]t is supported principally by only two 
categories of people," Mosher wrote Douglas, "namely those 
who are completely unsympathetic towards organized labour 
and collective bargaining, or those who know little or 
nothing about either."99 Mosher warned that the CCF had 
often led the fight against such legislation, and that its 
passage would have "repercussions".lOO Congress was 
particularly concerned about the 1955 Ontario provincial 
election, and the effect it would have on PAC. Moreover, he 
added, it would jeopardize the probable political policy of 
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the new post-merger labour congress. lOl 
Douglas replied to Congress that it would only be 
introduced as a "last resort". If negotiations broke down 
and the union began a strike vote, then the government, 
Douglas argued, had only three alternatives. They could 
"accede" to the union's wage demands even though they 
contravened the government's wage policy; they could proceed 
with voluntary arbitration; or allow the strike. The 
Premier did not wish to see the public threatened with the 
temporary loss of power or heat. "I don't think any 
government with a sense of responsibility for its people 
could allow such a thing to happen. It is 25 degrees below 
zero this morning .•• ". Furthermore, he argued, no group 
of employees had the right to demand "preferred treatment" 
merely because they worked in a "vital" industry.102 He 
preferred to see the dispute settled without a strike 
through voluntary arbitration, but if talks failed, he told 
r10she r, " •.. I can assure you the Government will take all 
the steps necessary to make a legal strike of power and gas 
employees impossible."103 
Douglas was becoming impatient because he wanted the 
dispute resolved before the Legislature was adjourned. l04 
The two sides were still "miles apart" and the Premier wrote 
to inform Ingle that the legislation was within days of 
being introduced. l05 Douglas appeared resigned to the 
inevitable and wrote Ingle so the national party would not 
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receive "too great a shock when the news breaks in the 
press."106 
Despite the Premier's doom and gloom, a settlement was 
reached. The union offered a proposal to the Premier in 
mid-March which laid the basis for the eventual 
agreernent. 107 They withdrew the strike threat after Douglas 
agreed not to introduce compulsory arbitration, and the 
government agreed to the union's proposal that a specific 
sum be set aside to deal with the basic wage cost, providing 
the Union agreed to David Lewis as a mediator.lOa As the 
past national secretary of the CCF he was acceptable to the 
government, and he was acceptable to the union because he 
had acted as their legal counsel in Ontario. Mediation 
began on April 6, and a settlement was reached soon after. 
The union won an a.3 per cent wage increase, over two years, 
across-the-board.10 9 
Although the Power dispute was settled, unions and the 
government were no less suspicious or bitter towards each 
other. Neil Reimer, International Vice-President of the 
OWIU, complained to Congress about the 'right wing' CCF 
MLA's in the government, and felt there was something 
"drastically wrong" with the CCF approach to labour 
relations. "They bargain in a snied [sic] and sarcastic 
manner" he complained. "[T]he entire line of authority is 
cumbersome and the actual stories are not properly related 
to the Cabinet. They act in an unscrupulous manner at the 
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negotiating table. The Unions obviously do make errors as 
they do with other employers, but I found it extremely 
difficult to get down and talk business with them." He very 
reluctantly concluded the government must have "welcomed" 
compulsory arbitration for public utilities workers, and had 
intended to make the OWIU the "goat", but had backed away 
from fear of committing "political suicide".110 
Reimer stated the Union acted out of consideration for 
CCL policies, and the unionists who were running on the CCF 
'ticket' in the upcoming provincial election. They were 
therefore willing to compromise in order not to embarrass 
either the Congress or their candidates by forcing the issue 
and having compulsory arbitration imposed. III 
Nevertheless, the Power dispute affected SFL-PAC, and 
it was not as effective thereafter. 112 As the 1956 election 
approached, the SFL had "considerable difficulty" finding a 
chairman for PAC, and the SFL executive was forced to 
undertake the task, with R.E. Hale as chairman.113 At the 
national level, the TLC and CCL merged into the Canadian 
Labour Congress (CLC) in April 1956. While the SFL-PAC was 
working for the re-election of the CCF, they received word 
from the CLC that it was hesitant to endorse their partisan 
political campaign. The SFL responded angrily in support of 
the CCF and their PAC program, and Gardiner bluntly informed 
the CLC that PAC would continue to function. " ..• [W]e will 
not tolerate any interference with it."114 The SFL were 
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faced again with the potential loss of their legislative 
gains, and they were not about to dissolve their PAC efforts 
merely to pl~cate the newly merged and officially 'neutral' 
CLC. 
In the 1956 provincial election, the CCF were re­
elected with 36 seats. Art Stone and Charlie Williams were 
returned, but labour representation in the Legislature was 
reduced when Dempster Heming and Harry Gibbs retired. This 
was partly offset by the election of Bill Davies, longtime 
executive secretary of the SFL, as a CCF MLA £or Moose Jaw. 
For the first time the CCL had direct representation in the 
government caucus, and following Davies' election, a "strong 
representation" was made to have him appointed Minister of 
Labour. IIS Douglas appeared to be favourable to the sugges­
tion, yet Davies did not get the portfolio. Williams 
remained popular at the polls, and a change in a ministry 
usually heralded legislative changes; changes which the CCF 
would not consider. 
Yet, while the election of Davies gave the labour 
movement, and the CCL in particular, a voice in government, 
relations did not improve substantially. Despite the CCL's 
political loyalty to the government, the knowledge each side 
gained of the other during the years of collective 
bargaining served to widen a gUlf between the interests of 
labour and the farmer's government. As events unfolded, 
each side began to lose an appreciation of the other's 
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problems as they became exclusively concerned with their own 
economic troubles. Moreover, the gulf generated to 1952 was 
widened owing to recurrent conflict with the Minister of 
Labour which kept 'wounds' fresh. 
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1.Hub Elkin had been elected as the first president of the 
newly created Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, but left 
the position in early 1945 to become Chief Executive Officer 
of the LRB. His duties apart from conciliation matters, 
were to prepare and process certification and other 
applications, and to enforce the Trade Union Act. Here he 
worked closely with both Bill Davies and Ken Bryden in the 
administration of the new industrial relations system. 
2.Elkin had returned to Saskatchewan following the election 
of the CCF in 1944 and was persuaded to lead the delegation 
without having any first-hand knowledge of Williams. The 
incident, recalled Elkin, "didn't exactly get things off to 
a good start", and in retrospect he felt it had been "a real 
boner." Over the years, Elkin acquired the impression from 
Williams that the episode was "sticking in his craw". Elkin 
Interview, 18 November 1986. 
3.SAB-SFL, Correspondence, CCL and International Officers, 
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4.IBID., Mosher to Davies, 27 August 1948. 
5.See: SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, 
Labour Unions and Collective Bargaining Agreements, Lewis to 
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Williams, wanted him fired. Cabinet upheld Elkin's 
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District 26 of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), 
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after 1942, he was Regional Director of Organization for the 
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reflection "of what organized labour in Saskatchewan can 
expect from your administration of the legislation which 
directly concerns them." IBID. 
17. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, 
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
Farmers and workers came together during the Depression 
when their mutual suffering led them to seek joint political 
action against the 'big interests' they saw as their common 
exploiters. Rural sympathy for labour was demonstrated by 
the enactment of the Trade Union Act and the creation of an 
industrial relations framework that encouraged union 
organization and collective bargaining. However, the Act 
was passed by a government inexperienced in labour 
relations, and it was not until unions began to confront the 
government as an employer that farmers and the CCF came to 
understand the new power of organized labour in 
Saskatchewan. 
Union interests in higher wages, better wages and 
improved working conditions clashed with CCF expectations of 
labour solidarity on wages and industrial relations. The 
increasing conservatism of rural Saskatchewan reinforced the 
private enterprise orientation of the government, and wage 
conflict educated the farmers' party upon the finer points 
of collective bargaining. Sympathy for labour's rights and 
interests evaporated in the annual battles fought in 
contract negotiations. Farmers and politicans began to view 
labour as greedy and ungrateful, which spawned demands for 
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restrictive measures against unions, and further labour 
reforms were not forthcoming. 
Caught between the conflicting demands of labour for 
higher wages, and of farmers for controls on unions, Douglas 
responded by offering a social contract on wages. It was 
designed to reduce union militancy, deflect the anti-labour 
demands of farmers, and to produce voluntary wage restraint 
in government industry. The joint committees established to 
develop union-government co-operation, however, were swept 
away by bargaining conflict and labour unrest, as CCF-CCL 
industrial relations exhibited the usual problems found in 
the labour-capital struggle. The mutual confidence evident 
when Congress and CCF leaders met to resolve their 
differences was not reflected in union-government relations 
at the bottom where strong union bargaining was matched by 
government obduracy. 
Strikes, disputes and conflict in the Department of 
Labour at times threatened to disrupt CCF-CCL political 
relations at the national and provincial levels. Union 
militancy provoked an anti-labour response among some 
CCF'ers in the province, but the intervention of David 
Lewis, Pat Conroy and Aaron Mosher resolved the immediate 
problems. However, these voices of compromise and 
moderation only prolonged the inevitable quarrels in most 
cases, and their attempts to encourage union-government co­
operation collapsed with the joint committee concept in 
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1951. 
A genuine working partnership was impossible given the 
irreconcilable interests held by the opposing sides, and 
political co-operation did not lead to employer-employee 
harmony. Local unions had little or no political 
alternative but to support the CCF, and government leaders 
understood this and acted upon it. This is not to suggest 
that workers would have deserted the CCF at the polls. 
Rather, they came to see that the intervention of Congress 
in provincial disputes was not in their interests when it 
served only to reinforce the government's bargaining 
position. Local unions had few quarrels with the CCF as a 
political party of reform, but as an employer the CCF 
Government left much to be desired. Unions rejected the 
social contract because their interests diverged from the 
government and from Congress headquarters. The political 
relationship of Congress and CCF leaders deflected local 
union-government disputes to a level remote from the sources 
of the conflict. Agreements reached at that level did not 
treat the causes, but only the symptoms, of industrial 
relations conflict. In fact, the political relationship 
between Congress and Government leaders eventually led to 
local union questioning of the efficacy of Congress 
policies. 
Union-government relations in Saskatchewan from 1944 to 
1956 were marked by labour disputes, wage conflict and 
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confrontations with Cabinet ministers. The struggle between 
ceL unions and the government was symptomatic of the 
irreconcilable interests of labour and management. Labour 
legislation, joint committees and political interests could 
not reconcile the opposing interests the two sides held, but 
could only influence industrial relations in the direction 
of compromise and stability. 
As long as industrial relations was a struggle for 
power, the two sides would be foes. Yet, as this thesis has 
illustrated, industrial relations opponents can remain 
political friends. The CCF's labour and social reforms 
should not be underestimated, for they earned .the government 
the consistent political support of organized workers. 
However, as David Lewis accurately pointed out to Tommy 
Douglas in 1944, the Trade Union Act was not enough, and 
the attitudes and practices of the government prevented 
closer relations with their unions. It would have taken a 
great deal more imagination, innovation and power-sharing 
than the CCF were willing to attempt for industrial 
relations to have developed along co-operative lines. 
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APPENDIX I 
TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP IN SASKATCHEWAN 1930­1956 
Year Total a. TLC CCL Independent Others 
1930 9565 
1931 8962 
1932 7344 
1933 6714 
1934 6478 
1935 6752 
1936 7417 
1937 8010 
1938 9426 
1939 10,254 
1940 8725 
1941 9116 
1942 9715 
1943 11,124 
1944 16,557 6996 b. 3824 b. 
1945 19,290 11,546 b. 5897 b. 
1946 23,895 13,691 7309 2895 
1947 25,593 14,768 7907 2918 
1948 26,940 14,750 9316 2874 
1949 27,509 15,273 9261 2975 
1950 27,690 13,718 9301 4590 
1951 30,326 15,734 10,117 4475 
1952 31,611 16,446 10,684 4481 
1953 34,695 18,328 11,476 4891 
1954 38,754 19,967 12,927 3582 2278 
1955 40,124 20,203 13,778 3768 2375 
1956 42,145 32,340 c. 4399 d. 3127 2329 
SOURCE: 
a. - Government of Saskatchewan, Department of Labour, 
Thirtieth Annual Report, 1973 
b. - These figures are low estimates taken from certification 
applications granted by the Saskatchewan Labour Relations 
Board as cited in Government of Saskatchewan, Department of 
Labour, Annual Report, 1944; 1945; and 1946. 
c. - Unions affiliated to the Canadian Labour Congress. By 
comparing earlier Saskatchewan Department of Labour Reports 
with the post merger findings, the following affiliation 
figures are arrived at for 1956: TLC - 21,792; CCL - 14,897. 
d. - Unions chartered by the Canadian Labour Congress. For 
example, United Civil Servants of Canada; Saskatchewan 
Sanatorium Employees' Union; Canadian Hospital Employees' 
Union; University of Saskatchewan Employees' Union, and 
Saskatchewan Insurance Employees' Union. 
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APPENDIX II
ORGANIZED LABOUR AND THE SASKATCHEWAN LABOUR FORCE 
YEAR Population Labour Force Percentage of Population 
1911 492,432 202,522 41.4 
1921 757,510 266,975 35.2 
1931 921,785 388,911 42.2 
1936 931,547 346,604 37.2 
1941 895,992 315,846 35.3 
1946 832,688 310,486 37.2 
1951 831,728 302,112 36.3 
1956 880,665 308,000 34.3 
Non- %Total Organized % Non- %Tota1 
YEAR Agricultural Workforce Labour Agric. WorkForce 
1931 134,439 34.6 8962 6.7 2.3 
1936 129,389 37.3 7417 5.7 2.1 
1941 128,430 40.7 9116 7.1 2.9 
1946 146,521 47.2 23,895 16.3 7.7 
1951 154,532 51.2 30,326 19.6 10.0 
1956 164,000 53.3 42,145 25.6 13.8 
YEAR Urban Population Organized Labour % UrbanPop. 
1946 208,872 23,895 11.4 
1951 252,470 30,326 12.0 
1956 322,003 42,145 13.1 
SOURCE: 
Urquhart, M.C., (ed.), Historical Statistics of Canada, p.14i 
Government of Saskatchewan, Economic Advisory and Planning 
Board, The Statistical Yearbook,1947, p.206-208i and 
Saskatchewan Economic Review, No.12 September 1958 
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APPENDIX III 
CHANGES IN THE LABOUR FORCE 
Rural 
YEAR Total Population Urban Rural Farm Non-Farm 
1946 832,688 208,872 623,816 443,499 180,317 
1951 831,728 252,470 579,258 389,279 180,979 
1956 880,665 322,003 588,662 360,651 198,011 
% Change 
1941-46 -7.1 +8.6 -11.4 -13.3 -6.3 
1946-51 -0.1 +20.9 -7.1 -10.2 +0.4 
1951-56 +5.9 +27.5 -3.6 -9.5 +9.4 
Non-Agric. Union 
YEARS Population Workforce Membership 
% change 1931-1936 +10.0 -3.8 -17.2 
% change 1936-1941 -3.8 -7.4 +22.9 
% change 1941-1946 -7.1 +14.1 +162.1 
% change 1946-1951 -0.1 +5.5 +26.9 
% change 1951-1956 +5.9 +6.1 +38.9 
Organized Labour 
YEAR Total TLC %Tota1 CCL %Total 
1946 23,895 13,691 57.3 7309 30.6 
1951 30,326 15,734 51.9 10,117 33.4 
1956 42,145 21,792 51.7 14,897 35.3 
SOURCE: Government of Saskatchewan, Economic Advisory and
Planning Board, Saskatchewan Economic Review, #12 March 1958
1944 
1945 
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APPENDIX IV 
STRIKES IN SASKATCHEWAN 1944 - 1956 
Year Strikes Workers 
Involved 
Mandays 
Lost 
CCL Unions 
on Strike 
1
5
48 24 o
1310 1736
1946 4 108 1914
1947 15 1818 42,908
3 
2
7
1948 9 679 12,333 4 
1949 6 425 4548 4 
1950 4 197 1200 2 
1951 5 216 2885 4 
1952 8 1284 15,182 2 
1953 8 744 18,283 3 
1954 7 529 21,808 4 
1955 3 65 2329 3 
1956 6 240 2932 2 
SOURCE: All figures from Government of Saskatchewan, 
Department of Labour, Annual Reports, 1944 to 1956. 
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APPENDIX V 
INCOMES IN SASKATCHEWAN 1941 - 1956 
Cash Income From Net Farm Wages and 
Year Farm Products a. Income b. Salaries c. 
(000,000) (000,000) (000,000) 
1941 159.7 94 123 
1942 195.4 136 131 
1943 327.4 200 143 
1944 543.2 393 161 
1945 409.6 230 173 
1946 387.6 253 198 
1947 428.5 304 213 
1948 534.0 429 255 
1949 566.1 441 262 
1950 412.5 327 276 
1951 636.2 619 311 
1952 710.1 642 349 
1953 743.4 553 386 
1954 456.6 219 406 
1955 425.0 386 429 
1956 598.0 534 501 
SOURCE: 
a. - Government of Saskatchewan, Economic Advisory and 
Planning Board, Saskatchewan Economic Review, i 12, March 
1958, p.9 
b. - IBID., p. 4 
c. - IBID. 
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APPENDIX VI
AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS IN SASKATCHEWAN 1947-1956 
YEAR A. B. C. 
1947 $ 35.35 84.4 $41.88 
1948 38.76 96.9 40.00 
1949 41.50 100.0 41.50 
1950 42.86 102.2 41.94 
1951 46.88 111.7 41.79 
1952 50.90 112.8 45.12 
1953 54.77 113.1 48.43 
1954 56.21 114.1 49.22 
1955 58.02 114.6 50.63 
1956 61.66 115.8 53.25 
A. - Average Weekly Wages and Salaries 
B. Consumer Price Index for Regina and Saskatoon 1949 = 100 
C. - Average Real Weekly Wages 
Average weekly wages, and average real weekly wages are an 
industrial composite. "Real" wages refers to the approximate 
measure of purchasing power. 
SOURCE: 
Government of Saskatchewan, Department of Labour, Twentieth 
Annual Report, 1963, p.ll 
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Year 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
Non-agricultural 
Workforce (000) 
139
142
146
148
149
151
152
154
159
163
168
173
178
183
189
194
200
206
212
APPENDIX VII 
IN SASKATCHEWAN 1944-1962 
Unemployed 
2233
3105
6312
5683
5267
6016
7606
6571
5563
6004
9049
11,181
9865
11,167
15,369
14,320
15,969
17,215
15,781
Unemployment 
Sask. 
1.6% 
2.2 
4.3 
3.8 
3.5 
4.0 
5.0 
4.3 
3.5 
3.7 
5.4 
6.5 
5.5 
6.1 
8.1 
7.4 
8.0 
8.4 
7.4 
Rate
Can.
1.7%
3.0 
5.3 
3.5 
3.6 
5.0 
6.2 
4.5 
5.6 
6.2 
8.3 
7.5 
6.3 
8.1 
10.9 
8.8 
10.1 
9.8 
8.5 
SOURCE:
Government of Saskatchewan, Department of Labour, Nineteenth 
Annual Report, 1962, p.16 
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APPENDIX VIII
RESULTS FOR SASKATCHEWAN, ONTARIO AND FEDERAL ELECTIONS 
1943-1958 
PARTY STANDINGS IN SASKATCHEWAN ELECTIONS 
1944-1956 
1944 1948 1952 1956 
CCF 47 31 42 36 
Liberal 5 19 11 14 
Conservative 0 0 0 0 
Social Credit 0 0 0 3 
Other 3 2 0 0 
PARTY STANDINGS IN ONTARIO ELECTIONS 1943-1955 
1943 1945 1948 1951 1955 
CCF 34 8 21 2 11 
Liberal 15 14 14 8 3 
Conservative 38 66 53 79 84 
LPP 2 2 2 1 0 
Ind.Libera1 1 0 0 0 0 
PARTY STANDINGS IN PARLIAMENT 1945-1958 
1945 1949 1953 1957 1958 
CCF 28(18)* 13(5) 23(11) 25(10) 8(1) 
Liberal 125(2) 190(14) 170(5) 105(4) 48(0) 
Conservative 67(1) 41(1) 51(1) 112(3) 208(16) 
Social Credit 13(0) 10(0) 15(0) 19(0) a 
Other 12(0) 8(0) 6(0) 4 (0) . 1(0) 
* - Elected from Saskatchewan 
SOURCE: 
Urquhart, M.C., (ed.), Historical Statistics of Canada; and 
Morley, J.T., Secular Socialists 
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